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 Data from the 1999-2001 World Values Survey (WVS), the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook 
are used to assess individual and national level explanations of environmental attitudes 
among 34,555 respondents from 27 countries. Three analyses are presented: an 
individual-level analysis that examines the previously assessed correlates of 
environmental attitudes; a national-level analysis of the relationship between a variety of 
national-level characteristics and aggregate environmental attitudes; and a multilevel 
(HLM) model assessing these effects simultaneously. Guided by the New Ecological 
Paradigm (NEP), the post-materialist thesis and the World-Systems Perspective national-
level characteristics are assessed in the context of the core-periphery hierarchy of the 
modern world-system. The findings indicate overall that most of the variation in 
environmental attitudes can be accounted for by individual-level characteristics, with 
only about 3% being accounted for between countries. The interaction between the two 
levels suggests that accounting for national-level variation may be a necessity in 
contemporary environmental research.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Human behaviors have had a devastating impact on the condition of the natural 
environment. Pollution has led to a decline in the health of humans as well as for a 
variety of flora and fauna. The continued devastation of the land through over harvesting 
of natural resources, poor mining practices, and a host of other means has led to a decline 
in the potential quality of life for current and future generations. Many individuals, 
groups, nations, and larger inter-governmental organizations have made efforts to end 
such shortsighted practices. Some of these efforts have been relatively successful, while 
others have not. Unfortunately, even the best efforts of individuals, groups, or nations are 
often ineffective if other individuals, groups, or nations fail to make positive effort to 
reduce the human footprint on the planet.  
Of the major environmental problems, those related to air pollution seem to get 
most of the attention. There may be a good reason for the attention, as the World Health 
Organization (2006) estimates that about 2 million deaths occur worldwide on an annual 
basis due directly to air pollution. Some of these pollutants, called “greenhouse gases” 
allow sunlight to pass through, but prevent infrared radiation (heat) from escaping the 
earth’s atmosphere. The result is typically called the “greenhouse effect” in that it 
operates in much the same way as a greenhouse, by causing the temperature of the earth 
to increase. The outcome of the “greenhouse effect” is an increase in the average surface 
temperature of the earth. There exists some controversy about whether the greenhouse 
effect is actually causing the changes in temperature it has been reported to, but 
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according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2002; 2007) the evidence 
is clear.  
Other types of environmental problems are important as well, though many of 
them are given much less attention than global warming. One example is water pollution. 
Freshwater scarcity is already a big problem in many parts of the world, and is likely to 
become one of the most pressing issues of the 21st century (World Resources Institute 
1998). Estimates indicate that in the mid-1990s, about 40% of the world’s population was 
already suffering from severe water shortages (United Nations Environment Programme 
2002). The primary causes of such shortages are population growth, increases in irrigated 
agriculture, and industrial development.  
In addition to pollution in the water and air, even our soil is experiencing 
degradation. By 1990 agricultural practices had degraded 562 million hectares of the 
world’s cropland (Oldeman 1994). This represents about 38% of the earths original 1.5 
billion hectares of cropland. The major causes of land degradation include poor 
agricultural practices (overgrazing, over cultivation, water logging, and salinization), 
mining, fire, development, and deforestation. Approximately half of the forests that 
existed on earth when humans first began to practice agriculture are gone.  Between 1980 
and 1995, an area the size of Mexico was lost to logging, fire, and development (Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 1997).  
There are many causes of these environmental problems, but most of them are of 
concern specifically because of the human component of the problems. Population 
growth plays an important role in the causes of these problems, and even more 
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importantly on the intensity with which they affect us. Technology can be important for 
solving many of these problems, though it can surely be implicated in causing some of 
them as well. Fossil fuel that is burned to power automobiles, trucks, and buses 
contributes to air pollution. In fact, the pollution from cars in Austria, France, and 
Switzerland caused more deaths than those resulting from automobile accidents (Reaney 
1999). Another problem that comes with technology has to do with the disposal of the 
components of that technology. Besides the problem of disposing of car tires, toxic fluids, 
and plastics, many technological devices contain hazardous waste like mercury and lead, 
which can be deadly if disposed of improperly.  
The evidence is clear that environmental degradation continues to have severe 
negative effects on the planet and its inhabitants. Though attitudes and behaviors are 
rarely perfectly correlated with each other, having an understanding of these problems, 
and being concerned about them are essential in promoting efforts to change them. There 
has been much research focused on the conditions in which people develop concern for 
the environment, and a desire to behave in an environmentally responsible manner. Thus 
far, much of this research has focused on the individual, primarily through social surveys. 
The knowledge gained from this research has been useful in developing a better 
understanding of the demographic, social, and cultural conditions related to concern and 
environmental attitudes. Other studies have focused instead on the structure of nations in 
order to discover how the social structures of a nation impact the environment. This 
suggests that there are structural variations between societies when we compare them 
from a macro-perspective. The purpose of the present study is to examine the combined 
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roles of the factors operating at both the individual level and the national level in the 
formation of environmental concern and environmental attitudes.  
In order to understand the reasons for more social change in some areas compared 
to others, we must examine both the individual and national-level factors that contribute 
to environmental attitudes. Environmental sociologists have developed a large and wide-
ranging body of literature on the topic of environmental concern (Dunlap et al. 2000). In 
much of this research, concern for the environment has been treated as a significant 
predictor of environmental behaviors.  
Unfortunately, tests of theories to explain variation in environmental attitudes 
have not been very successful at explaining where and when positive change in the 
human-environment relationship will occur. My argument is that this failure is primarily 
because past studies have not simultaneously included both individual-level and national-
level factors in the analyses. Researchers have examined specific demographic and 
cultural factors such as: age (Jones and Dunlap 1992), race (Mohai 1980; Mohai and 
Bryant 1998), political orientations—whether one is politically liberal or conservative 
(Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), religious beliefs (Sherkat and Ellison 2007; Greeley 1993), 
gender (Mohai 1992), education (Jones and Dunlap 1992), and income (Van Liere and 
Dunlap 1980) , while others have examined more structural types of factors such as 
political structure, economic system, and the availability of certain types of 
infrastructure—recycling centers, for instance (Schultz and Oskamp 1996). These 
strategies have both had limited success in the understanding of human attitudes about 
the environment.  
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While researchers have, to varying degrees, noted the value of examining 
individual or structural factors influencing environmental attitudes, they have not 
attempted to combine both types of factors into their analyses in any meaningful way. In 
the following chapters, I examine the confluence of individual and national-level factors 
which influence both national- and individual-level environmental attitudes. I will use 
several statistical techniques in order to examine both individual-level and national-level 
characteristics separately as well as combined.  
Many researchers have examined the relationship between attitudes and 
behaviors. This body of research is important in that we often assume that by attempting 
to understand attitudes we are implicitly somehow able to understand corresponding 
behaviors. While in some instances this may be true, the literature on the attitude-
behavior relationship makes no attempt to claim that this is true in all instances. Some 
research of note in this area has suggested that attitudes do not predict behavior, but they 
can predict the intention to behave in a certain way (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen and Fishbein 
1980; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Fishbein 1967). Intentions may not always predict 
behaviors, however, due to a variety of structural constraints that may exist in a given 
situation (Stets and Biga 2003). For example, even when we would like to recycle in an 
effort to reduce household waste, if the infrastructure, opportunity, or financial resources 
required to recycle are not available, we are not likely to do so (Oskamp and Schultz 
1996).   
It is therefore important to study both individual and national levels of pro-
environmental attitudes, but it is also necessary to examine individual and structural 
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factors that may influence these attitudes. In other words, individual-level characteristics 
have more of an effect on the attitudes of individuals, and structural factors have more of 
an effect on the attitudes of aggregate levels of these individuals. For example, some 
research has noted that people with certain political affiliations often have higher levels 
of environmental concern (Dunlap 1975). While this may be helpful when we look at the 
individual, many of the challenges we face with regards to the environment require not 
only a change in the attitudes of individuals, but also changes at the national level. With 
the exception of several world-systems researchers (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Chew 
1997; Burns, Davis, and Kick 1997; Bartley and Bergesen 1997), it seems that many 
environmental social scientists have not come to terms with this reality.  
By simultaneously assessing individual and national-level predictors of 
environmental attitudes—whether one has a generally positive or negative view of the 
human-environment relationship—we not only gain a more complete understanding of 
the human-environment relationship, but also a more complete understanding of the 
sources of influence and their impacts on both individual and aggregate levels of  
environmental attitudes. Building on past studies that focus only on individuals or only 
on structures, my goal is to provide an integrated individual and national-level model of 
environmental attitudes. 
To accomplish such a task, I use a variety of techniques. Indeed these tools will 
be specific to each of three tasks necessary for this undertaking. While each particular 
analysis will be useful on its own, only by examining the results of all three analyses in 
context can the bigger questions be properly answered.  
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In Chapter 2, I review the theoretical and substantive literature on environmental 
attitudes, post-materialism, and the world-systems perspective. In examining 
environmental attitudes at the individual level, I review the literature on the New 
Ecological Paradigm and post-materialism. In examining environmental attitudes at the 
national level, I incorporate the world-systems perspective and examine the literature 
both broadly and in greater detail by examining its origins and applications, as well as its 
specific application to the issue of environmental degradation. Lastly, I frame the three 
studies in Chapters 3-5 in the context of post-materialism and the world-systems 
perspective.  
In Chapter 3, I examine individual environmental attitudes in a cross-national 
context. The examination of individuals in this context allows for a clearer picture of the 
variety of factors associated with environmental attitudes. Also, the nature of cross-
national analyses allows one to gain a more complete understanding of the undoubtedly 
complex relationships between the many individual-level characteristics that contribute to 
pro-environmental attitudes. Another advantage of this technique is that it gives us a 
picture of the variation between different nations. In order to accomplish this, I use 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic regression techniques, as well as other uni- 
and multi-variate statistical methods. The data comes from the 1999-2001 World Values 
Survey.  
In Chapter 4, I focus on assessing the national-level factors that affect aggregate 
environmental attitudes. This analysis is necessary in order to complete the analysis in 
Chapter 5. However because there are a variety of different factors that have been 
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examined in previous research, it is also required in order to examine the variety of 
potential variables involved. Understanding the structural factors that may influence pro-
environmental attitudes is important because it allows for a more complete picture of 
various aspects of life in a given nation that may help or hinder the development of pro-
environmental behaviors. In order to accomplish this, I use aggregated data from the 
1999-2001 World Values Survey, as well as national-level data from the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). I use a 
variety of uni- and multi-variate statistical techniques to examine the national differences 
in environmental attitudes. This allows me to more easily discern how structural 
constraints and national-level characteristics influence aggregate levels of environmental 
attitudes.  
In Chapter 5, I examine the dual influences of individual characteristics and 
national-level factors on individual environmental attitudes. This third analysis combines 
the analyses from the individual-level analysis (Chapter 3) and the national-level analysis 
(Chapter 4) by combining the separate individual and national-level factors into a 
multilevel model. In order to accomplish this, I have created Hierarchical Linear Models 
in which the level 1 (individual-level) variables are the individual factors as examined in 
Chapter 3, and the level 2 (national-level) variables are the national-level characteristics 
examined in Chapter 4. The most significant contribution that comes from this analysis is 
a formalized model of the individual and national-level factors that are necessary for 
understanding environmental attitudes within and between countries. Put differently, I 
assess whether national-level differences in environmental attitudes stem from the 
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characteristics of the nation and its relationship to other nations, or from the 
characteristics of individuals within the nation.  
In Chapter 6, I conclude by reviewing and discussing the findings of each study, 
as well as placing them in the context of the world-systems perspective, post-materialism, 
and the New Ecological Paradigm. I also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of this 
research and assess potential future directions for this research.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL ORIENTATION 
The world-systems perspective (Chase-Dunn 1989; Wallerstein 2000) has been 
widely used in environmental sociology. Past research, however, has tended to focus 
solely on macro-level characteristics of nations. While environmental sociologists have 
looked at environmental problems in both macro- and micro- contexts, they have not 
attempted to examine environmental issues from both levels simultaneously.  
The research presented here examines environmental attitudes at both macro- and 
micro- levels. In an individual-level approach, such as Dunlap et al.’s (2000) New 
Ecological Paradigm (NEP), researchers have found that pro-environmental attitudes 
have become more common across the social spectrum in recent decades. While the 
originators of the NEP concept make no concrete claims about the reasoning behind such 
a trend, it has been suggested by others that the trend is due to the availability of 
information regarding the types of environmental problems we face both in the local 
context, but also in the global context (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Additionally, the post-
materialist perspective, shares many similarities with the NEP. First, both view the 
increase in environmentalism as a response to a generational shift in social attitudes. 
Finally, both generally focus on individual attitudes, though post-materialism research 
often incorporates national level attributes. The NEP suggests that environmental 
attitudes should be relatively consistent across social classes, whereas the post-materialist 
thesis suggests that environmental attitudes should be stronger among the higher social 
classes.  
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Building on these approaches, the world-systems perspective (WSP), views the 
condition of the natural environment as an unfortunate casualty of the development, 
growth, and spread of the singular capitalist world-system, and the various structural 
factors that are dependent upon such an arrangement. As such, individual level 
environmental attitudes are formed not only by the social and demographic 
characteristics of the individual, but also by the contextual environment in which they 
live.  
In this chapter, I describe these perspectives with respect to their relationship to 
one another and to the environment. Additionally, the research objectives of the present 
study are explained within the context of the world-systems perspective, post-materialism 
and the NEP.  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 
Concern for the environment and public knowledge of environmental problems 
are necessary to begin to solve environmental challenges. Because many environmental 
problems were caused by human activities, human behavior is required to solve them. 
Researchers studying environmental behavior have rarely examined the relationship 
between attitudes and behavior in any direct context. Instead, they have examined various 
aspects of the behaviors themselves, such as examining recycling as a function of the 
effort required by individuals (Schultz and Oskamp 1996), or by examining the outcomes 
of elections in terms of the similarity between the voters and the candidates’ views 
regarding the environment (Gill, Crosby, and Taylor 1986). Others have adopted various 
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mostly psychologically focused theoretical frameworks to explain human behavior that 
contributes to environmental problems, rarely identifying the social components of 
environmental problems. My goal is to understand both individual and national-level 
characteristics associated with environmental attitudes. I assume that environmental 
attitudes should, at least indirectly be associated with environmentally friendly behavior.  
In the last few decades there has been a significant increase in interest among 
Americans on the state of the natural environment (Bell 2004; Kalafatis, Pollard, East and 
Tsogas 1999; Krause 1993; Ottoman, Stafford, and Hartman 2006). Especially in recent 
years, even advertisers have exhibited some change towards greener tactics (Pujari and 
Wright 1995). This change does not necessarily reflect a higher level of environmental 
awareness, as suggested by Peattie and Crane (2005), though it does play an important 
role in the level of exposure of certain populations to this issue. Yet the relationship 
between awareness of the problem and acting on potential solutions has not been 
sufficiently examined. In other words, even though there appears to be a steady upward 
trend in environmental consciousness (Kalafatis et al. 1999) and an overall increase in 
awareness of the potential solutions to these problems, little is known about why some 
people are acting “green” while others are not. Because macro- and micro- approaches to 
this question have only been marginally useful, a new approach is required.  
The New Environmental Paradigm (also referred to as the “paradigm shift thesis,” 
the “alternative environmental paradigm,” or the “ecological social paradigm”) is, put 
simply, a theory about paradigm change. The NEP proposes, in contrast to the post-
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materialist view that only the wealthy are concerned about the environment (Inglehart 
1995).  According to Bell, the NEP can be explained as follows (2009:173):  
Rather than seeing environmentalism as an affectation of the comfortable, this 
theory suggests that in response to discrepancies between evidence of 
environmental threats and ideologies that do not consider environmental 
implications, people are slowly but steadily adopting a more environmentally 
aware view of the world. 
 
In other words, people, regardless of background no longer see themselves as exempt 
from the environmental implications of their behaviors. This represents an important 
change from the previous belief that human behavior was not directly responsible for 
environmental problems. Researchers using the NEP have argued that what the theory is 
intended to examine is the process in which people’s values about the environment catch 
up with their beliefs about it (Bell 2009). From this, one can assume no differences in 
environmental attitudes among social classes or income levels. 
This view should be seen in contrast to competing perspectives regarding the 
nature of environmental concern. The Human Exemptionalism Paradigm (HEP) 
(alternatively, the “dominant social paradigm,” or the “technological social paradigm”), 
suggests that humans are “exceptional creatures who are able to overcome environmental 
limits,” and are therefore exempt from the rules which apply to all other beings on earth 
(Bell 2009: 174). Additionally, because humans are capable of developing such high 
levels of technology, they are able to master nature. An example of this view is apparent 
when one considers the use of dams in order to store, re-route, or stop water in order to 
benefit human societies, regardless of the consequences to wildlife and ecosystems. 
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Another useful perspective is the post-materialism thesis. This thesis applies 
much more broadly than just the environment and attitudes towards it, and is intended to 
suggest that a shift has taken place between materialist and post-materialist values. 
Inglehart (1995; among others) argues that newer generations are less concerned with 
“economic and physical security” issues (material values) and are more concerned with 
“freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life” (post-material values). Specifically, 
those with more wealth, or higher social class should have higher pro-environmental 
attitudes.  
Ingelhart (1981) describes the concept of post-materialism as a shift in values 
with two central hypotheses. First, “a scarcity hypothesis,” proposes that people are most 
concerned about those things which are in short supply. For instance, as in economics, 
people generally value those things which they see as the most central to their immediate 
survival, particularly when those things are in short supply. This includes food, clothing, 
shelter, and water. Second, “a socialization hypothesis,” which proposes that a shift in 
values from materialist (concerned mainly with survival) to post-materialist (concerned 
with higher-order values) is a process of socialization and as such, it responds slowly to 
changes. Based on this perspective, one should expect to observe higher pro-
environmental attitudes among wealthier and more educated people, and also, relatively 
consistent findings among populations who have shared in this process of socialization.  
International survey responses suggest that according to respondents, the goals of 
various countries have shifted from “maintaining order in the nation,” and “fighting 
rising prices” (materialist responses) to “giving people more say in important government 
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decisions,” and “protection of freedom of speech,” (post-materialist responses) 
suggesting that such a shift has some empirical support (Bell 2009:172). Ingelhart argues 
that concern for the environment is another post-materialist value, and as such, we should 
expect to see that only wealthier respondents would be concerned about it. Other studies 
have also found correlations as high as r = .79 between income (GDP per capita) and 
environmental concern, suggesting that the wealth of a nation is extremely important in 
explaining pro-environmental attitudes (Franzen 2003). One possible explanation could 
be the “top-down” spread of values from wealthier nations to poorer nations in which 
they exert great influence. This may be especially true in former colonies.  
Though the NEP is seen as a response to the post-materialist thesis, the major 
difference between the two seems to be that the post-materialist shift seems to focus more 
on differences between countries, while the NEP focuses more on differences within 
countries (though it is noted that the shift has occurred elsewhere—suggesting more 
evidence in favor of the shift). Neither perspective has carefully considered the 
possibility that shifts in thinking about human impacts on the environment happen 
unevenly among countries based on the characteristics of those countries, and their 
relative positions to each other internationally. Regardless of these differences, the post-
materialist thesis is of great utility in the present study. Though the NEP is useful for 
understanding environmental concern—something that the post-materialism literature 
does a good job of as well—it is less useful for forming testable hypotheses. 
Additionally, post-materialist values, while not in contrast to the research stemming from 
the NEP, are generally much easier to categorize. In other words, the NEP is not tested in 
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this research, but is used as a basis for understanding environmental attitudes more 
thoroughly.  
 
THE NECESSITY OF MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 
Environmental attitudes are complex and therefore require a variety of 
perspectives to truly understand. What the NEP and the post-materialism thesis have in 
common is that they are useful at the micro-level. No perspective explicitly attempts to 
look at environmental values at both an individual and national level of analysis. But 
another perspective exists that focuses on the structural level. The world-systems 
perspective has been used in only a few empirical studies of human-environment 
interaction, though it has been used extensively in other areas of social inquiry. In the 
following, I will describe the world-systems perspective and some of its main ideas in 
order to help situate the present research within this theoretical perspective.  
 
THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 
The world-systems perspective posits that nations can be divided into three main 
categories based upon their position in the capitalist world-economy: (1) the core—those 
nations with the highest levels of technological advancement and highly industrialized (or 
even post-industrial) economies, such as the United States and many western European 
nations; (2) the periphery—those less-developed nations which base their economy on 
the extraction of raw natural resources, such as many sub-Saharan African nations; and 
(3) the semi-periphery—those nations that fall somewhere between the core and 
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periphery in the hierarchy, such as China, Mexico, and many of the former Soviet 
republics (Wallerstein 1990).  
Proponents of the world-systems perspective argue that the world is not a set of 
distinct nation-states that operate without the influence of other nation-states and non-
state actors. Wallerstein (1972[2000]) posits that the failure of Marx’s predictions of a 
socialist revolution is due to his focus on the “stages” of capitalist development and his 
insistence on their “coexistence.” In response, Wallerstein (1972[2000]:74) on the other 
hand, proposes that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries “there has been only 
one world-system in existence, the capitalist world-economy.” In other words, there was 
no global socialist or communist revolution because every nation-state was a part of a 
single global economic system based on capitalism. In contrast to the work of past 
sociologists, this capitalist world-system contains the necessary division of labor required 
to ensure its continued functioning. Wallerstein (1972[2000]: 75) defines a world-system 
as “a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems.” This distinction 
is important, as is the discussion of the failures of Marxism in that this perspective is 
capable of explaining not only that a single capitalist world-economy exists, but how it 
operates across international boundaries.  
When applied to the environmental debate, the logic of the world-systems 
perspective suggests that by being a beneficiary of this single capitalist world-system, 
core nations are able to export the negative consequences of their environmentally 
destructive and resource intensive practices to peripheral and semi-peripheral states. For 
example, the United States imports many raw materials from Africa, leaving the people 
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of Africa to deal with the consequences of profit-enhancing resource extraction methods 
while the people of the U.S. enjoy lower prices and greater ease of availability of 
products made with these resources. At the same time, the U.S. exports hazardous 
materials to other poorer (periphery) nations who often have no choice but to accept 
them. These are two different ways in which the core is able to exploit the periphery via 
the environment.  
Wallerstein’s (2000) world-systems perspective has been used and tested in a 
variety of sociological areas, including environmental sociology. Wallerstein (2000) 
posits that much of the change that has occurred in the capitalist world-system follow the 
Kondratieff wave (also called the “K-wave” or the “long wave,” see Figure 2.1) pattern, 
each about 60 years in length, which help to explain the fluctuations that are easily 
observable to any analysis of social change on a global scale. While environmental 
degradation has occurred for much of human history, there was very little by way of 
effect or visibility of such degradation until much more recently, at least on the scale that 
we observe it today.  
Another significant contribution to the discussion of the world capitalist economy 
or the world-system from Wallerstein (2000) comes from his explanation of hegemony 
within the system. Wallerstein suggests that this capitalist economy began in the 
sixteenth century in Europe, and “Iberian America,” which is essentially the colonies of 
Spain and Portugal in South and Central America. Shortly after it began, this capitalist 
world-system expanded to cover the entire globe through both trade and war. Since the 
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sixteenth century, the world has only known three instances of Hegemony (Wallerstein 
2000: 253). For Wallerstein,  
Hegemony in the interstate system refers to that situation in which the ongoing 
rivalry between the so-called “great powers” is so unbalanced that one power 
can largely impose its rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto 
power) in the economic, political, military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas. 
The material base of such power lies in the ability of enterprises domiciled in that 
power to operate more efficiently in all three major economic arenas—agro-
industrial production, commerce, and finance (Wallerstein 2000: 255).  
This status has only been reached in three instances, according to Wallerstein (2000: 
256): (1) the United Provinces, essentially the Dutch Provinces [1625-1672]; (2) the 
United Kingdom [1815-1873]; and the United States [1945-1967]1.  
This recognition is important in any so-called world-system analysis in that the 
recognition of the explicit existence of three hegemonic powers highlights the fact that 
the capitalist world-economy is a singular entity that is dynamic. But in the example of 
the environment, it is significant because, as Wallerstein notes, hegemony, by its very 
definition requires that these powers are able to more efficiently operate in the three 
major economic arenas, of which, the agricultural-industrial arena is of great importance, 
if we are to understand the influences of this capitalist world-system on the condition of 
the natural environment. In other words, hegemonic powers must be relatively efficient in 
all three major economic arenas which ensures their position above semi-peripheral and 
peripheral nations.  
                                                             
1 Though Wallerstein specifically cites 1967 as the end date for the U.S. as hegemonic power, when 
calculating world-system positions for the analysis in Chapter 5, the U.S. was a significant outlier on all 
three measures used to compute world-system position. The U.S. GDP in 2000 was $925,500,000,000. The 
GDP per-capita was $33,900. Military expenditures were $276,700,000,000. One could argue that the U.S. 
may still hold the title of hegemonic power.  
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The contributions of Wallerstein to the world-system perspective cannot be 
overstated. While much of his work is only peripherally related to the environment and 
environmental degradation, it was carefully researched in a fashion that made later 
discussion possible and useful for the field of environmental sociology. Wallerstein was 
not alone in this endeavor, however, and others have followed intellectually from the 
fundamentals of world-system analysis.  
Similar to Wallerstein and other world-system scholars such as Giovanni Arrighi, 
and Terence Hopkins, in Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy (1989) 
Christopher Chase-Dunn proposes that the use of the world-system perspective is 
currently the most productive method for studying the modern world-system. What 
differentiates Chase-Dunn (1989) from other world-system theorists is his advocacy for a 
return to structural models of a dynamic world-system. While he acknowledges that a 
return to structuralism, in a world of post-structuralism may seem odd, and indeed that it 
goes against the position of many other scholars who prefer to use theoretical ideas as 
“heuristic devices,” Chase-Dunn (1989:1) believes that “theory construction is a valuable 
activity in its own right, and is a necessary part of the effort to build social science.”
 Chase-Dunn (1989) explains the key concepts of the world-system perspective by 
comparing them specifically to the work of Marx. While the research conducted in the 
following chapters might have also been useful if framed under general Marxist ideas, the 
specific claims laid out by Chase-Dunn quickly make it apparent that Marx, and the 
Marxist scholars who followed him made a few oversights, some of which are specific to 
relationships in the global economy. Chase-Dunn (1989:21-22) describes what he 
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believes to be the basic characteristics of capitalism in Marx’s theory (in its fully 
developed state) as follows:  
1. Generalized commodity production: The production of commodities for 
profitable sale on a price-setting (competitive) market. 
2. Private ownership of the major means of production: Private capitalists 
accumulate capital by making investment decisions within a logic of profit 
maximization. This implies that the capitalist state does not directly interfere 
in investment decisions or in the market, but rather provides legitimation and 
order, using its power primarily to guarantee external defense and internal 
peace consistent with the institutions of private property. 
3. The wage system: Labor power is a commodity sold by proletarians (who do 
not own means of production) to capitalist owners of the means of production 
in a competitive labor market.  
 
In contrast, however, Chase-Dunn (1989: 43) defines2 “real capitalism” as: 
1. Generalized commodity production in which land, labor, and wealth are 
substantially commodified. 
2. Private ownership and/or control of the means of production, which may be 
exercised by individuals or organizations, including single states, which are 
themselves players in the larger competitive arena of commodity production 
and geopolitics. This allows for “state capitalism.” 
3. Accumulation of capital based on a mix of both competitive production of 
commodities and political-military power, in which commodity production 
has the greater weight in the determination of outcomes in the system as a 
whole.  
4. Exploitation of commodified labor which is, however, not always paid a 
wage.  
5. The combination of class exploitation with core/periphery exploitation such 
that the former is more important quantitatively in the accumulation of 
capital, but the latter is nevertheless essential because of its political effects 
on the mobility of capital and in reducing class conflict and weakening anti-
capitalist movements in the core.  
 
According to Chase-Dunn (1989), this reformulation of Marx’s core definition of 
capitalism allows for more explicit assumption testing in research. Also, by incorporating 
the role of the state (mainly in the form of political and military power), within the core-
                                                             
2 Emphases in bold added by Author.  
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periphery hierarchy, Chase-Dunn differs from Wallerstein in that he does not assume the 
totality of the capitalist world-system, providing him with more explanatory power and 
the ability to analyze separately the boundaries of the world-system and those of the 
modes of production. This makes it easier for us to discuss the phenomenon as it is 
directly related to both the modes of production, as well as positions within the world-
system.  
Another contribution to the world-system perspective by Chase-Dunn (1989) is 
his formulation of the structural features of the capitalist world-system: (1) the interstate 
system – a system in which disproportionately powerful states compete for resources 
through commodity production and geopolitical and military competition; (2) a 
core/periphery hierarchy; (3) a more complex formulation of capitalism (see above); and 
(4) commodity production is the central form of competition. These concepts allow us to 
place the nation-states into the core-periphery hierarchy (see Kentor 2000).  
 A third contribution to the world-system perspective regards the cyclical nature of 
the world-system. Though others working in this tradition have posited a cyclical 
understanding of capitalist development, Chase-Dunn (1989) dismisses outright the 
notion of stages within capitalism. For him, a single capitalist system that has seen 
several periods of time differs from the view that capitalism itself undergoes a series of 
transformations. The idea of a single capitalist world-system that has transitioned over 
time is not supported empirically because of the degree to which we see coercion towards 
workers and the gap between the pay earned by workers in core states when compared to 
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peripheral states. In other words, “immiseration has tended to be relative rather than 
absolute, while exploitation has everywhere increased” (Chase-Dunn 1989: 66-67).  
Lastly, Chase-Dunn notes several more recent trends in the world-system. 
Primarily, there have been increases in population and urbanization in peripheral and 
semi-peripheral countries, especially the “increasing primacy of the largest cities within 
developing countries” (Chase-Dunn 1989: 256). In other words, the empirical base 
supporting the world-systems perspective includes the recognition of two factors which 
both have been posited to be related to environmental degradation specifically (e.g. 
urbanization and population growth) (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997).  
Chase-Dunn and Wallerstein are not the only scholars (Jorgenson forthcoming; 
Rothman 1998) working in the development and testing of the world-system perspective 
and several have made significant contributions to the perspective, and to the empirical 
analysis of the perspective. Scholars from a variety of fields have attempted to explain in 
other ways exactly how the position of one nation in the capitalist world-economy can 
have an unequal impact on other nations in lower positions (Rothman 1998). This 
proposition closely follows the findings made by world-systems scholars that nations in 
the core have not only consumed materials imported from the periphery and semi-
periphery, but have exported the waste from the use of these materials back to the 
periphery and semi-periphery as well (Jorgenson forthcoming). For this reason, the 
world-systems perspective is useful in that it requires researchers to focus on its “total 
impacts, those generated within and beyond national borders” (York, Rosa, and Dietz 
2003: 288).  Jorgenson (forthcoming) finds that historically, more powerful societies 
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have used their relative position of power to engage in unequal ecological exchanges with 
other (typically) less-developed and less-powerful societies. He also notes that we must 
“treat the world as a system of stratified countries in which the affluence and material 
consumption of one country usually comes at the social and environmental expenses of 
other countries” (Jorgenson forthcoming:17).  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE  
Many scholars have addressed a variety of environmental issues within the 
framework of the world-systems perspective. Deforestation, for instance has been shown 
to occur in its most intense forms in semiperipheral nations (Bartley and Bergesen 1997; 
Kick, Burns, Davis, Murray, and Murray 1996). This is explained by the long history of 
exploitation of peripheral and semiperipheral forests by core countries. Additionally, 
though population growth causes deforestation at all levels within the world-system, its 
effects are much more pronounced in the semiperiphery (Bartley and Bergesen 1997).  
While these particular studies do not address environmental attitudes specifically, they 
make a compelling case about the differential exposure to negative environmental 
problems that are caused by core states, while disproportionately affecting the non-core. 
Following from this, research on international data should show some significant 
differences in concern about the environment stemming directly from the exposure of 
their citizens to environmental problems (Brechin and Kempton 1994).  
Another environmental problem, global warming, has been examined as well 
using the world-systems perspective. The overall findings from these analyses suggest a 
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curvilinear relationship between relative position in the core-periphery hierarchy and 
greenhouse gas (carbon dioxide and methane) emissions (Bartley and Bergesen 1997). 
Burns, Davis, and Kick (1997) find that the two greenhouse gases are associated with 
different levels of development. In other words, carbon dioxide is produced more in 
highly developed countries, while methane is produced more in less developed countries. 
This pattern does not reflect the relationship between position in the world-system and 
economic development (Bartley and Bergesen 1997). This curvilinear relationship, which 
has the shape of an inverted letter “U,” shows us that greenhouse gas emissions are the 
most intense in moderately developed (semiperiphery) countries when compared to more 
developed (core) and less developed (periphery) countries. Though the more highly 
developed nations still contribute the most to overall carbon dioxide emissions, they 
pollute less intensely, likely due to the efficiency with which they operate, compared to 
the less developed nations who pollute more intensely, with less regulation, as they 
attempt to “catch up” with core nations (Grimes and Roberts 1995)3.  
Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997) examine the changes in the world-system during the 
last 12,000 years and propose the Iteration Model of World-System development (Figure 
2.2). This model explains the formations of the world-system hierarchy in the following 
manner: population growth causes an increase in the intensity of environmental 
degradation. The type and degree of degradation depends on the production technology, 
and the degree of exploitation of natural resources required to meet demand. This 
increased population exerting higher levels of environmental degradation leads to a 
                                                             
3 It should be noted that as of this writing, China has surpassed the United States in Carbon emissions.  
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variety of population pressures. The population pressures increase the amount of effort 
required to meet one’s needs, often leading to emigration to regions where resources are 
more readily available4, if such regions exist and are not already inhabited. Otherwise, 
circumscription occurs, leading to competition between groups over resources. Conflict is 
a likely outcome from circumscription, often leading to the formation of new hierarchies 
(systems of stratification) to regulate the use of various new technologies and resources. 
The formation of hierarchies and the processes of technological change are said to be 
iterative because “population growth continues so that the same problems re-emerge on a 
larger scale, and so similar problems need to be solved once again” (Chase-Dunn and 
Hall 1997:410). These iterations lead directly to more population growth and the 
subsequent environmental degradation.  
This view of the relationship between the world-system and ecological 
degradation is useful in that it puts environmental degradation at the center of the major 
factors that lead to the formation of various hierarchies and technological changes 
necessary to situate a society within the world-system. According to Bartley and 
Bergesen (1997), in more complex societies, several new paths may potentially emerge in 
the iteration model allowing for a society to bypass circumscription or conflict with 
population pressures leading directly to new hierarchies and technological change.  
Andrew Jorgenson (2003) has found that a country’s position in the core-
periphery hierarchy helps to explain per-capita ecological footprints. Ecological 
                                                             
4 According to Myers (2002) there are an estimated 25 million environmental refugees in the world, 
alongside the approximately 26 million traditional refugees. These numbers were estimated to approach 
100 million by 2010, based on many estimates. Current figures were unavailable.  
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footprints act as a proxy measure of consumption, indicating that populations residing in 
core nations exhibit higher levels of consumptive behavior than those living in the 
periphery or semiperiphery. This effect occurs both directly and indirectly via the 
influence of world-system position on urbanization, domestic income inequality, and 
literacy rates.  
Because per-capita ecological footprints are usually considered to be correlates of 
negative environmental practices like deforestation and water pollution, Jorgenson (2003) 
also makes a note that he finds these correlations to be negative (higher position in the 
world-economy is associated with lower levels of both deforestation and water pollution), 
a finding which is consistent with other researcher’s findings (for example, see Bergesen 
and Bartley 2000).  
Though it appears that researchers using the world-system perspective have made 
significant headway in the environmental arena, the use of this perspective is a relatively 
recent development within the discipline. Indeed, in the near future much growth in this 
area should be expected; however, at this point we are just beginning to explore the 
environment in the context of the world-system. One particular shortcoming of the world-
systems research is that it has not yet incorporated the attitudes of the individuals living 
within the countries included in its samples. This limits our ability to understand the best 
ways to influence attitudes that we expect to directly relate to the behaviors of these 
individuals.  
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ASSESSING POST-MATERIALISM, THE NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM, AND 
THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE  
Now that I have elaborated on the theoretical perspectives I believe are necessary 
to understand the following analyses, and discussed some of the relevant literature 
stemming from all three approaches, I hope to make clear exactly how these theoretical 
perspectives will help to explain the research goals.  
Chapter 3 provides findings from the analysis of individual-level characteristics 
associated with attitudes towards the environment. As is consistent with other research 
guided by the post-materialist thesis and the New Ecological Paradigm, I expect that 
internationally there will be relatively high levels of concern among the citizens of 
various nations. Where I differ from the NEP perspective is that I will argue that the 
social bases of this environmental concern will have a variety of sources that have only 
been assessed in a haphazard fashion in the past. In other words, the standard correlates 
of environmental concern may have found support in research on U.S. and other Western 
nations, but these correlates may not be as useful in understanding environmental 
attitudes elsewhere. Additionally, I expect that wealthier nations—where the population 
is more likely to have enjoyed access to more wealth—will have higher degrees of pro-
environmental attitudes, as is consistent with the post-materialism thesis. The main 
research questions for Chapter 3 are: Which characteristics best explain environmental 
attitudes at the individual level? Secondly, How well do previous explanations of 
environmental attitudes apply across nations?  
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In preliminary analyses, these previously accepted correlates do not appear to 
operate in the same way cross-nationally, and what is even more intriguing, is that there 
does not appear to be an obvious pattern. For example, the religious affiliation of 
respondents in Spain demonstrates a relatively strong correlation with environmental 
attitudes, but religious affiliation is not associated with environmental attitudes in other 
European nations. The NEP is often seen as the antithesis of the view that 
environmentalism is a concern only for the wealthy (e.g. post-materialism). If this is an 
accurate characterization of the NEP, we should expect to see no difference based on 
socioeconomic status. That is, if environmental concern exists among the poor as well as 
the rich, it should follow this pattern cross-nationally. Testing this, however, requires the 
use of national level characteristics more than individual level characteristics. The results 
of this analysis are presented in Chapter 3.  
Next, I examine the extent to which world-system position is associated with 
environmental attitudes. In order to test for these effects, I will use national level 
characteristics to compute world-system positions (for these details see the methods 
section in Chapter 4—based on the work of Kentor 2000 and Jorgenson 2003), and to 
examine the relationship between world-system position (core, periphery, semi-
periphery) and environmental attitudes.  
Past research in the world-systems tradition suggests that higher levels of 
consumption and degradation of the environment can both be explained, at least partially, 
by the relative position of a nation in the core-periphery hierarchy. Others have suggested 
that exposure to environmental problems, which should be more pronounced in the 
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periphery and semi-periphery than in the core, may help to predict levels of 
environmental concern (Brechin and Kempton 1994). Also, it has been suggested that 
those with higher degrees of knowledge of environmental problems are more likely to be 
concerned (Vining and Ebreo 1990). The main research questions for Chapter 5 are: How 
does the location of a country in the core-periphery hierarchy impact environmental 
attitudes? Additionally, does access to outside information (such as telephones, internet 
access, etc.) contribute to a nation’s environmental attitudes?  
While each of the analyses conducted in chapters 3 and 4 contribute uniquely to 
the field of environmental sociology generally, and more specifically to the literature on 
environmental attitudes and the world-systems perspective, I believe that the most useful 
findings will come from a combination of individual and aggregate level characteristics.  
Therefore, in Chapter 5 I use a Hierarchical Linear Modeling approach to 
combine these two levels of analysis into a single and cohesive model. This model tests 
all theoretical perspectives simultaneously in order to help develop a better understanding 
of the importance of individual and national characteristics for understanding pro-
environmental attitudes. While I make no claims about the explanatory power or heuristic 
utility of either perspective over the others, this final analysis should help to clarify where 
and how each perspective contributes to understanding environmental attitudes. The main 
research questions for Chapter 5 are: Do individual- or national- level characteristics 
better explain aggregate levels of environmental concern? Do these differences apply 
across all levels of the core-periphery hierarchy?  Last, if there are differences between 
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individuals in different nations in terms of environmental attitudes, on which 
characteristics do they vary? 
In short, I examine environmental attitudes cross-nationally at both the individual 
and national levels. The three analyses each contribute uniquely by allowing for a more 
explicit test of the main hypotheses. Post-materialism is used in comparison to the New 
Ecological Paradigm (NEP) in order to assess whether environmental attitudes appear to 
vary by social class, or other characteristics of individuals. The world-systems 
perspective is used to guide the national-level analyses in which I compare nations. 
Overall, I expect to see that wealthy nations and individuals have the highest pro-
environmental attitudes.  
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CHAPTER 3: MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUAL ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES  
Many solutions to environmental problems are proposed under the assumption 
that changing people’s attitudes about their impact on the environment and environmental 
degradation as a whole will lead people to change their corresponding behaviors (Jones 
and Dunlap 1992). There is no consensus regarding how accurate this thinking is, and 
many public campaigns attempting to educate the public seem to focus on individual 
attitudes and behaviors (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Some governments, however, have 
enacted sweeping legislation in order to deal with environmental problems, such as 
curbing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing the availability of recycling programs, and 
preventing deforestation (Bell 2004; Kalafatis, Pollard, East and Tsogas 1999; Krause 
1993; Ottoman, Stafford, and Hartman 2006). It is unclear, however, whether national 
level policy changes reflect individual attitudes, or if individual attitudes are affected by 
public policy.   
The social psychological examination of the attitude-behavior split has been 
popular in recent decades, but has been relatively ineffective for measuring the attitude-
behavior relationship in the environmental context largely because suitable measures of 
environmental attitudes have yet to be tested in the context of the attitude-behavior split 
(Ajzen 1985; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Fishbein 1967; Kaiser 
et al. 1999). While scholars have sought to measure environmental attitudes, rarely have 
they done so cross-nationally (Dunlap et al. 2000; Evans 2007; Tarrant and Cordell 1997; 
Vining and Ebreo 1992). Additionally, the different methods of measuring environmental 
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attitudes have led to inconsistencies in making cross-national comparisons using separate 
studies. As difficult as these types of analyses are within one particular nation, such 
problems are exacerbated when conducting research on international samples, 
particularly when the data were collected by different organizations in each county. The 
incompatibilities of these data have meant that very few cross-national studies have been 
conducted, with even fewer that have included non-industrialized nations.  
The data used in the following analyses include a number of core, peripheral and 
semi-peripheral nations, making it one of the largest international datasets available that 
includes items dealing with the environment. Having such a diverse sample creates 
problems, however, particularly with respect to the applicability of concepts and 
measures across various cultures with different structural facilities in place for informing 
the citizens of a nation.  
 In this chapter I examine the factors that have been previously shown to be related 
to environmental attitudes. These analyses focus on two main research questions: (1) 
which characteristics of individual’s best explain environmental attitudes at the individual 
level; and (2) how well do previous explanations of environmental attitudes apply across 
nations. While it is clear that there is considerable variation among counties, this analysis 
helps to focus future analyses by confirming and quantifying these variations based on 
the most often cited correlates of environmental attitudes.  
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LITERATURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES 
The central issue in environmental sociology is the relationship between society 
and the natural environment. Environmental concern is an important concept in this line 
of inquiry. It is conceptualized as an attitude toward the environment and environmental 
issues (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978).  One of the more common associations that 
researchers make is the relationship between various characteristics of the respondents 
and their levels of environmental concern. Several different correlates have been 
identified in these studies with varying degrees of support in the findings. Of these 
studies, perhaps the most compelling is the work of Tarrant and Cordell (1997) who 
examine several different environmental concern scales and compare them to the most 
commonly cited correlates of environmental concern. The findings of past work have 
suggested that gender (Mohai 1992), residence – whether one lives in a rural versus urban 
area (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), education (Jones and Dunlap 1992), income (Van 
Liere and Dunlap 1980), age (Jones and Dunlap 1992), race (Mohai 1980; Mohai and 
Bryant 1998), and political orientation – whether one is conservative or liberal (Van Liere 
and Dunlap 1980), are all associated with environmental concern. Tarrant and Cordell 
(1997) found that the environmental concern has significant associations with residence, 
education, and age. This suggests that there are several socio-demographic characteristics 
that should be controlled for when assessing environmental attitudes.  
The post-materialist thesis posits that once basic human needs (food, clothing, and 
shelter) have been met, people often shift the values that they consider to be important 
from those which focus on meeting needs to those that focus on quality of life. For 
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instance, according to Inglehart (1995), after the post-materialist shift people focus on 
values like protecting freedom of speech, where before such a shift, people would have 
valued maintaining order in the nation. Though these values are not tested here, the post-
materialist perspective provides insight into a potential reason for the prominence of 
environmental attitudes. Support for the post-materialist thesis should demonstrate that 
wealth or socioeconomic status is significantly related to environmental attitudes.  
 At the center of the following analyses lies the importance of individual attitudes. 
Beyond these attitudes, however, lies the significance of structural and cultural 
boundaries imposed on individuals by the nation in which they live. While believing that 
the environment is in danger, and recognizing the types of behavioral change necessary to 
minimize our individual impact on the natural world is an undeniable part of the puzzle, 
some behavioral changes require things of us that are beyond most of our individual 
means, such as recycling where facilities for recycling do not exist (Schultz and Oskamp 
1996).  
 The world-systems perspective provides a much different picture of international 
relations than many other perspectives. It has been useful for studying the environment in 
the past; however it has not been used to examine environmental attitudes. In this 
particular analysis, I focus on characteristics of individuals, however with an 
international sample, differences between respondents from different countries become 
interesting.  In this analysis, I seek to examine the correlates of environmental attitudes as 
they apply to respondents from different places. The world-system perspective suggests 
that differences between countries should stem from position within the core-periphery 
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hierarchy. That is, differences are due to the socio-historical, economic, and military 
histories of the development of the modern world-system, rather than from differences in 
the individuals within nations.  This will be examined in later chapters in greater detail.  
 
THE NEW ECOLOGICAL PARADIGM SCALE 
The NEP is the basis for the NEP scale. The NEP scale is included in many 
surveys of environmental attitudes and to examine five underlying dimensions of 
environmental concern: (1) the balance of nature, (2) limits to growth, (3) human 
domination over nature, (4) human exemptionalism, and (5) ecocrisis (Dunlap et al. 
2000). The balance of nature dimension contained in the NEP scale is intended to 
measure the degree to which one feels that the balance of nature is being threatened by 
human activities. The limits to growth dimension seeks to provide an understanding of 
the degree to which people accept the idea that there is a certain point at which the size of 
the population and its impact on the environment can no longer be sustained. That is, the 
point at which the current consumption of natural resources by people will diminish the 
earth’s ability to recover. The human domination over nature dimension is intended to 
measure the presence and strength of beliefs regarding the relationship between humans 
and the natural environment, in which humans are viewed as dominant. The human 
exemptionalism dimension is intended to examine the degree to which people believe that 
humans are exempt from the forces and laws of nature (Dunlap et al. 2000). The final 
dimension has been characterized as a measure of concern for the occurrence or 
likelihood of catastrophic environmental changes (Dunlap et al. 2000; Evans et al. 2007). 
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While the original scale is not available for the present research, many of these 
characteristics were taken into consideration in the development and interpretation of the 
research models presented here.  
The majority of researchers of “environmental concern” (EC) appear to have 
reached agreement on the importance of EC as a subject worthy of scholarly 
investigation. Unfortunately, the major scholars doing research in this area have not 
reached consensus on (1) the best definition of the concept of environmental concern 
(Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; Dunlap et al. 2000; Weigel and Weigel 1978; among 
others), (2) the best way to measure such a concept (Franzen 2003), and (3) most 
importantly, how such a concept is useful in understanding human-environment 
interaction. Even without agreement on these core issues, the literature on environmental 
concern appears to be one of the more active sub-areas within environmental sociology.  
Past research has focused on measuring the reliability and validity of the NEP 
scale, and has found that the scale continues to be reliable and valid for the various 
populations on which it has been tested (Evans 2007). After revising the scale, Dunlap et 
al. (2000) suggest that previous work using the scale has underscored several types of 
criterion validity; known-group validity (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978) and predictive 
validity (Tarrant and Cordell 1997; Vining and Ebreo 1992). Other studies using different 
methods (particularly qualitative) have supported the content validity and construct 
validity of the NEP scale (Dunlap et al. 2000).  
The findings of this work have suggested that gender (Mohai 1992), residence – 
whether one lives in a rural versus urban area (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), education 
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(Jones and Dunlap 1992), income (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), age (Jones and Dunlap 
1992), race (Mohai 1980; Mohai and Bryant 1998), and political orientation – whether 
one is conservative or liberal (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980), have all had significant 
associations with environmental concern. Tarrant and Cordell (1997) found that the NEP 
scale had significant associations with residence, education, and age. This suggests that 
there are several socio-demographic characteristics that should be controlled for when 
examining environmental attitudes.  
Other research has focused less on the measurement of environmental concern, 
and more on its usefulness as a concept. One of the biggest shortcomings of large 
national or international surveys on the topic of the environment is that rarely, if ever, do 
they include all 15 of the NEP scales items. In fact, very few studies have done this, often 
making the findings of past studies difficult to replicate. In other words, while the 
specific items on the NEP scale may have undergone a rigorous battery of tests, because 
it is so rarely included on large nationally (or internationally) representative datasets, it 
may not be as useful to scholars seeking to study nations or, indeed, “world-systems.” In 
other words, the NEP scale was not used in any survey appropriate for cross-national 
analysis. For this reason, I use the NEP as a conceptual idea regarding the necessity for 
testing factors which influence environmental attitudes, and do not explicitly assess the 
NEP scale.  
One issue with the NEP world view is that it proposes that people have been 
steadily (however slowly) adopting a more eco-friendly world view. While there is 
nothing inherently problematic with such a claim, it appears to be based more on a 
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specific trend in environmentalism, than an actual change in human values or 
preferences. That is, we see increased rates of responses identified as pro-environmental, 
but it may be an artifact of social desirability, rather than actual changes in attitudes. In 
other words, the NEP does not specify the reasons for such a change. In fact, others have 
suggested that such measures are actually more concerned with the outcomes and 
consequences of human behaviors than they are with environmental values (Dutcher 
2007; Stern et al. 1995).  
While the measures of environmental attitudes used in this study do not precisely 
reflect the work of either Dunlap et al. (2000) or Weigel and Weigel (1978), it is clear 
that the available measures of environmental concern do comprise at least one component 
of what these two scales propose to measure. More specifically, both scales attempt to 
measure how big of a problem people consider environmental degradation, while the 
Environmental Concern scale also assesses willingness to contribute to solving these 
problems. For this reason, it is reasonable to conclude that the measure of environmental 
concern, while not ideal, used in the following analyses is sufficient to test any claims of 
difference cross-nationally, and to use as the focus of measuring international attitudes 
about the environment. Additionally, as Franzen (2003) notes, it is preferable to use 
measures of attitudes which focus on the environment-economy trade-off when global 
(rather than local) environmental concern is the focus of the study.  
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HYPOTHESES 
 Previous research in the area suggests several important hypotheses about 
individual-level factors influencing environmental attitudes. There exist many factors 
which may influence environmental attitudes, but based on the availability of measures, 
and previously significant findings about the relationship, I propose the following 
hypotheses for these analyses: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Higher social class standing will be associated with more 
positive environmental attitudes. 
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980; Inglehart 1995) have suggested that social class maybe 
related to environmental attitudes. It is hypothesized that those with higher relative social 
class will be more concerned with the preservation of the natural environment than those 
who have lower social class, because they will be more educated and wealthier, and will 
be less concerned with the economic trade-offs necessary in order to protect the 
environment. The post-materialist thesis also suggests that those with less trouble 
ensuring their needs are met are more likely to value environmental protection.  
Hypothesis 3.2: Higher age will be associated with more positive environmental 
attitudes. 
Jones and Dunlap (1992; among others) have found support for the age hypothesis, which 
indicates that the elderly are typically more concerned about the environment than the 
young. One possible explanation is that the elderly will be interested in preserving the 
environment for their children and grandchildren, while younger people will not. 
According to the post-materialist perspective (Ingelhart 1995), the age effect is likely a 
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generational effect in which older people are more likely to have belonged to a generation 
in which material values were more important during their youth (i.e. baby boomers, the 
depression generation, etc.—at least in the U.S.). Additionally, these generations are 
more likely to have shifted their values from materialist to post-materialist.  
Hypothesis 3.3: Political conservatism (the “right”) will be negatively related to 
positive environmental attitudes.  
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) propose that political conservatism is associated with lower 
levels of pro-environmental attitudes. Politically conservative attitudes tend to favor the 
economic, social, and political institutions that are typically at odds with preservation of 
nature.  
Hypothesis 3.4: Confidence in social/governmental institutions will be positively 
related to positive environmental attitudes. 
Bernauer (1995) suggests that international issues, like many environmental problems are 
less-likely to be solved when there are lower levels of confidence in social and 
governmental institutions. This relationship is likely because having confidence in these 
institutions and organizations means that one is more likely to believe what they tell you 
with respects to the condition of the natural environment.  
Hypothesis 3.5: Non Judeo-Christian religious traditions will be more positively 
related to positive environmental attitudes. 
White (1967) argues that the Judeo-Christian religious traditions have a worldview which 
is inconsistent with a pro-environmental worldview. Several places in Judeo-Christian 
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texts specify the divinely inspired relationship between man and nature. In most of these 
cases, man is specified as the ruler or master of the natural world.  
Hypothesis 3.6: Gender will have no significant relationship with positive 
environmental attitudes.  
While Kanagy and Nelsen (1995), Mohai (1992), Blocker and Eckberg (1997), and 
Tarrant and Cordell (1997) have found relationships between environmental attitudes and 
gender, the results have generally suggested that while women may be more concerned 
about specific issues, the method of measurement of environmental concern appears to be 
the biggest predictor of any differences here.  
Hypothesis 3.7: Rural respondents will have more environmental concern than 
urban respondents.   
Samdahl and Robertson (1989) suggest that community size is positively related to one’s 
perception of environmental problems and their support for change.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 The data used for the current study come from the 1999-2001 collection of the 
World Values Survey. This is an international study conducted by different entities in 
each of the nations in which data was collected. Each nation had their own specific 
methods of data collection with some using simple random samples of the population, 
and with others using more complex proportionally stratified sampling procedures. The 
specific analyses conducted in this paper are based on data from 27 countries during 
1999-2000.  
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Sample sizes for these 27 countries ranged from 720 to 3,000 persons, making up 
from 2.1% to 8.5% of the total sample, with a total sample size of N = 34,555. For a 
complete list of the countries and the sample sizes for each country see Table 3.1. Due to 
the complexities of international data collection, and in the interest of space, I will not 
describe the data collection procedures in greater detail. Information is available from the 
World Values Survey website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/).  
The WVS is an ongoing international survey that is conducted by a variety of 
organizations and institutions in participating countries. The mode of data collection used 
is survey questionnaires conducted using face-to-face interviews whenever possible. Due 
to the complexities of international data collection efforts, the sampling procedures vary 
widely, depending on the nation in question. Another important difference between 
nations is the age at which respondents were allowed to participate.  
In the United States, 100 zip codes were randomly selected, and an interview 
facility near these data points was selected in which to conduct the interviews. Telephone 
numbers were randomly selected from a list of telephone numbers within a 15-mile 
radius of the facility, and respondents were offered a cash incentive to participate in the 
face-to-face interview. In several instances, the facility for interviewing included 
respondents from two different sampling points (zip codes), and in other instances, no 
suitable facility was found, so the data point was moved to the nearest location with a 
suitable facility.  
In China, a 40 county/city sample was used. The sample was selected using a 
stratified multi-stage probability proportionate to size (PPS) technique in order to obtain a 
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sufficient sample based on the past work of the Research Center of Contemporary China 
(RCCC). After selecting the 40 counties and county-level cities, and several degrees of 
further differentiation based upon the population size, number of townships and streets 
contained therein, 25 households in each sampling unit were selected. After each 
household was selected, the member of the household aged 18 or over who participated 
was selected at random.  
These descriptions help to illustrate the differences used in the sampling 
techniques in various countries. While these techniques varied greatly, we can be 
confident that the data was collected with strict scientific standards which make cross-
national comparisons possible.  
 Though missing data was only moderate (i.e. < 10% on any particular variable), I 
used multiple imputation in the interest of having the most complete data possible. To 
accomplish this, I used the ice module in Stata. I created five imputed datasets on which 
to conduct the analyses in this section. More information about the ice module can be 
found at the Stata website (http://www.statajournal.com/article.html?article=st0067_2 or 
http://www.stata.com). Once the imputed dataset is created, the mim module is used in 
Stata in order to allow me to analyze the five imputed datasets while reporting a single 
set of results. In order to test for the inflation of significance values, I ran the analyses 
several times on each imputed dataset, as well as 5% samples of each, and then finally on 
the whole dataset using the mim module. The results of these preliminary analyses 
indicate that the large sample size does not artificially inflate the significance of these 
findings.  
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The dependent variables for the individual- level analyses are two-fold: first, a 
scale intended to measure environmental attitudes which relate to willingness to make 
economic sacrifice in favor of the environment. The scale is created by using the sum of 
two items yielding a Chronbach’s Alpha of .81. The two items contained in the scale ask 
the respondents: “how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I 
would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent 
environmental pollution” and; “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution.” The two items used to construct the scale are coded such that a 
response more favorable to the environment yields a higher score.  
 For the second dependent variable, a third question asked respondents: “Here are 
two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic 
growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?” (1) “Protecting the 
environment should be given priority; even if it causes slower economic growth and 
some loss of jobs” or (2) “Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, 
even if the environment suffers to some extent.” This variable measures environmental 
attitudes differently, by comparing economic tradeoffs often required in favor of 
environmental protection.  
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Inglehart (1995) has suggested that social class may play a role in the 
development of environmental attitudes. For this analysis, I use several measures of 
social class: First, I use a measure of subjective social class, which asked respondents: 
“people sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle 
class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: (1) 
upper class, (2) upper middle class, (3) lower middle class, (4) working class, or (5) 
lower class.” Their responses were coded such that a higher subjective social class was 
given a higher score. In other words, if they chose “upper class” they were coded as a 5, 
and conversely, if they chose “lower class,” they were coded as a 1. The average 
subjective social class score was 2.66 with a standard deviation of 1.0, indicating that 
most respondents identified as being somewhere between “working class” and “lower 
middle class.” Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution on this variable.  
Next, I included a measure of income to account for a more objective 
measurement of social class. The income variable was created from an item which asked 
respondents to choose the income that most closely matches their own from a list of 
values. In most countries, the list included 10 possible choices, while several had 11 and 
one had 15. In the case of a nation having more than 10 choices, additional categories 
were collapsed into the highest income category (i.e. 10). Unfortunately, this measure is 
of the individual income, and not the household income of the respondent.  
Finally, social class measures should account for education as well. I assess 
education by using a categorical variable which assigns respondents to one of six 
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categories for the highest level of education achieved. Respondents were asked what the 
highest year of schooling they completed was. Their responses were coded into: (1) “no 
formal education,” (2) “some primary school,” (3) “some secondary school,” (4) 
“completed secondary school,” (5) “some college,” or (6) “college degree or higher.” The 
“no formal education” category was used as the reference. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 
distribution of the sample by education.  
 Previous research has also proposed an age hypothesis that suggests that the 
elderly will be less concerned about the environment than the youth will be (Jones and 
Dunlap 1992). Other research has found support for such a hypothesis (Tarrant and 
Cordell 1997; Kanagy and Nelsen 1995). In order to account for this pattern, I use an age 
variable computed by subtracting the date of birth of the respondent from the date of the 
interview. This results in an age range from 15 to 97 years old (imputed values ignored). 
The average age for the full sample was 40.12 years with a standard deviation of 15.9 
years5.  
 It has also been hypothesized that politically conservative values are associated 
with lower levels of pro-environmental attitudes (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). In order 
to assess this effect, I used an item which asked respondents the following: “In political 
matters, people talk of ‘the left,’ and ‘the right.’ How would you place your views on this 
scale, generally speaking?” The responses were coded as a score from 1 to 10 with 1 
being left and 10 being right. The more right-wing the respondent, the higher their score 
                                                             
5 In preliminary analyses I checked logged and squared age distributions, which were not significantly 
different than using the normal age variable. I left the age variable in its original form in order to more 
easily interpret the results.  
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on the measure. The sample mean was 5.8, indicating a slightly right-wing average 
among respondents. I refer to those who are politically right-wing as “conservative6”.  
 Thomas Bernauer (1995) suggests that it is important in international analyses to 
assess confidence in social institutions because with lower levels of confidence in 
institutions, international collaboration is less likely to be successful. In order to control 
for this effect I include a scale which measures the degree of confidence an individual has 
in several governmental institutions. The institutions included are the armed forces,  
police, government in Washington, political parties, Parliament, and the Civil Service. 
These variables were combined into a mean scale with high alpha reliability ( = .86). 
Additionally, I include a measure of confidence in the environmental movement. 
 Next, I assess the affect of religious affiliation on environmental attitudes. Lynn 
White Jr. (1967) proposed that a Judeo-Christian theological view was inherently 
inconsistent with pro-environmental attitudes. Respondents were asked “do you belong to 
a religious denomination?” if yes, the respondents were able to choose from: “Roman 
Catholic,” “Protestant,” “Orthodox (Russian/Greek/etc.),” “Jewish,” “Muslim,” “Hindu,” 
or “Buddhist.” The respondents were also able to choose “no, not a member,” “no 
answer” or they were able to write in a specific denomination. In this analysis, I use the 
seven categories, plus a category “Evangelical” (the largest “other”), a category for “no” 
religious preference, and a category for “other religious denomination.” The 
“Evangelical” label can lead to some confusion, however, so I collapsed “Protestant” and 
                                                             
6 I fully recognize that political conservatism is not necessarily the equivalent of being politically right-
wing, however in an effort to simplify the language, I choose to use the term conservative instead of 
“politically right-wing.” 
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“Evangelical” into a single group. Because the Evangelical group is self-identified, and is 
written-in, many Evangelicals might have reported being “Protestant.” Similarly, many 
who identified as Protestant might have better been categorized as Evangelical. It has 
been suggested that even within the Christian faith; there are differences between 
traditions with respect to the environment (Sherkat and Ellison 2007). This goes counter 
to the argument provided by White (1967). Unfortunately, by collapsing the Evangelical 
and Protestant groups into a single group, I lose the ability to assess specific differences 
between traditions. Figure 3.3 shows the frequencies of each religious tradition. In the 
following models, I use the “no religious preference” group as the referent.  
Gender norms may also play a role in helping to determine attitudes towards the 
environment (Kanagy and Nelsen 1995). Mohai (1992) and others have found support for 
a gender hypothesis which recognizes the importance of cultural definitions of 
masculinity and femininity. These norms are likely to vary considerably by both national 
origin, and religious preferences. Respondents were asked their sex and those responses 
were coded into a dichotomous measure in which men were coded as zero, and women 
were coded as one. The sample had a gender breakdown of 48.5% men, and 51.5% 
women in the full sample, though these proportions varied by country.  Blocker and 
Eckberg (1997) find that women tend to exhibit somewhat more environmental concern, 
though they are no more likely to engage in environmental action than men. They note 
that both men and women with higher social status and with more knowledge of 
environmental issues, and greater degrees of trust in science are more likely to engage in 
pro-environmental action. Similarly, Tarrant and Cordell (1997) find that women had a 
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stronger relationship with environmental concern than did men, though it was noted that 
the method of measuring environmental concern made a difference.  
 Tarrant and Cordell (1997; among others) have suggested that urban and rural 
residents of a country may have differing opinions on the issue of the environment. Rural 
or urban residence has not been shown to be statistically significantly related to 
environmental attitudes. Samdahl and Robertson (1989) find that the size of the 
community in which one lives is positively related to ones perception of environmental 
problems and support for change. Generally, it appears that the research on the 
relationship between residence and environmental concern has gone both ways, making it 
difficult to determine how important it actually is (Van Liere and Dunlap 1980). These 
relationships have rarely been examined with international samples, however.  In order to 
best capture this with the World Values Survey data, I created a dichotomous measure of 
urban versus rural. Due to the difficulties inherent to international data, there were some 
countries that used different population sizes for a variable asking the respondents the 
population of their town of residence. So I created a dummy variable using approximately 
50,000 residents as the cut off for urban, with towns of 50,000+ residents being 
considered urban. For countries which did not have a clear 50,000 person population cut 
off, I used the middle category which was usually within 20,000 of this 50,000 person 
cutoff. This yields a variable in which 53.5% are considered rural and 46.5% are 
considered urban.   
 Table 3.2 shows the bivariate correlations for all of the variables used in the 
following models. With such a large sample it is not surprising that most of the 
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relationships are significant at the p < .05 level or higher. Many of the correlations are 
quite small, even for variables that seem to be intuitively related to each other. This 
suggests to me that there are a lot of factors that influence environmental attitudes, 
beyond what have been suggested in previous research.  
 
FINDINGS 
 These analyses required the use of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and 
logistic regression techniques. OLS regression allows one to assess the additive effects of 
a series of variables on the variance of another variable. In this case, the independent 
variables are regressed on the willingness to sacrifice scale. The results of this analysis 
are shown below in Table 3.3.  The mim module in Stata is used to run analyses on 
multiply imputed datasets. One of the downfalls of this method is that it does not 
compute the R-squared coefficient for the proposed regression model. I  
ran the a regression on each of the imputed data sets individually, to overcome this issue, 
and the results below represent a model with an adjusted R-squared coefficient of about 
.06. In other words, the combination of independent variables explains about 6% of the 
variance in this measure of environmental attitudes. Though this is relatively low, it is 
similar to the findings of other studies on environmental attitudes, and a high R-squared 
value is not necessary to find support for the proposed hypotheses.   
 Many of the regression coefficient effects are statistically significant. Confidence 
in Government Institutions is statistically significant (p < .001). This effect is positive, 
and is consistent with hypothesis 3.4. In other words, as expected, respondents with more 
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confidence in government institutions have more positive environmental attitudes. 
Specifically, a one unit change in confidence in government institutions is associated 
with a .158 unit change in environmental attitudes. Similarly, confidence in the 
environmental movement has a statistically significant (p < .001) positive effect on 
environmental attitudes. The B coefficient of .231 represents a 23% increase in 
environmental attitudes for each one unit change in confidence in the environmental 
movement.  
 The results for social class standing are mixed. Education and subjective social 
class are significantly (p < .001) and positively associated with environmental attitudes. 
For the education variables, each level of education is associated with a respectively 
increasing effect on environmental attitudes. For example, those with some primary 
education are significantly different from those with no education, and are associated 
with a .170 unit change in environmental attitudes. Furthermore, those who have 
completed college are associated with a .551 unit change in environmental attitudes when 
compared to those with no education.  A smaller effect ( = .090) is found between 
subjective social class and environmental attitudes. The income measure is not 
statistically associated with environmental attitudes. These findings support hypothesis 
3.1 and are consistent with the post-materialist thesis.  
 Urban residence is not statistically associated with environmental attitudes, but 
age is. A one year increase in age is associated with a -.001 unit change in environmental 
attitudes. These results refute hypotheses 3.2 and 3.7. Additionally, sex is negatively 
associated (p < .001) with environmental attitudes. Sex is coded as a dummy variable 
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with women coded as one, and men coded as zero. This suggests that or a one unit 
increase in sex, there is -.068 unit change in environmental attitudes. In other words, men 
tend to have slightly more positive environmental attitudes than women. This is not 
supportive of hypothesis 3.6. Similarly, political conservatism (politically right wing) 
was hypothesized (hypothesis 3.3) to be negatively related to environmental attitudes.  
The analysis suggests otherwise; in this case, a one unit increase in political conservatism 
is associated with a .032 (p < .001) unit increase in environmental attitudes. In other 
words, respondents who identified as more politically “right,” also have higher 
environmental attitudes.  
 Lastly, the results suggest mixed results for hypothesis 3.5. More specifically, it 
was hypothesized that non Judeo-Christian religious traditions would be associated with 
more positive environmental attitudes. The results tend to show that even though most of 
the Christian traditions have a negative relationship with environmental attitudes (when 
compared to the reference category “no religious preference”), Jews, Buddhists, and 
Muslims are not significantly different from those with no religious preference. While 
this demonstrates partial support for the hypothesis, Hindu respondents exhibit a similar 
effect as the Christian traditions, which is counter to the hypothesis. In other words, with 
the exception of Orthodox Christians, all religious groups are associated with negative 
environmental attitudes.  
The second analysis uses logistic regression techniques to test the effects of the 
independent variables on the dichotomous outcome variables. The logistic regression 
results are presented in table 3.4. The odds-ratios are reported in the first column. The 
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odds ratio represents the change in odds that are expected for a person with a certain 
score on the independent variable will fall into the 1 category of the dichotomous 
outcome (dependent) variable. While confidence in government institutions is not 
statistically associated with one outcome over the other, confidence in the environmental 
movement is. Specifically, for each one unit increase in confidence in the environmental 
movement, a respondent is 1.29 times, or 29% more likely to have given the environment 
priority over the economy. This indicates mixed results for hypothesis 3.4.  
 Hypothesis 3.1 suggests a similar pattern. Income is not significantly associated 
with choosing the environment over the economy, but subjective social class is. The 
effect is minimal; those with a higher subjective social class are about 6% more likely to 
give the environment priority over the economy. The education variables were dummy 
coded for the logistic regression models, and respondents identifying as having “no 
formal education” used as the reference category. The results show that while having 
some primary or secondary education is not statistically different from having no formal 
education when it comes to the likelihood of preferring environmental protection over 
economic growth. Completing secondary education is statistically significant, indicating 
that those who complete secondary education are about 1.3 times more likely to favor 
environmental protection. The effect is similar but larger for those with some college 
education and those who completed college with an 81% and 96% increase in the 
likelihood of favoring environmental protection over economic growth. Together, these 
findings indicate support for hypothesis 3.1.   
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Hypothesis 3.7 is not supported, as urban respondents and rural respondents are 
not significantly different in their support for the environment over the economy. 
According to hypothesis 3.3; political conservatism is expected to be related to decreased 
odds of favoring the environment over the economy. The results indicate that for a one-
unit increase in political conservatism, respondents are about 1% more likely to favor 
environmental protection over economic growth. This finding does not support the 
hypothesis.  The age hypothesis (hypothesis 3.2) is supported, as age is a significant 
predictor of support for environmental protection. Specifically, for each one year increase 
in age, respondents are .2% more likely to favor environmental protection over economic 
growth. Hypothesis 3.6, however is supported, as gender is not statistically related to the 
likelihood of favoring environmental protection over environmental growth.  
The findings for religion are interesting. Hypothesis 3.5 states that Non Judeo-
Christian respondents will have more positive environmental attitudes. When compared 
to those with no religious preference, it appears that of those with statistically significant 
associations the Judeo-Christian traditions have lower odds ratios. Protestants, for 
example are about 32% less likely to favor the protection of the environment over 
economic growth. Muslims are about 29% less likely, and Orthodox Christians are about 
20% less likely. A similar relationship appears for Buddhists and those who listed “some 
other religion.” While the “other” category included a variety of Christian traditions, it 
included non-Christian respondents as well7. This indicates that the findings for 
                                                             
7 Though the “other” category included a variety of smaller Christian traditions, it contained mainly non-
Christians. Additionally, most of these groups would be difficult, if not impossible to re-categorize into 
other groups.  
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hypothesis 3.5 are at the very best, mixed. Hindu’s and Catholic’s are not significantly 
different from those with no religious preference.  
While the hypotheses have found mixed support in the analyses, the overall goal 
of assessing cross-national environmental attitudes and the factors associated with them 
appears to point out a number of other issues. Perhaps the largest issue at hand is how 
applicable these findings are cross-nationally. Preliminary analyses suggest that there are 
some significant differences between nations when considering the applicability of these 
hypothesized relationships. For instance, the adjusted R-squared values for the OLS 
model ranged from -.0007 (none of the predictors are significant) in Puerto Rico. to .1531 
(about 15% of the variance in environmental attitudes) in Vietnam. With differences this 
large, it is clear that accounting for other sources of variance is necessary, particularly 
when conducting international analyses. The country-specific adjusted R-squared 
coefficients are listed in Table 3.5.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The previous explanations of environmental attitudes appear to cover only a small 
portion of the variance in the actual measurement of these attitudes. One way of 
interpreting this is that the issue is so complex and multifaceted that it is difficult to 
accurately formulate how to assess attitudes and which characteristics of people influence 
environmental attitudes.  While many studies have addressed this particular issue within a 
single nation, or a subset of similar nations, rarely has anyone attempted to address this 
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issue internationally (Dunlap et al. 2000; Evans 2007; Tarrant and Cordell 1997; Vining 
and Ebreo 1992).  
 The overall result of these analyses suggests three important things about 
explaining environmental attitudes with individual characteristics: (1) Social class 
appears to have an impact on environmental attitudes, though how social class is 
measured appears to be an important determinant of exactly how this relationship  
operates; (2) confidence in social and/or governmental institutions seems to influence 
environmental attitudes, but in some instances, not in the way one should expect; and (3) 
there is evidence that religious beliefs play a role in the development of these attitudes as 
well, though the role religion plays may be difficult to accurately capture.  
 The concept of social class has been operationalized in a variety of ways (Bollen 
et al. 2001). Unfortunately, there is little agreement on how to measure it. While asking 
people which social class category they belong to might be an easy way to overcome the   
difficulty in accurately measuring something as complex as social class, it may be prone 
to bias introduced by the assumption that one belongs to a group, for instance, the 
working class, when in reality they would better be categorized as middle class, 
particularly when a person lives in a social setting that values hard work or a working 
class identity. Additionally, some social classes have stigma associated with them, 
reducing the likelihood of respondents choosing that category. On the other hand, 
measures of income can become very convoluted, particularly when conducting cross-
national analyses, as even splitting income into 10 categories does not really tell the 
researcher about what it means to have one category over another except that one 
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category means a person earns more money than someone in a different category. 
Additionally, with this data, respondents were asked their own income, and not their 
household income, which can mask the true effect of income on environmental attitudes. 
Education appeared to also be an important component of social class, and a relatively 
clear one for at least the first analysis. According to the post-materialist thesis, we should 
not be surprised by this finding, as education, social class and income are all associated 
with the formation of post-materialist values.  
 As Bernauer (1995) suggests, confidence in government and social institutions 
can be important with issues that have international effects. The findings clearly show 
that confidence in government institutions can have a positive impact on environmental 
attitudes, though confidence in the environmental movement seems to point to other 
issues. It is undeniable that the effects of environmental degradation are far-reaching, and 
we would likely expect international collaboration, yet there are still some hold-outs 
among nations. Is it that the citizens of these nations are unsure of the severity of the 
problem? Or could it be related to how much confidence they have in their governments? 
Religion can often be a significant driving force for social change as well as for 
maintaining the status quo, and the findings here suggest the same. While religious 
beliefs can be overwhelmingly complex and detailed, White’s (1967) thesis seems to be a 
drastic oversimplification of the reality of the religion-environmental attitude 
relationship. To date, researchers have not reached an agreement about the direction of 
the religion environment relationship; however, some have suggested that these mostly 
inconsistent findings can be attributed to the measurement of some concepts used in past 
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analyses (Sherkat and Ellison 2007). The more traditional view is that those with more 
literal interpretations of religious texts (specifically, the Christian bible) typically have 
lower levels of pro-environmental attitudes (Greeley 1993; Hand and Van Liere 1984; 
Lowry 1995 with some exceptions). Others have suggested that any relationship between 
pro-environmental attitudes and religious beliefs or religiosity can be explained with the 
addition of other structural factors, such as social class, age, gender, and region (Kanagy 
and Nelsen 1995), or that measures of religiosity are simply poor predictors of pro-
environmental orientations (Boyd 1999). This suggests that perhaps the way in which 
religion is measured is equally as important as its actual effect on environmental 
attitudes. Nevertheless, it endures as a variable which should, at the very minimum, be 
included in such analyses.  
 Additionally, differences between nations appear to be significant, though not in 
any clear sense at this point. In the following chapter, I will examine the importance of 
differences in the countries themselves. It appears, at least at this point, that social class, 
religious identification, and confidence in government institutions are the most 
significant predictors of environmental attitudes. Further analyses are necessary to 
understand how these factors (and others) impact environmental attitudes when compared 
to structural constraints within specific countries, like those imposed by the world-system 
hierarchy.  
 The two main research questions guiding this analysis suggests the following 
conclusions: (1) religious beliefs, social class, and confidence in social and governmental 
institutions are the strongest predictors of environmental attitudes at the individual level; 
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and (2) many of the previously hypothesized models of explaining environmental 
attitudes are less successful with an international sample. While other factors are 
certainly useful for explaining environmental attitudes, few operated consistently across 
dependent variables, others are not significant predictors. This suggests that previous 
research models are not as useful in international analyses because there are national-
level differences between nations that are unable to be assessed with individual level 
data.  
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CHAPTER 4: MEASUREMENT OF NATIONAL-LEVEL ENVIRONMENTAL 
ATTITUDES  
 Environmental attitudes and their associated behaviors depend not only upon the 
characteristics of individuals, but also on the policies, both national and international, of 
various national governments. Actual change, however, could require more than pro-
environmental attitudes. Additionally, the infrastructure of a society could be associated 
with the likelihood of pro-environmental change. For example, it would be hard for 
individual attitudes about recycling to influence the actual rates of recycling if the 
infrastructure necessary to facilitate recycling was unavailable. 
 The world-systems perspective has been useful in other fields in order to 
understand how the core-periphery hierarchy has been instrumental in impacting the lives 
of people. World-systems researchers have been able to demonstrate the powerful effects 
of the modern world-system on the natural world (Bartley and Bergesen 1997; Kick, 
Burns, Davis, Murray, and Murray 1996). Other factors related to world-system position, 
such as access to information, may also be important structural constraints that should be 
considered when examining influences on environmental attitudes.  
 I assess two research questions about the relationship between national-level 
characteristics and aggregate environmental attitudes: (1) How is the location of countries 
in the core-periphery hierarchy of the modern world-system associated with aggregate 
environmental attitudes? and, (2) Does access to outside information through telephones, 
and the internet contribute to the development of average national environmental 
attitudes? Do these associations persist when other characteristics are included in the 
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model, such as Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) scores, the proportions of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) made up of the agricultural, service, and industry sector, 
and the type of government (e.g. Republic, Monarchy, etc).   
 
LITERATURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES 
 Most of the literature on environmental attitudes focuses on the characteristics of 
individuals that influence their environmental attitudes. While this is useful for 
understanding differences in groups of people within a single nation, it is less useful for 
cross-national comparisons because it ignores the importance of structural constraints 
imposed by governments, economic systems, and access to information. Put differently, 
understanding the characteristics of individuals that influence environmental attitudes is 
only useful within a nation, as there is significant variation  of these characteristics across 
nations.  
 Previous research has rarely examined both individuals within nations and 
between nation differences in environmental attitudes and correlates of environmental 
attitudes. In the few studies that have done both, there have been serious methodological 
limitations: first, the cross-national examples tend to focus on peer countries, that is, 
nations which are similarly developed and/or are economically and politically similar in 
other ways. Second, they assess environmental attitudes in very different ways, making 
comparisons difficult. 
 One of the more frequently cited examples of a cross-national study of 
environmental attitudes is Arbuthnot and Lingg’s (1975) comparison of American and 
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French environmental behaviors, knowledge, and attitudes. Their study’s findings 
suggested two main things: (1) knowledge of environmental issues may act as a mediator 
between attitudes and behaviors, and (2) that the difference between the American and 
French samples with regards to the status of environmental awareness depends heavily on 
the developmental status of the nation. Overall, however, the study is handicapped 
mainly by small samples and by similarities between France and the U.S. 
 A more recent study examines “cross-cultural” rather than “cross-national” 
differences in environmental attitudes compared Asian New Zealanders to European New 
Zealanders (Milfont, Duckitt, and Cameron 2006). The authors examine the concept of 
environmental attitudes psychologically by dividing it into three distinct conceptions of 
environmental concern: (1) egoistic (me, my lifestyle, my health, and my future), (2) 
altruistic (people in my county, all people, children, and future generations), and (3) 
biospheric (plants, marine life, birds, and animals). The findings suggested some 
differences between Asian New Zealanders and European New Zealanders with respects 
to the motivations behind their environmental concern. 
 Olofsson and Öhman (2006) provide several compelling findings from their cross-
national analysis. First, general beliefs about the environment are consistent predictors of 
environmental concern. Second, education and political identification are also stable 
predictors of environmental concern. Unfortunately, the sample is based on North 
American and Scandinavian respondents to the 2000 International Social Science 
Programme (ISSP) survey. These findings are important, but they are not applicable to a 
more diverse sample of nations than the ISSP provides.  
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 Others have focused more on the determination of environmental behaviors than 
the formation of attitudes. Oreg and Katz-Gerro (2006), for instance, find that post-
materialist values affect environmental concern, a finding which is not consistent with the 
New Ecological Paradigm (Dunlap et al. 2000), which in turn affects pro-environmental 
behaviors. Similar to the Olofsson and Öhman (2006) study, the sample comes from the 
ISSP’s 2000 data, which only includes a sample of peer-nations.  
 Similarly, Hayes’ (2001) study focuses on a cross-national comparison of gender, 
scientific knowledge, and attitudes toward the environment. Her results suggest that 
“even though men and women do differ in terms of their knowledge of scientific matters, 
this has little or no effect on their attitudes toward the environment” (2001:657). 
Additionally, even when controlling for scientific knowledge, there are few gender 
differences with respects to environmental attitudes.  
 Though the contributions of past research are important in many regards, they 
only provide a limited picture of the differences between nations. Each of these examples 
shares one of two flaws: they either use a limited and culturally homogenous sampling of 
nations, or they conceptualize environmental attitudes in an unconventional manner, 
limiting the comparability of their findings to the findings of others.  
 
THE WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
 Past research guided by the world-systems perspective has been relatively clear 
and consistent on the relationship between world-system position and environmental 
degradation of varying types (Bartley and Bergesen 1997; Kick, Burns, Davis, Murray, 
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and Murray 1996). Generally, that is, the core is associated with lower degrees of 
degradation than the periphery, while the semi-periphery engages in the highest degree of 
environmental degradation. Though this past research does not assess environmental 
attitudes in a world-systems perspective context, it continues to carry the connotation of a 
relationship between behaviors and attitudes (Brechin and Kempton 1994).  
 The general argument is that developing nations (i.e. non-core) attempt to play 
catch-up to the developed world and are much more likely to favor economic growth over 
environmental protection. Additionally, the problem is confounded by the exportation of 
environmental “bads” by core nations, and the exportation of environmental “goods” by 
peripheral and semi-peripheral nations. In other words, wealthy nations are able to 
effectively export undesirable outputs of industry and pollution to nations who need the 
revenue, while poorer nations simultaneously degrade their own environment in an effort 
to produce raw resources for sale to wealthier nations.  
 Past research suggests that the characteristics of nations are important as well. 
The type of government, for example can be an important factor in assessing a nation’s 
environmental performance (Scruggs 1999). Similarly, access that individuals have to 
outside information through various forms of media, such as television, the internet, and 
telephones should increase pro-environmental attitudes by helping them become 
informed about global issues regarding the environment. Additionally, the actual 
conditions of the environment in local context may also play a role in the formation of 
attitudes about the environment.  
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 It is clear that national-level characteristics can affect environmental outcomes, 
but how do national-level characteristics affect aggregate levels of environmental 
concern? If attitudes and behaviors are related, then one should expect to find a similar 
set of patterns between the characteristics of nations and the attitudes of its citizens. For 
example, when confidence in the government is high among a population, governmental 
policies are generally viewed with respect. On the other hand, even within the same 
country, some citizens may be suspicious of government policies if the government has 
inspired less confidence in them.  The post-materialist thesis suggests that even among 
the citizens of a nation, there may be several generations, each with a different 
perspective on a variety of issues. If the post WWII generation in a country is suspicious 
of the government, this can impact the average environmental attitudes of the country. 
Those citizens who are poor, however, are more likely to value the means of survival 
over more aesthetic values like environmental quality. This means that nations with 
poorer, less educated citizens are likely to have a different association with aggregate 
environmental attitudes than nations with wealthier, more educated citizens. Therefore 
we should expect to see the association between characteristics of nations and the average 
environmental attitudes of its citizens vary by position in the core-periphery hierarchy.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
Past research has indicated several likely hypotheses at the national-level:  
Hypothesis 4.1: Core nations should have higher average pro-environmental 
attitudes than periphery or semi-periphery nations.  
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As suggested by Bartley and Bergesen (1997; among others), generally the core is 
associated with lower degrees of environmental degradation. Similarly, because core 
nations have higher GDP per-capita they tend to engage in more protective measures for 
the environment than non-core nations. Additionally, the post-materialist view of 
environmental attitudes suggests that the higher degrees of national wealth in core nations 
should be associated with higher proportions of people in core nations who have met their 
material needs, and would therefore be more likely to show preferences for post 
materialist values like environmental protection.  
Hypothesis 4.2: Nations with higher average access to information will have 
higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes.   
Brechin and Kempton (1994) argue that experiencing environmental degradation should 
lead to greater concern about the environment. Similarly, more access to information 
about the environment should lead to higher pro-environmental attitudes. Access to 
information is more likely to occur in wealthier core nations than in the periphery. If 
greater information explains differences in attitudes by position in the world-system, then 
including these measures should eliminate differences by position in the world-system. 
Information and communication measure post-materialist rather than materialist 
development in nations, because information exchange comes after basic needs are met. 
Hypothesis 4.3: Lower scores on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) 
will be associated with higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes.  
Knowledge of environmental problems has been demonstrated to have influence on 
environmental attitudes (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Such knowledge comes from many 
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sources, including the various forms of media available in a country. Based on the world-
systems perspective, one would expect to see that those in the periphery and to a smaller 
extent, the semi-periphery, are more likely to experience environmental degradation, and 
that seeing the degradation first-hand would increase the likelihood of developing pro-
environmental attitudes. Though core nations tend to have lower levels of degradation, 
they also generally have governments that are more responsive to environmental 
problems. The ESI is a composite measure that assesses a nation’s environmental well-
being, as well as it’s governments responsiveness to these problems. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 The data used for this analysis come from a variety of sources. Primarily, I use 
data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Factbook (www.cia.gov).  I do, 
however, also include measures from the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI). The 
ESI is an attempt to develop a composite measure of overall environmental performance 
of most nations by aggregating known information on environmental degradation, policy, 
and participation in international treaties on the environment. It is collaboration between 
the World Economic Forum, the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, and the 
Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), at Columbia 
University (http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/). These data cover the year 
2000. Finally, the dependent variable comes from the aggregated individual-level 
environmental attitudes measures. These data come from the World Values Survey from 
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the 1999-2001 wave. These data contain responses from people in 27 nations on several 
important questions regarding the environment and their attitudes towards it.   
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The focal dependent variable for this analysis is the aggregated environmental 
attitudes measures from the individual analyses in Chapter 3. These variables include: (1) 
a scale intended to measure environmental attitudes which relate to willingness to make 
economic sacrifice in favor of the environment. The scale is created by using the sum of 
two items yielding a Chronbach’s Alpha of .81. The two items contained in the scale ask 
the respondents: “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I 
would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent 
environmental pollution” and; “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution.” The two items used to construct the scale are coded such that a 
response more favorable to the environment yields a higher score. In order to use this 
variable for the national-level analysis presented here, the mean for each country was 
used as the score for the outcome variable. I refer to this variable as willingness to 
sacrifice.  
 (2) A second question which asks respondents: “Here are two statements people 
sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them 
comes closer to your own point of view?” (1) “Protecting the environment should be 
given priority; even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs” or (2) 
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“Economic growth and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment 
suffers to some extent.” This variable measures environmental attitudes differently, by 
requiring that one recognizes the tradeoffs inherent to environmental protection. In order 
to use this variable for the national-level analysis presented here, the mean for each 
country was used as the score for the outcome variable. It should be noted that for the 
second dependent variable, the mean represents the proportion of respondents in that 
nation who chose the first category, “protecting the environment should be given priority, 
even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs,” the more pro-
environmental response. I refer to this dependent variable as economic tradeoffs.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The main independent variable is a continuous measure of world-system position.  
This is based heavily on the work of Jeffery Kentor (2000). The position in the world-
system is measured by the following three items: (1) a measure of “Capital 
Intensiveness,” which is measured by the Gross Domestic Product Per-Capita and is 
intended to measure the “ability of an actor (country) to be more competitive in the 
global marketplace”. (2) “Production Size [. . .] refers to the relative size of a country’s 
productive infrastructure,” is measured by the Gross-Domestic Product (GDP). (3) 
Military Expenditures in dollars, which “reflects a country’s ability to assert its will both 
directly and indirectly in the world-economy by use of military force.”  
Originally, Kentor specifies a 10-item model to measure three dimensions, but 
finds that the three item version of the construct has a .98 correlation with the original 
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measure and should be a suitable measure for most needs. The z-scores for each of these 
three pieces of data are summed to arrive at the composite measure of position in the 
world-economy (Kentor 2000). The core is comprised of those in the top third, the 
periphery is comprised of those countries in the bottom third, and the semi-periphery 
makes up the remainder of the nations. After completing this step, I compared my list of 
countries at each level of the hierarchy to other work using similar techniques and found 
no oddities. The list of core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral nations is provided in table 
4.1, as well as the original world-system position scores. I also created dummy variables 
of each level of the core-periphery hierarchy which are used in some of the plots in this 
chapter.  
Additionally, in order to assess objective environmental performance, I use the 
Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) score. The ESI is a composite measure of 
environmental sustainability that includes a variety of factors such as the amount of 
certain types of pollutants present in the water and air, efforts to reduce such pollution, 
global stewardship, and the technological capacity to debate and solve environmental 
problems. The scores range from 24.7 in Haiti, to 80.5 in Finland. The average ESI score 
for all nations is 49.4, and for the countries in the analysis the mean is 48.52 indicating 
that the sample used here is relatively consistent. Table 4.1 also contains the ESI scores 
for the nations in the sample.  
 Other important variables used in this analysis include the number of internet 
users per-capita, the number of televisions per-capita, the number of cellular telephones 
per-capita, and the number of landline telephones per capita. Others have argued that 
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knowledge of environmental problems is associated with attitudes, and by proxy, 
environmental behaviors (Arbuthnot and Lingg 1975; Vining and Ebreo 1990). Access to 
outside information should be a useful means of acquiring such knowledge, and 
telephones, internet and television are the three most likely venues for this to occur. In 
order to control for the U.S. as an extreme outlier, I have used the logged version of these 
variables to compute the scatterplots below. This approach minimizes the extreme 
influence of the U.S. on the regression line for the core nations. Additionally, I will 
examine the type of government, as determined by the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
(CIA) classification system. Scruggs (1999) found that the government types vary in 
environmental performance specifically if governments sign, ratify, or enforce global 
environmental treaties. This should be especially important in democratic societies in 
which post-materialist values exhibit great influence on attitudes. Also, I assess 
associations between both dependent variables and the sector composition of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in terms of the Industrial, Agricultural, and Service sectors.  
 
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS 
 In order to conduct the following analyses, I use two techniques. First, I examine 
the directions of relationships in order to clarify which patterns exist. Due to the small 
sample size (N = 27) statistical significance in standard parametric statistical procedures 
would be difficult to achieve. Therefore, I employ nonparametric tests of the relationships 
between country level characteristics. 
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 Hypothesis 4.1 states that world-system position will be positively associated with 
aggregate pro-environmental attitudes. Higher scores indicate closer to the core, therefore 
a positive association indicates that those countries closer to the core will have higher 
pro-environmental attitudes. Bivariate correlations between the world-systems position 
score and the two environmental attitudes measures produce mixed results. The first 
environmental attitudes measure, willingness to sacrifice, yields a Pearson’s R of -.142, 
but the second environmental attitudes measure, economic tradeoffs, yields a correlation 
of .257, suggesting that the association is much stronger for economic tradeoffs than for 
willingness to sacrifice. The differences in the underlying concepts being measured, that 
is, willingness to sacrifice to support saving the environment, versus tradeoffs between 
environmental protection and economic growth should explain these differences. Figures 
4.1 and 4.2 illustrate these relationships. It should be noted that the U.S. is the outlier in 
these examples, as the U.S. has such a large GDP and Military Expenditures than other 
nations included in the sample. In figure 4.1, world-system position is negatively 
associated with willingness to sacrifice for all but the core. With economic tradeoffs, 
however, the relationship is positive for all but the periphery. This distinct contradiction 
suggests that the two outcomes—willingness to sacrifice and economic tradeoffs—are 
assessing two different dimensions of environmental attitudes and they mean different 
things to nations in different positions in the core-periphery hierarchy.  
Hypothesis 4.2 states that access to outside information (television, internet, and 
telephones) will be positively related to aggregate environmental attitudes. Bivariate 
correlations show a moderate negative association between landline telephones per-capita 
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and willingness to sacrifice (r = -.222); the association is stronger for cell phones per-
capita (r = -.301), but weaker for internet users per-capita (r = -.167), and weakest for 
number of televisions per-capita (r = -.068). Because these correlations are all in the same 
direction (negative) but of different strength, I conclude that more access to knowledge 
from outside of a particular country does not increase pro-environmental attitudes, but 
also that these indicators measure more than global knowledge. Therefore there is not 
support for this particular hypothesis.   
 The economic tradeoffs measure of environmental concern illustrates mixed 
results as well—with some positive, some negative and different sizes of correlations. 
The correlations for landlines per-capita (r = -.368) and televisions per-capita (r = -.192_ 
with economic tradeoffs is negative, but internet users per-capita (r = .167) and cell 
phones per-capita (r = .029) have positive associations with economic tradeoffs. These 
mixed findings again suggest that there are some underlying differences between the two 
environmental attitude measures as should be expected. In order to see if these effects are 
influenced by world-system position, I constructed scatterplots to illustrate the 
differences in slopes and intercepts on these variables, and further indicate if the 
associations differ by world-system position. The results are presented in figures 4.3 
through 4.10.  
 Assessing the patterns of association between sources of outside information and 
environmental attitudes, the scatterplots make several things clear. First, by controlling 
for world-system position, the differences in the slopes and intercepts are highlighted. 
This is reassuring as it illustrates the powerful effects of the position of a nation within 
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the core-periphery hierarchy. Second, we are able to observe the magnitude of these 
effects. And finally, there are several important differences between the various sources 
of outside information which may be useful in explaining differences in environmental 
attitudes cross-nationally. In order to avoid the influence of outliers, the logged versions 
of all of the measures of access to outside sources of information are used in these plots.  
 In figure 4.3, we again see that the relationship between willingness to sacrifice 
and the logged number of cellular telephones is negative. Though this may seem 
counterintuitive, it could be due to the increasing number of cellular-only households in 
many nations, which certainly helps to explain the much steeper slope (and the higher 
intercept) for semi-peripheral nations when compared to the periphery and core. Figure 
4.7 illustrates a different pattern for the measure of economic tradeoffs, in which the 
semi-periphery exhibits a positive effect while core and peripheral nations exhibit 
negative effects.   
 Figures 4.4 and 4.8 assess the pattern of relationships between the logged number 
of internet user’s per-capita on environmental attitudes. The results suggest a mixed 
pattern where one measure of environmental attitudes tends to increase with more logged 
internet users per capita, while the other decreases.  The effect for the semi-periphery 
tends to follow the overall pattern better than the effects of internet access in core and 
peripheral nations. Overall, however, the effects of internet access on environmental 
attitudes are inconsistent. One potential reason for this finding is that the measure only 
accounts for internet user’s per-capita, and does not address the frequency with which 
one has access to the internet. Additionally, having access to the internet can mean very 
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different things for different people as the ways in which this access is used vary greatly 
between people.  
 Figures 4.5 and 4.9 assess the pattern of relationship between the logged number 
of land line telephones per-capita and environmental attitudes. The bivariate correlations 
are negative, yet the scatterplots highlight several different effects which vary by position 
in the world-system. It appears that the negative effect does not represent the semi-
periphery when compared to economic tradeoffs, suggesting that there are other factors at 
work. The core and the periphery, however, exhibit a clear negative trend. Again, this 
highlights the large impact of the core on the overall pattern. One potential effect of the 
core’s impact on the non-core is the “trickle-down” of technology and information. If this 
is the case, we should expect environmental attitudes to do the same.   
Figures 4.6 and 4.10 assess the degree of relationship between the logged number 
of televisions per-capita and environmental attitudes. Overall, these variables have a 
negative bivariate correlation. In the scatterplots, this is really only representative of the 
peripheral nations, where the effect is negative. For willingness to sacrifice, the effect is 
slightly negative for core and peripheral nations. For economic tradeoffs, however, the 
effect is positive for the core and semi-periphery and negative for the periphery. Overall, 
the effect of access to outside sources of information is limited to landline telephones, 
which appears to be the most consistent correlate of those tested here.  
 Hypothesis 4.2 states that ESI score and environmental attitudes will be 
negatively related. Though this seems counterintuitive, some scholars have suggested that 
the degree to which environmental degradation is experienced will influence the strength 
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of environmental attitudes (Brechin and Kempton 1994). The ESI contains several 
measures of the actual condition of the environment for each nation. Therefore, one 
would expect those nations with more highly degraded ecosystems to have higher pro-
environmental attitudes. For the first measure of environmental attitudes (willingness to 
sacrifice), respondents were asked how willingly they would pay to protect the 
environment. This exhibits a Pearsons R of -.433, and it is statistically significant (p > 
.05). The second measure of environmental attitudes (economic tradeoffs) asks whether 
they would choose environmental protection over economic development. This 
relationship exhibits a Pearsons R of .104 (not statistically significant), which suggests 
once more that these two measures of environmental attitudes operate differently from 
each other, tapping into multiple dimensions. 
 Scatterplots of these relationships also exhibit differences. For the economic 
tradeoffs measure, core nations exhibit a positive relationship, while peripheral and semi-
peripheral nations exhibit negative effects. This can be explained in that residents of core 
nations prefer to give up some economic growth for environmental protection as the 
economies of these nations are relatively strong when compared to other non-core 
nations, but more importantly, core nations have political means for such change in place. 
For willingness to sacrifice, the effects are all negative, though to varying degrees. These 
plots also help to illustrate the apparently large differences between the slopes and 
intercepts for the nations when comparing scores on the ESI to environmental attitudes. 
These plots are shown in figures 4.11 and 4.12. For the most part, ESI score and 
environmental attitudes are related to one another in the hypothesized manner.  
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 Next, I conducted the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The Kolmogorov test is a 
nonparametric test useful when one compares distributions within a single sample of 
data. In short, it tests the null hypothesis that all variables have similar distributions 
against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the groups differs in terms of their 
distribution on a variable. Nonparametric tests do not assume a normally distributed 
variable, though the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test uses a normal distribution function to test 
the hypotheses. The results indicate that the distributions of logged number of landline 
telephones per-capita, ESI scores, logged world-system position scores, willingness to 
sacrifice, and economic tradeoffs are not significantly different from a hypothesized 
normal distribution.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Perhaps the most important finding contained in this analysis is the relationship 
between the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) score and the two measures of 
environmental attitudes. While it is clear that the two dependent variables tap into 
somewhat different dimensions of environmental attitudes; personal willingness to 
sacrifice, and economic tradeoffs, it is less clear exactly why the patterns observed exist. 
More specifically, why do the core nations have a positive relationship with the economic 
tradeoffs measure of environmental attitudes? Though this finding in some ways mirrors 
past research, specifically the findings of Grimes and Roberts (1995), it only appears to 
apply to this one dimension of environmental attitudes, which is essentially a measure of 
valuing environmental protection over economic growth.   
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 Other interesting findings regarding access to outside information suggest that 
virtually any effects of access to information on environmental attitudes are generally 
modified by position in the core-periphery hierarchy. Though these effects can be 
interesting on their own, the small sample size makes it difficult to come to any solid 
conclusions about World-system position’s effects on environmental attitudes. Also, the 
effects of access to outside information appear to be extremely inconsistent for all 
measures except for logged number of landline telephones per capita. This suggests that 
in future analyses, using phones per capita might make the results more consistent and 
useful. Counter to the expectation that access to outside information would help rather 
than hinder environmental attitudes, I find that this relationship is negative. This is also 
unexpected based on the post-materialist thesis as the development of these technologies 
should coincide with the development of post-materialist values.  
 Other analyses also point to some interesting patterns, with respects to the 
proportion of the GDP comprised of various economic sectors. For example, a 
statistically significant association between degree of GDP comprised of the service 
sector shows a positive correlation with World-system position score (.741 Pearsons R 
significant at the .05 level), while the degree of GDP comprised of the agricultural sector 
shows a similarly sized negative correlation (-.797 Pearsons R significant at the .05 
level). Though this is not surprising, this may be an important factor to assess, as it would 
appear that the agricultural lifestyle is less conducive to behaving in an environmentally 
friendly manner, while being more conducive to developing higher levels of concern 
about the state of the environment in the first place. Government type is not associated 
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with environmental attitudes, as expected. These findings do not support the post-
materialist thesis, because the association between higher development and more 
democratic governments does not have a positive association with pro-environmental 
attitudes.  
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CHAPTER 5: MULTILEVEL MODEL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES 
 A variety of factors have been shown to be associated with environmental 
attitudes. These factors, however, have been only approached from either the individual-
level, or from the national-level, and have not been assessed from both levels 
simultaneously. Though much past research has been guided by the assumption that in 
order to change people’s behavior their attitudes must be changed (Jones and Dunlap 
1992), scholars have assumed that efforts to change public perceptions should be focused 
on individual-level attitudes and behaviors (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Unfortunately, this 
ignores the role of social policy and the availability of required infrastructure in changing 
social behavior.  
 Dunlap et al. (2000) propose that humanity has entered a new paradigm in which 
the human-environment relationship is no longer operating on the belief that the natural 
world is unaffected by human behaviors. Moreover, environmental concern is not seen as 
an affectation of the wealthy, but rather that even the poor—some of the people who are 
most affected by environmental degradation—are concerned about the natural world as 
well. While this perspective has been demonstrated to be useful in understanding 
environmental attitudes in the wealthy industrialized nations in the West, it has generally 
not been applied internationally.  
 The post-materialist thesis holds that a fundamental shift in the values of various 
publics has occurred. Ingelhart (1995) finds that this change appears to have occurred 
mainly among certain generations, the post WWII generation for example. Such changes 
in values have decreased the importance of “materialist” values like national security and 
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economic development, and increased the importance of “post-materialist” values like 
environmental protection. Though this perspective has been assessed internationally, it 
has generally only been found to impact certain generations (Inglehart 1995). If the post-
materialist thesis applies to environmental attitudes, one should expect to see significant 
effects of social class characteristics on environmental attitudes, with the wealthier 
respondents having more positive environmental attitudes.  
 The world-systems perspective proposes that by being a beneficiary of the single 
capitalist world-system, wealthy core nations are able to export the negative 
consequences of their environmentally destructive practices to poorer peripheral and 
semi-peripheral nations.  Furthermore, those in the core become less concerned about the 
environment as they do not witness its degradation to the same extent as those in the 
periphery. Though this perspective has been useful in many studies, it has generally 
ignored environmental attitudes, and focused mainly on the characteristics of nations, 
rather than on the characteristics of individuals. If the world-systems perspective is useful 
for examining environmental attitudes, one should expect to find that the effect of world-
system position remains relatively consistent, and that higher positions in the world-
system are associated with higher pro-environmental attitudes.  
 The current analysis attempts to bridge the gap in past research by proposing a 
multilevel model of environmental attitudes. In order to do this, I use the insights 
provided by research that focuses on the individual-level and also on the national-level 
characteristics that influence environmental attitudes simultaneously. I ask the following 
research questions: Do individual- or national- level characteristics better explain levels 
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of environmental concern? Do these differences apply across all levels of the core-
periphery hierarchy?  Last, if there are differences between individuals in different 
nations in terms of environmental attitudes, on which characteristics do they vary? 
 
LITERATURE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES 
 At the national level, previous research tends to have two major shortcomings: 
first, it has tended to focus on nations that are developmentally and economically similar; 
and second, it relies on different measures of environmental attitudes, limiting the ability 
to make comparisons between otherwise similar studies. The findings are useful 
nonetheless, especially considering that this level of measurement is far less common 
than it is for individual-level analyses of environmental attitudes.  
 Studies have found that knowledge of environmental issues may act as a mediator 
between attitudes and behaviors (Arbuthnot and Lingg 1975). Put differently, public 
awareness of the extent of environmental degradation can mean the difference between 
making behavioral changes and not making them. Additionally, research on cross-cultural 
samples suggests that there are some significant differences in the motivating factors 
behind the development of environmental concern, though other factors may exist which 
can partially explain these differences (Milfont et al. 2006).  
 Olofsson and Öhman (2006) suggest that general beliefs about the environment 
and political identification are consistent predictors of environmental concern. These 
findings have been subject to criticism due to the similarities of the nations included. A 
similar criticism was made by Arbuthnot and Lingg (1975) regarding their own findings. 
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This criticism is important because findings based on similar developed nations limit the 
comparability of those findings to the findings in less developed nations.  
 Counter to Dunlap et al.’s (2000) New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), Oreg and 
Katz-Gerro (2006) find that post-materialist values affect environmental concern, which 
then influence pro-environmental behaviors. These findings have also been criticized as 
they focus on developmentally and economically similar nations, but are presented as 
universal. Hayes (2001) examines gender in the context of knowledge of science and 
attitudes toward the environment. She found that men and women do differ in terms of 
their knowledge of scientific matters, but the difference in knowledge had little or no 
effect on their environmental attitudes. She also notes that even when controlling for the 
differences in men and women’s knowledge of science, there are few gender differences 
in environmental attitudes.  
 The world-systems perspective has been used to examine national-level 
characteristics, but has not been used to study the environmental attitudes of the people in 
those nations. Yet world-systems scholars have demonstrated a relatively clear 
relationship between environmental degradation and world-system position. If 
environmental degradation and knowledge of environmental problems are associated 
with environmental attitudes, it can be assumed that nations with more environmental 
degradation will experience higher levels of environmental concern.  
 At the individual level, most of the literature on environmental attitudes has 
focused on the measurement of environmental attitudes (Dunlap et al. 2000; Weigel and 
Weigel 1978; among others). Other scholars have focused on the characteristics of people 
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that influence their environmental attitudes. Mohai (1992) suggests that gender may play 
an important role in environmental attitudes, though later studies have suggested that 
there may be no substantial differences, just different ways to measure environmental 
attitudes for men and women. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) found that whether one lives 
in a rural versus urban area may be a significant predictor of environmental attitudes. 
Urban residents are more concerned about the condition of the environment than are rural 
residents because rural residents are more likely to depend on the land directly (i.e. 
through agricultural work) than urban residents.  
Jones and Dunlap (1992; among others) argue that age is associated with the 
development of environmental attitudes, because younger citizens are less concerned, and  
older citizens are more concerned about the environment because the latter worry about 
their offspring. Additionally, they cite education as a predictor of environmental attitudes. 
Higher education is associated with higher concern. Income, as an indicator of social 
class, is also associated with environmental attitudes. Specifically, there is evidence that 
higher wealth is associated with higher environmental concern (Van Liere and Dunlap 
1980). Additionally, Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) find that more liberal survey 
participants have higher environmental concern.  
Though much of the past research focuses on the characteristics of individuals, 
the characteristics of nations may be equally useful for a more thorough examination of 
environmental attitudes. Past research has not examined individual-level environmental 
attitudes as they relate to the characteristics of the nations in which they live. The NEP is 
a useful perspective to examine individual-level environmental attitudes, though it does 
91 
 
 
 
not incorporate the characteristics of nations into the perspective. The world-systems 
perspective, on the other hand, generally ignores the characteristics of individuals but 
provides great insight into the characteristics of nations. By using both perspectives 
together, we get a clearer picture of these individual and contextual effects as they relate 
to environmental attitudes. Additionally, we can assess if associations within nations are 
similar or different in core and periphery nations.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
 Previous research on environmental attitudes suggests several hypotheses 
regarding both individual- and national- level factors that influence environmental 
attitudes. Based on these hypotheses, and the findings in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I 
propose the following hypotheses for these analyses:  
Hypothesis 5.1: Higher social class standing will be associated with more 
positive environmental attitudes. 
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) suggest that social class position may be an important 
predictor of environmental attitudes. It is hypothesized that those with higher social class 
will be more concerned with the preservation of the environment than those of lower 
social class, and will be less concerned with the economic trade-offs necessary in order to 
protect the environment. Additionally, post-material values are expected to be higher 
among those with greater wealth as they will have fewer problems satisfying their 
material needs (Inglehart 1995).  
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Hypothesis 5.2: Higher age will be associated with more positive environmental 
attitudes. 
Jones and Dunlap (1992; among others) have found support for the age hypothesis, which 
indicates that the elderly are typically more concerned about the environment than the 
young. One possible explanation is that the elderly will be interested in preserving the 
environment for their children and grandchildren, while younger people will not. 
Additionally, older people are more likely to belong to the post-materialist group, who 
has fewer problems satisfying material needs.  
Hypothesis 5.3: Political conservatism (the “right”) will be negatively related to 
positive environmental attitudes.  
Van Liere and Dunlap (1980) propose that political conservatism is associated with lower 
levels of pro-environmental attitudes. Politically conservative attitudes tend to favor the 
economic, social, and political institutions that are typically at odds with preservation of 
nature.  
Hypothesis 5.4: Confidence in social/governmental institutions will be positively 
related to positive environmental attitudes.  
Bernauer (1995) suggests that international issues, like many environmental problems are 
less-likely to be solved when there are lower levels of confidence in social and 
governmental institutions. This relationship is likely because having confidence in these 
institutions and organizations means that one is more likely to believe what they tell you 
with respects to the condition of the natural environment.  
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Hypothesis 5.5: Non Judeo-Christian religious traditions will be more positively 
related to positive environmental attitudes.  
White (1967) argues that the Judeo-Christian religious traditions have a worldview which 
is inconsistent with a pro-environmental worldview. Several places in Judeo-Christian 
texts specify the divinely inspired relationship between man and nature. In most of these 
cases, man is specified as the ruler or master of the natural world.  
Hypothesis 5.6: Gender will have no significant relationship with positive 
environmental attitudes.  
While Kanagy and Nelsen (1995), Mohai (1992), Blocker and Eckberg (1997), and 
Tarrant and Cordell (1997) have found relationships between environmental attitudes and 
gender, the results have generally suggested that while women may be more concerned 
about specific issues, men tend to have higher levels of general environmental concern. 
This suggests that the measure of environmental concern may also play an important role 
in the assessment of this hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 5.7: Rural respondents will have more environmental concern than 
urban respondents.   
Samdahl and Robertson (1989) suggest that community size is positively related to one’s 
perception of environmental problems and support for change.  
 At the national-level, several other hypotheses emerge: 
Hypothesis 5.8: Core nations should have higher average pro-environmental 
attitudes than periphery or semi-periphery nations.  
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As suggested by Bartley and Bergesen (1997; among others), generally the core is 
associated with lower degrees of environmental degradation than the periphery. 
Similarly, people in core nations, with their higher GDP per-capita are more likely to 
engage in protective measures for the environment. Core nations are more likely to have 
larger proportions of their populations with post-materialist values, rather than those in 
peripheral nations with more materialist populations.  
Hypothesis 5.9: Nations with higher average access to information will have 
higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes 
Brechin and Kempton (1994) argue that experiencing environmental degradation will 
increase one’s concern about it. Similarly, one should reasonably expect to develop a 
similar understanding about the condition of the environment with access to outside 
sources of information. Access to information is more likely to occur in wealthier core 
nations, rather than in the periphery. Additionally, in terms of values, information and 
communication would best be described as post-materialist rather than materialist. That 
is, only once a population is able to feed, clothe, and care for themselves, will they 
become concerned about communicating with others who they are not in direct regular 
contact with.  
 Hypothesis 5.10 Lower scores on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) 
will be associated with higher aggregate pro-environmental attitudes. 
Knowledge of environmental problems has been demonstrated to have influence on 
environmental attitudes (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Such knowledge comes from many 
sources, including the various forms of media available in a country. Based on the world-
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systems perspective, one would expect to see that those in the periphery and to a smaller 
extent, the semi-periphery, are more likely to experience environmental degradation, and 
that seeing the degradation first-hand would increase the likelihood of developing pro-
environmental attitudes. Though core nations tend to have lower levels of degradation, 
they also generally have governments that are more responsive to environmental 
problems. The ESI is a composite measure that assesses a nation’s environmental well-
being, as well as its government’s responsiveness to these problems. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 This research uses multilevel analysis techniques that examine the effects of 
individual- and national-level characteristics on two measures (one continuous, one 
dichotomous) of environmental attitudes. Previous research has indicated that individual 
characteristics can be useful in predicting environmental attitudes (Tarrant and Cordell 
1997; Dunlap et al. 2000; Mohai 1992; Van Liere and Dunlap 1980; Jones and Dunlap 
1992; Mohai 1980; Mohai and Bryant 1998; among others). Other research has suggested 
that national-level characteristics may also play an important role in understanding 
human-environment interaction (Bartley and Bergesen 1997; Kick, Burns, Davis, 
Murray, and Murray 1996). Due to the dynamics of the modern capitalist world-system, 
core nations enjoy limited environmental degradation while enjoying economic growth. 
Similarly, peripheral nations experience a somewhat lesser degree of environmental 
degradation than the semi-periphery. Semi-peripheral nations experience the highest 
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degrees of environmental degradation as they attempt to catch up to the core by 
weakening environmental regulations (Bartley and Bergesen 1997).  
 Because the data used in this analysis consists of individuals nested within 
nations, the OLS regression assumption of independent observations is violated. A 
multilevel modeling approach is therefore required, as the assumption of independent 
observations is unnecessary in multilevel models. I conduct these analyses using HLM6 
(Raudenbush et al. 2005). Multilevel analyses allow one to examine separately and 
together, the individual and contextual effects. More specifically, HLM allows one to 
estimate the error terms for each level of analysis separately.   
 This comparison would not be possible using OLS regression techniques because 
the individual-level characteristics cannot be separated from the national-level contextual 
effects. OLS regression does not easily allow one to control for contextual effects with 
cross-sectional data. HLM allows one to separately analyze the individual and contextual 
effects, as well as their separate variance components. This ensures that standard errors 
and other statistics are as precise as possible (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Most 
importantly, in this analysis, HLM highlights individual-level effects, while controlling 
for national-level differences, and also national-level differences that account for 
individual-level variations.   
 Several other decisions must be made in the specification of multilevel models. 
The method of estimation can influence the results to the point of different inferences 
being drawn, so the decision of which method of estimation to use is important. HLM 6 
provides two methods of estimation; restricted maximum likelihood and full maximum 
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likelihood. While this decision warrants much more space than is available here, full 
maximum likelihood estimation was used as it provides a useful means for comparing 
two models to each other via the deviance statistic (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; 
ssicentral.com). Put differently, the deviance statistic and more specifically, the change in 
the deviance statistic between models hints at the explanatory power of subsequent 
models to a baseline model.  
 Additionally, one must make a decision regarding the centering of level-1 
variables. Centering these variables eases the interpretation of results by creating a 
meaningful baseline (0). The centering techniques that are most often used include group-
mean and grand-mean centering. In group-mean centering, the individual score is 
subtracted from the average of all individuals in each level-2 unit. In grand-mean 
centering, the individual score is subtracted from the mean of all cases, regardless of the 
level-2 unit (Littvay 2006). Other analyses, however, can require uncentered or raw 
scores.  
The decision of which centering technique to use can influence the inferences 
made as well as how to interpret the results. Group-mean centering allows us to examine 
differences between individuals within a level-2 unit (in this case, countries) It does not, 
however, allow us to assess group differences between level-2 units. Similarly, while 
grand-mean centering allows us to compare level-2 units to one another, it does little for 
comparing level-1 units within different clusters (Enders and Tofighi 2007). In order to 
answer some of the research questions presented here, both forms of centering are 
necessary. Rather than running each model both ways, I group-mean center all level-1 
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variables, but include an aggregated group mean for important level-1 variables at level-
2. For example, after group-mean centering, I include the average age for each country as 
a variable in the level-2 equation. This allows us to infer about individual-level 
differences (with the group-mean centered variables) as well as group-level differences 
(with the group-mean average variables)8. Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) recommend this 
practice even when one is not interested in both individual and group differences. This 
technique is referred to by a variety of different names, though in essence it is required to 
account for the covariance between the intercepts and slopes when group-mean centering 
is used, by introducing a “contextual factor” into the model (Bickel 2007:146). Kreft and 
de Leeuw (1998:110) suggest that adding the level-1 means into the level-2 model is 
simply “reintroducing the means” that are removed by group-mean centering. Hox (2002) 
notes that group-mean centering creates a different model than using the raw scores 
(uncentered data), while grand-mean centering simply shifts the intercepts. Reintroducing 
level-1 group means at level-2 helps to create a model much more similar to the original 
raw score model while also shifting the intercept for easier interpretation (Hox 2002:62). 
Additionally, Hox (2002), Enders and Tofighi (2007) recommend this technique any time 
cross-level interactions are included in the model. As recommended by Enders and 
                                                             
8 Unfortunately, with only 27 level-2 units, I am unable to include all of the aggregated level-1 variables in 
the level-2 model. In order to ensure the quality and accuracy of the results, I entered each of the 
aggregated variables one at a time to look for significance and to ensure that the variables were entered in a 
meaningful way. Only the significant variables with substantive import ended up making the cut in the final 
2 models. Once I had decided which variables to keep, I entered them each one at a time, in order to make 
sure nothing changed. Ideally I would have enough degrees of freedom remaining that I would not need to 
make these decisions or go through this process, but this was not in the cards for me this time.   
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Tofighi (2007) I used grand-mean centering for all level-2 variables except for the 
aggregated level-1 contextual effect variables.  
 Additionally, in order to answer the question about whether the variables in the 
model operate differently at different levels of the core-periphery hierarchy, I have 
included cross-level interactions. These interactions tell us whether the effect of an 
independent variable (level-1) on the dependent variable (in this case, environmental 
attitudes) is different at different values of some level-2 variable. For example, if we want 
to know if the effect of political identification on environmental attitudes is different in 
core countries than it is in peripheral countries, we would need a cross-level interaction 
of political identification and core/periphery status.  
 I estimate six models to evaluate my hypotheses and research questions. First, I 
specify a baseline model to determine the proportion of variance in environmental 
attitudes that exists within countries (level-1) and between countries (level-2). I then 
assess the differences in environmental attitudes while controlling for individual and 
national-level characteristics (fixed effects models). Next, I examine the random effects 
at level-2 in the random effects model. Finally, I examine the differences in 
environmental attitudes while also controlling for cross-level interactions and random 
effect patterns. The full level-1 (individual-level) model is provided below.  
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 The individual-level (e.g. level-1) data used for the current study come from the 
1999-2000 wave of the World Values Survey. This is an international study conducted by 
different entities in each of the nations in which data was collected. Each nation had their 
own specific methods of data collection with some using simple random samples of the 
population, and with others using more complex proportionally stratified sampling 
design. The results are based on data from 27 countries during 1999-2000. Sample sizes 
for these 27 countries ranged from 720 to 3,000 persons, making up from 2.1% to 8.5% 
of the total sample, with a total sample size of N = 34,555. For a complete list of the 
countries and the sample sizes for each country see Table 3.1 in Chapter 3. Due to the 
complexities of international data collection, and in the interest of space, I will not 
describe the data collection procedures in greater detail. Information is available from the 
World Values Survey website (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). For more 
information regarding the World Values Survey, see the Data and Methods section of 
Chapter 3.   
Though missing data was only moderate (i.e. < 10% on any particular variable), I 
used multiple imputation in the interest of having the most complete data possible. To 
accomplish this, I used the ice module in Stata. I created five imputed datasets on which 
to conduct the analyses in this section. More information about the ice module can be 
found at the Stata website (http://www.statajournal.com/article.html?article=st0067_2 or 
http://www.stata.com). Once the imputed dataset is created, the mim module is used in 
Stata in order to allow me to analyze the five imputed datasets while reporting a single 
set of results. In order to test for the inflation of significance values, I ran the analyses 
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several times on each imputed dataset, as well as 5% samples of each, and then finally on 
the whole dataset using the mim module. The results of these preliminary analyses 
indicate that the large sample size does not artificially inflate the significance of these 
findings.  
 Eattitudes is the shorthand measure for willingness to sacrifice, a scale measure of 
environmental attitudes. The scale is created by using the sum of two items yielding a 
Chronbach’s Alpha of .81. The two items contained in the scale ask the respondents: 
“how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would give part of 
my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental 
pollution” and; “How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I 
would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution.” The two items used to construct the scale are coded such that a 
response more favorable to the environment yields a higher score. 
 For the second dependent variable, economic tradeoffs, a third question asked 
respondents: “Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the 
environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of 
view?” (1) “Protecting the environment should be given priority; even if it causes slower 
economic growth and some loss of jobs” or (2) “Economic growth and creating jobs 
should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent.” This variable 
measures environmental attitudes differently, by comparing economic tradeoffs often 
required in favor of environmental protection. This variable is represented in the 
equations by proenvir.  
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Catholic is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 when a respondent identifies as 
being Catholic. Alternatively, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Protestant and Other 
represent respondents who identify as one of these respective religious traditions. They 
are compared to respondents who identify as having no religious preference. 
Conservative is an ordinal measure of political ideology. It ranges from “far left” at 0, to 
“far right” at 10. Sex is a dichotomous measure of gender, coded as 0 = man, 1 = woman. 
Urban is a dichotomous measure of urban versus rural residence, with a score of 1 
representing urban residence.  
Confidence is a measure of confidence in government institutions, with a higher 
score indicating more confidence and a lower score indicating less. Confenvir is an 
ordinal measure of confidence in the environmental movement. A higher score indicates 
more confidence. Some Primary, Some Secondary, Completed Secondary, Some College, 
and Completed College are dummy coded education variables. A respondent who 
completed college is given a score of 1 for the completed college dummy variable, and a 
0 for all else. For example, a respondent who has completed college will have a score of 
1 on Completed College and a score of 0 on all of the others. The reference category for 
education is “no formal education.” Income represents a categorical measure of total 
income earned. A higher value indicates a higher income category.  
 In order to assess national-level characteristics, the required level-2 equations are 
summarized below: 
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  0 = ߛ00 +  ߛ01  (ܧܵܫ) + ߛ02  (ܣܩܴܫܥܷܮܶ) +     ߛ03  (ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ) +   ߛ04  (ܵܧܴܸܫܥܧܵ) + ߛ05  (ܮܣܰܦܮܫܰܧ) + ߛ06  (ܯܱܰܣܴܥܪܻ) +   ߛ07  (ܥܱܯܯܷܰܫܵܶ) + ߛ08  (ܱܶܪܧܴܩܱܸ) + ߛ09 (ܵܧܯܫܲܧܴ)  ߛ010  (ܲܧܴ) + ߛ011  (ܴܱܱܴܲܲܶܫܱܰ ܹܱܯܧܰ) + ߛ012  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܷܵܤܬܧܥܶܫܸܧ ܱܵܥܫܣܮ ܥܮܣܵܵ) +
ߛ013  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܥܧ ܫܰ ܩܱܸܶ ܫܰܵܶܫܷܶܶܫܱܰܵ) +
ߛ014  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܥܱܰܨܫܦܧܰܥܧ ܫܰ ܶܪܧ ܧܸܰܫܴܱܰܯܧܰܶܣܮ ܯܱܸܧܯܧܰܶ) +
ߛ015  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܱܵܯܧ ܴܲܫܯܣܴܻ ܧܦ) + ߛ016  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܱܵܯܧ ܵܧܥܱܰܦܣܴܻ ܧܦ) +
ߛ017  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܥܱܯܲܮܧܶܧܦ ܵܧܥܱܰܦܣܴܻ ܧܦ) + ߛ018  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܱܵܯܧ ܥܱܮܮܧܩܧ) +
ߛ019  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܥܱܯܲܮܧܶܧܦ ܥܱܮܮܧܩܧ) + ߛ020  (ܣܸܧܴܣܩܧ ܫܰܥܱܯܧ) + ݑ0 
 1 =  ߛ10 +  ߛ11(ܵܧܯܫܲܧܴܫܲܪܧܴܻ) +  ߛ12(ܲܧܴܫܲܪܧܴܻ) +  ݑ1 
 . 
 . 
 . 
 9 =   ߛ90 + ߛ91(ܵܧܯܫܲܧܴܫܲܪܧܴܻ) +  ߛ92(ܲܧܴܫܲܪܧܴܻ) +  ݑ9 
.  . 
 . 
 . 
 21 =   ߛ210 + ߛ211(ܵܧܯܫܲܧܴܫܲܪܧܴܻ) + ߛ212 (ܲܧܴܫܲܪܧܴܻ) +  ݑ21  
 
 The national-level (e.g. level-2) data used for this analysis come from a variety of 
sources. Primarily, I use data from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World 
Factbook (cia.gov).  I do, however also include measures from the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI). The ESI is an attempt to develop a composite measure of 
overall environmental performance of most nations by aggregating known information on 
environmental degradation, policy, and participation in international treaties on the 
environment. It is collaboration between the World Economic Forum, the Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy, and the Center for International Earth Science 
Information Network (CIESIN), at Columbia University 
(http://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/). These data cover the year 2000.  
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 At level 2, ESI represents the nation’s score on the Environmental Sustainability 
Index (ESI). A higher score represents a nation with a government and industry that is 
more responsive to environmental degradation, among other things. Agricult represents 
the proportion of the nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that is made up of the 
agricultural sector. Industry represents the proportion of the nation’s GDP that is made up 
of the industrial sector. Services represents the proportion of the nation’s GDP that is 
made up of the service sector. Landline represents the number of landline telephones per-
capita within a country. It is used as a proxy measure for the degree of contact with others 
both in and outside of a country. Monarchy, Communist, and Othergov represent dummy 
variables for the type of government of a country. The reference category for these 
variables is “republic.”  
Semiper represents a nation’s position in the world-system core-periphery 
hierarchy. A score of 1 on semiper indicates a semiperipheral nation. Per indicates 
whether (1) or not (0) a nation is peripheral. Proportion Woman represents the aggregate 
gender makeup from level-1. Average subjective social class represents the average 
subjective social class from level-1. Average Confidence in Govt Institutions and Average 
Confidence in the Environmental Movement represent the aggregate levels of confidence 
in these two institutions at level-1. Average Some Primary Ed represents the proportion 
of respondents in a country with some primary education. Similarly, Average Some 
Secondary Ed, Average Completed Secondary Ed, Average Some College, and Average 
Completed College represent the proportion within each country that has attained each 
level of education. Average Income represents the average level-1 income.  
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FINDINGS 
 The two models examine the effects of both individual and national-level 
characteristics on environmental attitudes (see Tables 5.1 and 5.2) by using two different 
dependent variables. The first model examines the scale measurement of environmental 
attitudes (willingness to sacrifice), while the second model examines the dichotomous 
outcome variable (economic tradeoffs). This difference requires two separate statistical 
techniques be used, even within the context of HLM. The first model produces results 
similar to OLS regression techniques, assuming a normal distribution of the outcome 
variable. The second model requires the use of a Bernoulli distribution on the outcome 
variable, that is, a dichotomous outcome.  
 
Model 1: Willingness to Sacrifice Scale 
 Hierarchical Linear Modeling allows coefficients to be interpreted in roughly the 
same manner as most OLS results. For example, with all else being held constant, for 
each one unit increase in education environmental attitudes are expected to decrease by -
.08. This makes the results simple to interpret, though it should not belie the complexities 
of what this analysis is actually telling us.  
 At the individual level (i.e. level-1), many of the findings of main effects are 
similar to the findings in Chapter 3. Some findings however are quite different.  As 
shown in Model 5 (Table 5.1), when compared to those who do not identify as belonging 
to a religious tradition, Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims, 
Buddhists, Hindus, and those identifying as some “other” religion are no different. This 
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indicates that even after controlling for other factors, certain religious beliefs are not 
associated with environmental concern. Additionally, there are some significant cross-
level interactions (Model 6 – Table 5.1). Muslims in the semi-periphery have lower levels 
of environmental concern as illustrated in Figure 5.3. In other words, Muslims in semi-
peripheral nations have lower levels of environmental concern than Muslims in core 
nations. Similarly, Hindu’s in the semi-periphery have lower environmental attitudes than 
those in other world-system positions, as illustrated in figure 5.3. Buddhists however 
have higher environmental attitudes in the periphery than in other world-system 
positions. Put differently, Buddhists in peripheral nations have higher environmental 
attitudes than Buddhists in the core. Additionally, the variance components (Model 5, 
Table 5.1) for Catholic, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and those who identify as some 
other religion are statistically significant, indicating that there is significant differences 
between nations (level-2 units) in the effects of these variables. This partially explains the 
lack of significant main effects of religious affiliation, as the effects vary by country, 
essentially cancelling the effects of such affiliation. 
 In contrast to the findings in Chapter 3, however, political conservatism is not 
associated with environmental attitudes (Table 5.1). On the other hand, women have 
lower environmental attitudes than did men (-.075). Age is not a significant predictor of 
environmental attitudes. Unlike the finding in Chapter 3, urban residents are no different 
from rural residents with regards to environmental attitudes. There is a significant 
interaction between women and peripheral and semi-peripheral world-system positions, 
indicating that women in the periphery and semi-periphery have lower environmental 
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attitudes than women in the core. A plot of these interaction effects is provided in figures 
5.4. The variance in the effects of political ideology, sex, age, and urban residence are 
significant, indicating that the effects of these factors on environmental attitudes varied 
by the national level context.  
 A one unit increase in subjective social class corresponds to a .11 unit increase in 
environmental attitudes (Model 5). Also, the different dummy variables for education 
indicated that higher levels of education are associated with more pro-environmental 
attitudes than lower levels of education. Having some primary education only is 
associated with a .131 unit change in environmental attitudes when compared to having 
no formal education. Having some secondary education only is associated with a .260 
unit increase in environmental attitudes. Completing secondary education only is 
associated with a .317 unit increase in environmental attitudes, while attending some 
college only is associated with a .364 unit increase in environmental attitudes. Lastly, 
completing college is associated with a .457 unit increase in environmental attitudes. 
Income is not associated with any difference in environmental attitudes. These findings 
mirror the results of the analysis in Chapter 3.  
Cross-level interactions between some primary education, some secondary 
education, and some college with peripheral world-system position are significant as 
well. Some primary education has a negative -.420 unit effect on environmental attitudes 
in peripheral nations, Some secondary education has a negative -.408 unit effect on 
environmental attitudes in the periphery, and some college education has a negative .333 
unit effect in the periphery. The effects of these interactions are illustrated in Figure 5.5. 
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Put differently, respondents in the periphery with some primary education, some 
secondary education, or some college education are less concerned about the environment 
than those with similar levels of education in the core. The variance components of 
completed college education, completed secondary education, and some primary 
education are significant indicating that the effects of these variables on environmental 
attitudes vary between countries. The same is true of subjective social class.  
 Confidence in government institutions has a positive effect on environmental 
attitudes. For a one unit change in confidence in government institutions, environmental 
attitudes are expected to increase by .09 units. Similarly, confidence in the environmental 
movement has a stronger positive effect on environmental attitudes. For a one unit 
change in confidence in the environmental movement, holding all else constant, 
environmental attitudes is expected to increase by .24 units. The variance components in 
Model 5 indicate that the effect of confidence in both government institutions and the 
environmental movement varied significantly among the countries in the sample.  
 There are some important main effects at the national level (i.e. level-2) as well. 
National scores on the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) are not associated with 
changes in environmental attitudes. Additionally, the type of government of a nation has 
an impact on the environmental attitudes of its citizens. When compared to republics, 
monarchies have lower environmental attitudes. Monarchist governments are associated 
with a -.73 unit decrease in environmental attitudes. Communist governments and other 
types of governments are associated with higher environmental attitudes. Communist 
governments, holding all else equal, are associated with a .79 unit increase in 
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environmental attitudes. Other forms of government, holding all else equal, are associated 
with a .44 unit increase in environmental attitudes.  
 The percent of the nation’s GDP comprised of the service sector is positively 
associated with environmental attitudes. That is, a one unit change in the percent GDP 
comprised of the service sector is associated with a .02 unit increase in average 
environmental attitudes in a nation. Additionally, the number of landline telephones per-
capita is negatively associated with environmental attitudes (-.05).  
 Finally, the results for world-system position suggest mixed results. When 
compared to core nations, semi-peripheral nations have lower environmental attitudes. 
Specifically, semi-peripheral nations are associated with a -.43 unit decrease in 
willingness to sacrifice. Peripheral nations are significantly more likely to have higher 
degrees of willingness to sacrifice than core nations9. Specifically, peripheral nations are 
associated with a .28 unit increase in environmental attitudes. This finding is indicative of 
the inverted “U” shape of environmental concern with the semi-periphery having the 
lowest levels of concern as suggested by Bartley and Bergesen (1997).  
 Group differences between countries are assessed by examining the aggregated 
level-1 variables for some characteristics. The proportion of a population that is 
comprised of women is associated with a -5.8 unit decrease in environmental attitudes on 
average within countries. This indicates that there are significant differences among 
countries with regards to the effect of gender on environmental attitudes. Similarly, 
                                                             
9 Additional analyses indicate that peripheral nations are significantly different than semi-peripheral nations 
as well. The DV is a scale measure of environmental attitudes ranging from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most 
concerned about the environment.  
111 
 
 
 
average subjective social class, average income, and the proportions of the population 
with each level of education indicate some significant variation between countries (with 
the exception of the proportion of respondents who have completed some college). 
Subjective social class is associated with a -1.6 unit decrease in average environmental 
attitudes, while average income is associated with a -.26 unit decrease in environmental 
attitudes. The proportion with some primary education only is associated with a 3.6 unit 
increase in environmental attitudes, while the proportion completing college is associated 
with a 9.6 unit increase in environmental attitudes. Lastly, the average confidence in 
government institutions and the average confidence in the environmental movement are 
associated with a .77 and -0.9 unit change in average environmental attitudes 
respectively.  
 An examination of the variance components of Models 5 and 6 indicate some 
interesting effects. The inclusion of cross-level interactions makes all of the variance 
components statistically significant. In fact, where they are barely significant in Model 5, 
they are now more significant in Model 6. Overall, this suggests that there is something 
about the country (level-2 unit), rather than the individual that contributes to 
environmental attitudes. While the ICC suggests that only about 3% of the variation in 
environmental attitudes is at level-2, this finding perhaps points to the variables for which 
this effect exists.  
 Overall, these results are relatively consistent with the findings in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4. About 97% of the variation in individual environmental attitudes is found 
within countries, with about 3% of the variation in individual environmental attitudes is 
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due to national level variation. This is computed by calculating the Intraclass correlation 
coefficient (ICC), which is summarized as follows:  
 
In short, the ICC represents the variance within level-2 units divided by the total variance 
(level-1 plus level-2). The full results of Model 1 are presented in Table 5.1.  
 The deviance statistics of each of the six models indicate that the final model 
(Model 6, Table 5.1) is the best fit to the data, though it is not significantly better than 
Model 5. The statistical significance of most level-2 variables and most of the variance 
components indicate that much of the model fit is improved by accounting for national-
level variation in environmental attitudes.  
 Additional calculations are required to compare the multilevel model to the 
individual-level model (Chapter 3) in terms of the proportions of variance explained. 
Though HLM6 does not provide any of these statistics, many can be calculated by hand. 
In order to compare the approximate r-squared of the individual model to the multilevel 
model, I computed the proportion of variance explained in each model. The overall 
changes are indicative of a better model.  
 Compared to the baseline (null) model, model 2—the model with no interactions 
and no socioeconomic status variables—explains about 5.5% of the level-1 variance, 
about 58% of the level-2 variance and about 9.2% of the overall variance. Model 3—the 
model with cross-level interactions but no SES variables—these proportions change and 
provide about 5.6% of the variance at level-1, 63.5% of the level-2 variance, and about 
9.6% of the overall variance. Model 4—the fixed effects model, with no interactions and 
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no variance components—about 4.8% of the level-1variance is explained, about 77.4% of 
the level-2 variance, and about 10% of the overall variance explained. In Model 5, the 
main effects model, about 7.3% of the variance at level-1 is explained, while about 61.5% 
of the variance at level-2 is explained with about 11.1% of the overall variance being 
explained. The final model explains about 7.3% of the level-1 variance, about 64.7% of 
the level-2 variance, and about 11.4% of the overall variance is explained. Overall, this 
indicates that the multilevel model explains more of the variation in environmental 
attitudes than the individual-level model does, and that the final model (Model 6) 
explains more variance than previous models.  
 The results indicate many significant effects of social class. An additional set of 
models were developed to assess these effects specifically.  When used alone, subjective 
social class, education, and income accounts for about 1.8% of the variance in level-1 
willingness to sacrifice. While small, this still amounts for a relatively large portion of the 
level-1 variance. These results indicate, above all else, the impact of social class. This 
finding is consistent with the post-materialist thesis in that those with higher socio-
economic statuses have higher pro-environmental attitudes.  
 
Model 2: Economic Tradeoffs  
The second analysis uses a dichotomous measure of environmental attitudes. 
Dichotomous outcomes violate the assumption of normality in OLS approaches to data 
analysis. In order to overcome this limitation, logistic regression is generally the 
appropriate analytic procedure. If we are to understand how both individual- and 
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national-level characteristics are associated with environmental attitudes, however, a 
multilevel approach is necessary. With HLM, this comes in the form of the Bernoulli 
outcome.  In addition to the usual output, HLM also provides odds-ratios, which are 
useful for comparing the change in the likelihood of one outcome over another for 
respondents with a certain characteristic.  
When conducting analyses with HLM and using Bernoulli outcomes, one must 
also choose between unit-specific and population-average model results. According to 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002:303-304), the unit-specific model “describes a process that 
is occurring in each level-2 unit [i.e. countries] [. . .] of central interest is the question of 
how these processes differ over a population of level-2 units;” whereas the population-
average “results can be deduced as one characteristic of the distribution of the unit-
specific results.” For the results present here, I use the unit-specific model output, as I am 
more interested in the differences between nations, than the average effects of level-1 
units (e.g. individuals) across level-2 units (e.g. nations). The results of this analysis are 
provided in Table 5.2.  
Similar to the individual-level analysis conducted in Chapter 3, confidence in the 
environmental movement remains a statistically significant predictor of environmental 
attitudes. Respondents with higher degrees of confidence in the environmental movement 
are 1.3 times more likely to have more pro-environmental attitudes than those who have 
less confidence in the environmental movement. Confidence in government institutions is 
not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes, as it was not in Chapter 3.  
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Respondents with higher incomes are no more likely to favor environmental 
protection over economic growth than those with lower incomes. Unlike in Chapter 3, 
however, subjective social class is not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes. 
The effect for education is similar in the multilevel model; respondents who have 
completed secondary education, some college, or completed college are progressively 
more likely to favor the environment over economic growth than those with no 
education10. Specifically, those who have completed secondary education are 1.28 times 
more likely than those with no formal education to favor the environment; those who 
have some college education are 46% more likely to favor the environment over 
economic growth; while those who have completed college are almost 1.7 times more 
likely to favor environmental protection over economic growth.  
Age is not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes in this model. 
Women are about 6% less likely to favor the environment over economic growth than 
men, and urban residents are no different from rural residents in their environmental 
attitudes. Politically right wing respondents are slightly less likely than left wing 
respondents to favor the environment over the economy. Hindu, Muslim, Catholic, 
Protestant, Orthodox Christian, and Buddhist respondents are no more likely to favor 
environmental protection over economic growth than those with no religious preference, 
while Jews are about 32% less likely than those with no religious preference. Those who 
                                                             
10 Additional analyses indicate that respondents who had completed secondary education, some 
college, or completed college are significantly different from those who had no formal education, 
as well as those who had not completed secondary education. 
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identify as some other religion are about 1% less likely to favor environmental protection 
over economic growth.  
At the national-level (e.g. level-2), having access to a landline telephone is a 
significant predictor of environmental attitudes. More specifically, respondents from 
nations with a more landline telephones per-capita are about 7% less likely to favor the 
environment over economic growth on average. World-system position is also negatively 
related to environmental attitudes. Respondents in semi-peripheral nations are about 38% 
less likely to favor the environment over economic growth than core nations, while 
respondents in peripheral nations are about 45% less likely to favor the environment on 
average. Additionally, respondents with higher incomes are about 24% less likely to 
favor the environment over economic growth than are respondents with lower incomes. 
The composition of the various sectors of the economy also has an important effect on 
environmental attitudes. Nations with a higher percent of their GDP comprised of the 
agricultural sector are about 2% more likely to favor the environment over economic 
growth, while nations with a higher percent of their GDP comprised of the service sector 
are about 1.5% more likely to favor the environment.  
The type of government of a country is also a significant predictor of 
environmental attitudes. Countries with Monarchist governments are about 31% less 
likely to favor the environment over economic growth. Communist governments, on the 
other hand, are about 46% more likely to favor the environment over economic growth. 
Additionally, the average subjective social class of a nation is related to the average level 
of environmental concern of its respondents. Specifically, higher average subjective 
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social class is associated with a 52% lower likelihood of favoring environmental 
protection over economic growth.  
Several interesting cross-level interactions are also observed (Model 4 -Table 
5.2). The effects of religion on environmental attitudes appear to have considerable 
variation between nations. Catholics in the semi-periphery are about 21% more likely to 
favor environmental protection over economic development than Catholics in core 
countries (see Figure 5.6). Orthodox Christians in the semi-periphery are about 44% less 
likely to favor environmental protection than Orthodox Christians in the core. Muslims in 
the periphery are 180% more likely to favor the environment than Muslims in core 
countries. Additionally, Muslims in the semi-periphery are about 73% more likely to 
favor the environment over economic growth than Muslims in the core. Respondents who 
identified as some “Other” religion in the semi-periphery are 1.5 times more likely to 
favor the environment than their counterparts in the core while their peripheral 
counterparts are twice as likely as those in the core to favor the environment over the 
economy. Finally, those with higher degrees of confidence in government institutions in 
the periphery are about 18% more likely to favor the environment than their core 
counterparts (see Figure 5.7), while those with more confidence in the environmental 
movement in the semi-periphery are about 7% less-likely to favor the environment over 
the economy than their core counterparts.  
Additionally, the variance components (Model 3 - Table 5.2) highlight some 
important differences in the effects of certain variables in different countries. Among the 
effects of religious affiliation, Muslims, Catholics, Hindus, and those with some other 
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affiliation have significant variance components, suggesting that the effects of these 
variables may have differing effects on environmental attitudes between countries. 
Political ideology, age, subjective social class, and income also have significant variation 
in their effects in different countries. Overall, this explains why some of these variables 
are non-significant in the models presented above. In particular, this is potentially 
because the differences in these effects may cancel one another out when comparing 
countries.  
When using Bernoulli outcomes certain statistics are unavailable. A proportion of 
variance explained is only available for the level-2 effects. As noted in Raudenbush and 
Bryk (2002:309) this can be computed by taking the variance components at level-2 from 
the null model and subtracting the other model variance components from it. This number 
is then divided by the null model variance once more.  The results show that 84% of the 
level-2 variance in Model 1, 81% of the level-2 variance in Model 3, and 82% of the 
level-2 variance in Model 4 is explained. This indicates that the cross-level interactions 
were necessary to include.  
Overall, the results of the second analysis indicate that social class is a significant 
correlate of environmental attitudes, though the effects are in some cases different than 
they are in the first analysis. This again supports the post-materialist perspective, and 
highlights the importance of the two different measures of environmental attitudes.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
The results suggest several important conclusions about the factors which 
influence environmental attitudes. Hypothesis 5.1 proposes that higher social class 
standing will be positively related to pro-environmental attitudes. In the first model, 
subjective social class and education are both significant predictors of environmental 
attitudes, however income is not. This may be due to the way in which income is coded, 
or the fact that it is really only the income of the respondent, and not the total family 
income. In the second model, however, only education is a significant predictor of 
environmental attitudes. Overall this indicates that social class is related to environmental 
attitudes, though some measures of social class, such as subjective social class and 
education may be more useful. Additionally, the variance components of the first model 
indicates that, at least at some levels of education, variance in the effect of country-level 
education may be more important than the actual level of education at the individual 
level.  
 Hypothesis 5.2 proposes that age will be positively related to pro-environmental 
attitudes. Both multilevel analyses have failed to confirm this hypothesis. In other words, 
environmental attitudes appear to be similar, regardless of the age of the respondent. The 
significant variance components of age in both models suggest that the variance in age is 
likely related to national-level characteristics, rather than individual-level characteristics. 
In other words, the effect of age could be different in two countries. In preliminary 
analyses, the effects of age on environmental attitudes varied greatly. Where some 
countries have strong and obvious negative associations between attitudes and age, others 
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have relatively strong positive associations. This supports the post-materialist thesis in 
that post-material values are said to exhibit a generational effect, though I do not assess 
differences in generations, only actual age.  
 Hypothesis 5.3 claims that political conservatism (i.e. politically right wing) is 
negatively related to pro-environmental attitudes. In the first analysis, this hypothesis is 
not supported, but in the second it is. This indicates that the way we measure 
environmental attitudes may play an important role in whether or not political 
conservatism has an impact on the formation of environmental attitudes. Additionally the 
variance components of both models indicate that the variance in the effect of political 
ideology on environmental attitudes may be related to differences in the conceptions of 
political ideology in each country.  Preliminary analyses show the different slopes of 
political ideologies’ effect on environmental attitudes. Again, it is clear that there is 
considerable variation among nations. For example, in some nations being right wing is 
associated with lower environmental attitudes, while in some countries the opposite is 
true. Again, this finding is consistent with the post-materialist thesis in that political 
attitudes may reflect a generational pattern differently among the populations of various 
nations.  
 Hypothesis 5.4 proposes that confidence in social/governmental institutions will 
be positively related to pro-environmental attitudes. The first analysis confirms this 
hypothesis, while the second fails to do so, at least for confidence in government 
institutions. For confidence in the environmental movement, both models indicate 
support for this hypothesis (Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Overall this suggests that confidence in 
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government institutions and in the environmental movement are significant predictors of 
environmental attitudes.  
Hypothesis 5.5 suggests that non Judeo-Christian religious traditions will be more 
positively related to pro-environmental attitudes. While there are some differences by 
religious tradition, it is difficult to confirm this hypothesis based on these findings. It 
appears that the measure used to assess environmental attitudes might matter even more 
than the religious affiliation of the respondent as religion is much less significant in the 
first model than the second. The cross-level interactions by religious group indicate that 
world-system position may have different effects on environmental attitudes in different 
countries. For example, in the first model, semi-peripheral Muslims appear to have lower 
environmental attitudes than Muslims in the core (as illustrated in Figures 5.3 and 5.6). In 
the second model, however, they are more likely to favor environmental protection over 
economic growth than Muslims in the core. This suggests the underlying difference in 
these two distinct measures of environmental attitudes. The variance components of both 
models indicate that this variance may be more related to national-level characteristics 
than individual-level characteristics.  
 Hypothesis 5.6 proposes that gender will not be a significant predictor of 
environmental attitudes. This hypothesis is not supported as there are differences in 
environmental attitudes between women and men. Both models indicate that women are 
less concerned about the environment than men. Preliminary analyses indicate this 
pattern by showing the environmental attitudes of all countries as they are modified by 
gender. Cross-level interactions indicate that women in semi-peripheral and peripheral 
122 
 
 
 
countries have lower levels of environmental concern than their counterparts in core 
nations (Figure 5.4).  
Hypothesis 5.7 suggests that rural respondents will have a positive association 
with pro-environmental attitudes. The analyses indicate that rural and urban respondents 
are no different from one another. The models did not support this hypothesis because 
there is no association between rural/urban and pro-environmental attitudes. The variance 
components of both models, however, indicate that the variance in environmental 
attitudes associated with urban-rural residence can be attributed to national-level 
characteristics rather than individual-level characteristics.  
 Among the results for national-level characteristics, hypothesis 5.8 proposes that a 
higher world-system position will be related to more pro-environmental attitudes. Even 
though there is some evidence to suggest that this may be partially supported, there do 
not appear to be any consistent differences between the different measures of 
environmental attitudes. With that said, peripheral nations tend to have lower 
environmental attitudes than do core countries in Model 2, and semi-peripheral countries 
have lower environmental attitudes in both models. Where this hypothesis finds its best 
support is in the cross-level interactions. Overall, these findings appear to offer limited 
support for the post-materialist thesis in that the measure of environmental attitudes 
appears to affect the relationship between attitudes and world-system position.   
Hypothesis 5.9 suggests that access to outside sources of information will be 
negatively related to pro-environmental attitudes. The results for this hypothesis indicate 
that this effect is as expected. In the scaled measure of environmental attitudes, the 
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proportion of respondents with a landline telephone is a significant predictor of 
environmental attitudes, indicating that as the number of landline telephones per-capita in 
a country increased, environmental attitudes decreased. Specifically, a one unit change in 
the number of landline telephones per-capita is associated with a .05 unit decrease in the 
willingness to sacrifice. In the dichotomous measure of environmental attitudes the same 
is true. Specifically, countries with a higher number of landline phones per-capita are 
about 7% less likely to favor environmental protection over economic growth. This 
finding is inconsistent with the post-materialist thesis in that one should expect that 
access to outside information should be related to higher environmental attitudes scores, 
rather than lower.  
Hypothesis 5.10 proposes that the ESI score will be negatively associated with 
pro-environmental attitudes. The results do not indicate support for this hypothesis. In 
both analyses, ESI score is not a significant predictor of environmental attitudes.  In other 
words, the degree of degradation and government responsiveness to degradation in a 
nation is not associated with the attitudes of the population of that nation.  
 Overall, these findings show support or partial support for six of the ten 
hypotheses. More specifically, they indicate that political conservatism, confidence in 
social and governmental institutions, social class, access to outside information, gender, 
world-system position, and education are significant predictors of environmental 
attitudes. Furthermore, age, religion, and rural/urban residence have little or no consistent 
effect on environmental attitudes. This may be due to significant variations between 
countries on these variables, though other explanations may exist as well.  
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 Additionally, with regards to the specific research questions posed for these 
analyses, several important findings can be pointed out. Do individual- or national- level 
characteristics better explain aggregate levels of environmental concern? An 
examination of the variance components of these models indicates that individual-level 
characteristics account for more of the variance (about 97%) in environmental attitudes, 
the national-level characteristics account for about 3% of the variance. While the 3% 
between-country variance is a relatively small portion of the overall variance, it is 3% of 
the variance that is relatively easily explained by the characteristics of the nation being 
studied. In fact, the final model for willingness to sacrifice explains about 65% of the 
level-2 variance. This same model explains about 7.3% of the level-1 variance and an 
overall 11.4% of the variance. When compared to the individual-level model in Chapter 
3, this is a significant improvement.  
 Second, do these differences apply across all levels of the core-periphery 
hierarchy?  It appears that yes, they do apply across all levels of the core-periphery 
hierarchy. However, there are several important differences in certain variables such as 
religion, and education. This is important to note, as it appears that the effect of the 
position of a country in the modern world-system is likely to impact specific 
characteristics like religious beliefs but not the overall differences between respondents’ 
attitudes. In additional models, world-system position did not significantly explain 
environmental attitudes by itself. It does, however, explain a significant portion of the 
variance in environmental attitudes once you include individual (level-1) characteristics. 
Overall this is substantial support for the world-systems perspective in that environmental 
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attitudes have not been shown to be significantly related to world-system position in 
previous research.  
 Finally, if there are differences between individuals in different nations in terms 
of environmental attitudes, on which characteristics do they vary? Though cross-level 
interactions only significantly predicted core-periphery hierarchy differences among 
countries for a handful of variables, these variables could have a significant impact on 
our understanding of environmental attitudes. First, Muslim respondents exhibited some 
variation in attitudes depending upon where their country fell in the core-periphery 
hierarchy. Second, Hindus and Buddhists exhibited a similar pattern, as did Jewish 
respondents in the second analysis. Women have lower environmental attitudes than men 
overall, but women in non-core countries have increasingly lower environmental attitudes 
than women in the core. Confidence in government institutions is modified by world-
system position in the second model. Specifically, those with more confidence in the 
government in peripheral nations have an 18% higher chance of choosing to protect the 
environment over economic growth. Lastly, education, particularly for the education 
categories that did not mark completion of a certain level (i.e. “some primary,” “some 
secondary,” and “some college” are impacted by world-system position. Specifically, 
they are associated negatively with environmental attitudes when compared to their 
counterparts in the core.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
 In the previous chapters I have presented three analyses designed to shed some 
light on both individual-level and national-level characteristics that influence 
environmental attitudes internationally. While each of the analyses allows some 
important conclusions to be drawn, I believe that the biggest impact of this research is in 
the combined results. In this chapter, I will first reiterate the most important findings 
from the three analyses, while situating these results into the theoretical frameworks 
discussed in Chapter 2. Second, I will discuss these findings and their theoretical 
implications in an effort to situate this research within the field of environmental 
sociology. Finally, I will discuss the limitations of each of the analyses and discuss future 
directions for research on the topic of international environmental attitudes.  
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The preceding analyses have highlighted several important findings. At the 
individual-level, the previously observed correlates of environmental concern explain a 
significant portion of its variation. At the national-level, the importance of measurement 
of environmental attitudes is highlighted. The multilevel models demonstrate how these 
individual-level and national-level differences interact with one another to help highlight 
some factors influencing environmental attitudes, while minimizing others. Here, I will 
restate the important conclusions from each analysis, while framing the results in the 
theoretical contexts used to develop the analysis, the world-systems perspective and the 
New Ecological Paradigm (NEP).  
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Individual-Level 
 The individual-level analysis conducted in Chapter 3 helps to demonstrate the 
small effects of previously hypothesized correlates of environmental attitudes. While 
these effects may be indicative of weak theoretical guidance, it is more likely that they 
reflect the unapparent complexity of environmental attitude formation. Specifically, the 
findings suggest three important things about explaining environmental attitudes by 
individual characteristics: (1) social class appears to have an important impact on 
environmental attitudes, though how social class is measured appears to be an important 
determinant of exactly how this relationship operates; (2) confidence in social and/or 
governmental institutions seems to influence environmental attitudes, but in some 
instances, not in the way one might expect; and (3) there is evidence that religious beliefs 
play a role in the development of these attitudes as well, though the role religion plays 
may be difficult to precisely capture.  
 In order to accurately characterize the nature of the social class—attitude 
relationship, it must be discussed in its component parts. In these analyses, the measures 
of social class included income, education, and subjective social class. Income proved not 
to be a correlate of environmental attitudes regardless of how environmental attitudes 
were conceptualized. Subjective social class proved to have a significant effect on 
environmental attitudes, indicating that the higher the subjective social class, the more 
positive the environmental attitudes. In the OLS model (DV = Willingness to Sacrifice), 
education is significantly related to environmental attitudes, as hypothesized, indicating 
that more education is associated with pro-environmental attitudes. In the Logistic 
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regression model, the impact of education on environmental attitudes is progressively 
stronger as education increases, after one finishes secondary school. For respondents with 
less than a secondary school education, there is no significant difference when compared 
to respondents with no formal education.  
 It appears that the impact of social class may have several possible explanations. 
First, the manner in which social class is conceptualized cannot be understated (Bollen et 
al. 2001). In fact, often times conceptualizing social class in one way or another can 
create problems when it comes to the comparability of findings in two or more studies. 
Though I attempted to overcome this difficulty by including three distinct measures of 
social class (subjective social class, income, and education), one of the most common 
measures of social class (income) had no significant effect in any of the final models. 
Education and subjective social class however were important correlates of 
environmental attitudes. Second, we turn to the hypothesized relationship between social 
class and environmental attitudes. That is, social class position is positively related to 
environmental attitudes. The results of this analysis indicate support for such a pattern, 
but they are unable to explain this relationship. Van Liere and Dunlap (1980:183) 
propose that this relationship exists because upper and middle classes have “solved their 
basic material needs and thus are free to focus on the more aesthetic aspects of human 
existence.” Additionally, they note that this pattern may reflect “relative,” rather than 
“absolute” deprivation in that the wealthy tend to live in nicer places, with less personal 
interaction with environmental degradation, and so when they see it they recognize it for 
what it is. Conversely, the poor live, work, and participate in recreational activities in 
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poorer, dirtier areas, and so they see this as a norm. Post-materialism posits that this 
relationship is what is expected as well.  
 Having confidence in social and government institutions appears to have at least a 
moderate effect on environmental attitudes. As Bernauer (1995) suggests, international 
problems are less likely to be solved when there are lower levels of confidence in social 
and governmental institutions. Though the effects are moderate, the results of this 
analysis appear to support this hypothesis, with higher levels of confidence in 
government and the environmental movement being positively related to environmental 
attitudes. The logistic regression model for economic tradeoffs indicates that confidence 
in government institutions has no significant impact on environmental attitudes.  
 An explanation of this pattern is that by having confidence in governmental 
institutions or the environmental movement, one is more likely to trust them when they 
point to problems with the environment. Likewise, when one lives in a nation with a 
corrupt government, or a less-than-credible environmental movement, they are less likely 
to take the word of these institutions. This is especially important today during the era of 
“climate-gate,” during which the computers of the University of East Anglia’s (UEA) 
Climatic Research Unit (CRU) were hacked. The aftermath has led to allegations by 
climate change skeptics that the hacked emails pointed to scientific and academic 
misconduct within the climate science community. Media outlets failed to report on the 
inaccurate sensationalism originally presented, even though several independent 
committees revealed the claim of misconduct to be untrue through subsequent 
examinations of the materials. The effect of this particular example remains to be seen, 
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though if the results of the present study hold true, the decline in confidence in the 
environmental movement and even the government, should the government choose to 
take a global warming standpoint, could negatively impact environmental attitudes.  
 Religious beliefs appear to be significant predictors of environmental attitudes, 
though the means of assessing these attitudes determines the effect. In the OLS model, 
Catholics, Hindus, Protestants, and those of some other religion are less likely than those 
who do not identify with a religious tradition to have pro-environmental attitudes. 
Conversely, Orthodox Christians are more likely than those with no religious tradition to 
have pro-environmental attitudes. In the Logistic regression model, all religious traditions 
but Catholics and Hindus are significantly less likely to favor environmental protection 
over economic growth than those with no religious tradition. Catholics and Hindus are no 
different from those with no religious tradition. This difference in results between models 
suggests that how environmental attitudes are conceptualized and measured can have an 
important effect on the findings. A similar effect was noted on the effect of gender, with 
women being less concerned than men.  
 Though more recent studies have noted gender differences (McCright 2010; 
Blocker and Eckberg 1997) in environmental concern, they generally measure 
environmental concern differently from one another. For example, Aaron McCright 
(2010) examines gender differences in scientific knowledge and concern over global 
climate change. The findings indicate that women express slightly greater concern about 
climate change than do men, while also having a higher level of scientific knowledge 
regarding climate change than do men. Unfortunately, these results may reflect the 
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author’s assessment of climate change attitudes, rather than environmental attitudes 
overall. Similarly, Tarrant and Cordell (1997) find that women have a stronger 
relationship with environmental concern, though they note that the method of measuring 
environmental concern made a difference. It has been suggested that the difference lies in 
the perception of individual vulnerability to the risks associated with environmental 
problems (Bord and O’Connor 1997). That is, women recognize the risk associated with 
not acting about specific environmental issues more than men, and so they are more 
easily concerned about it. Therefore, when the measure of environmental attitudes is 
more vague and does not point to a specific problem, men are likely to show more 
concern.  
 
National-Level 
 The national-level analysis conducted in Chapter 4 highlights some interesting 
patterns as well. The results suggest several important findings: (1) the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) score is negatively related to willingness to sacrifice for core, 
periphery, and semi-peripheral nations, though ESI is positively associated to the 
economic tradeoffs measure only for core nations; (2) access to outside sources of 
information is impacted by position in the core-periphery hierarchy, however the pattern 
exists to such an extent that few of  the conclusions regarding these findings are useful; 
and (3) the makeup of the economy in a nation has an impact on the environmental 
attitudes, and even more specifically, with the position of a nation in the core-peripheral 
hierarchy.  
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 While the ESI is negatively associated with willingness to sacrifice, this pattern is 
not true of economic tradeoffs. Specifically, this pattern is only true for core nations; all 
non-core nations are negatively associated with both measures of environmental attitudes. 
Primarily this begs a question regarding the consistency of the two measures of 
environmental attitudes, though this question appears to be a relatively obvious one. Less 
obvious, however is a question about why this pattern exists for core nations? One 
potential answer is that core nations share some important features that non-core nations 
generally do not.  
First, core nations are characterized as being the nations with the highest levels of 
technological advancement and highly industrialized (or post-industrial) economies 
(Wallerstein 1990). Additionally, they often share the characterization of being 
exploitative of the non-core. Why then, would wealthy nations with high levels of 
technical advancement exhibit a difference between their ESI score and their 
environmental attitudes that did not exist among less wealthy countries? One explanation 
is that the level of technological advancement allows a more efficient degradation of the 
environment, minimizing the overall impact of such degradation. Additionally, as 
suggested by Jorgenson (Forthcoming), core nations often export the consequences of 
such degradation to the non-core11. This is done by providing an international market 
with a ready consumer of resource and pollution intensive practices like mining, logging, 
and agriculture.  
                                                             
11 Note that I am not making the claim that environmental degradation is not obvious in the core.  
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Another explanation of this pattern is that the governments are so much more 
responsive to environmental degradation that these problems are generally less serious 
than they would be in a country in the periphery with a less-responsive government who 
participates in fewer international environmental treaties, etc12. As Brechin and Kempton 
(1994) note, environmental attitudes should be influenced by the visibility of 
environmental issues to a certain population. We should, therefore, expect to see less 
concern among core nations who would be more likely to have implemented measures to 
minimize the impacts of environmental degradation or at the very least, to ensure that 
they happen in less visible places (including other countries).  
Access to outside sources of information was expected to be related to 
environmental attitudes because it was assumed, based on Brechin and Kempton (1994), 
that access to outside information would increase the visibility of such environmental 
degradation, thereby increasing the concern among people. Though there was certainly 
some evidence to suggest that this pattern exists, the differences between nations in the 
core-periphery hierarchy overshadow any overall trends. This pattern reflects on all of the 
measures of access to outside sources of information: (1) cellular telephones per-capita, 
(2) internet users per-capita, (3) television sets per-capita, and (4) landline telephones 
per-capita, though the number of landline phones per-capita was the only variable that 
had a consistent effect across measures.  
                                                             
12 I write this with full knowledge of the continuing oil leak in the Gulf of Mexico. However, I do not think 
that this instance necessarily negates the argument, as one can imagine how much worse this leak might 
have been if it had happened in the gulf of Mexico to a peripheral nation’s oil company, which would not 
have had the resources necessary to minimize the effects to the extent American companies have been able 
to do at this point.  
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In the U.S., methodologists have recognized the effect of using landline 
telephones in studies, as the number of cellular-only households grows. But this effect is 
likely nonexistent in the periphery and semi-periphery, as access to a landline telephone 
can be difficult enough. Television is no longer relied upon for information in the core 
(where it is generally for entertainment), it may be more difficult to find consistent access 
to a television in most of the periphery and semi-periphery, minimizing its impact as a 
source of information. Landline telephones, however, remain a necessary medium of 
communication internationally. It has been demonstrated that even though access to a 
variety of newer means of communication has grown overall, the gap between wealthy 
and poor countries has grown (Rodriguez and Wilson 2000). Though a relationship has 
been demonstrated between economic performance and access to information and 
communication technologies (ITCs), it is generally held that the effects of such 
technologies will be observed in the long run (Rodriguez and Wilson 2000). Put 
differently, poorer nations are just now beginning to see the effects of such ICTs, so an 
analysis of more recent data would be required to observe any effects.   
Finally, the composition of the economy effects a country’s position in the world-
economy (e.g. world-system position), while the position in the core-periphery hierarchy 
is negatively related to willingness to sacrifice in all but core nations. World-system 
position is positively related to economic tradeoffs in all countries but the periphery. One 
potential explanation for this pattern is that core nations have experienced the negative 
environmental consequences of economic development. Specifically, after WWII, many 
of the people in countries that are considered to be members of the core saw a rapid 
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industrialization of their country. Such rapid industrialization came at great costs to the 
environment. In the 1970s, when environmental consciousness shifted towards 
sustainability, the costs of economic development became more apparent. This reflects 
quite clearly the “socialization” hypothesis of the post-materialist perspective. That is, 
historical changes in the social interaction of a population can remain relatively 
unchanged even several decades later.  
A second explanation of the effect of why peripheral nations appear to favor 
economic development over environmental protection is that poor nations are attempting 
to play “catch up” to wealthy nations (Bartley and Bergesen 1997). Though the results 
here only pointed to the periphery, past research has generally pointed to the semi-
periphery as the level of the core-periphery hierarchy that attempts to play catch up most 
dramatically. Additional evidence to support this explanation points to the composition of 
the economy, indicating that the proportion of the economy comprised of the service, 
agricultural, and industrial sectors may be important. While a larger proportion of the 
economy should be agricultural in the periphery, a larger portion of industrial in the semi-
periphery, and a larger portion service in the core, these results are not always consistent.  
 
Multilevel Model 
 In the third analysis, a multilevel model allows one to assess individual and 
national level effects on environmental concern simultaneously. Of the ten hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 5, six exhibited support or partial support. The results indicate that 
political conservatism, confidence in social and governmental institutions, subjective 
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social class, access to outside information, gender, world-system position, and education 
are significant predictors of environmental attitudes. Furthermore, age, religion, and 
rural/urban residence have little or no consistent effect on environmental attitudes. This 
may be due to significant variations between countries on these variables.  
 Overall, individual-level characteristics account for about 97% of the variance in 
willingness to sacrifice, while national-level characteristics account for about 3%. These 
differences appear to apply at all three levels of the core-periphery hierarchy, though 
some cross-level interactions were significant. Differences between the results in each of 
the two models tested suggest that there may be an important difference in findings 
depending on exactly how environmental attitudes are conceptualized.   
 I asked three research questions that could only be assessed with a multilevel 
model. First, I asked whether individual- or national- level characteristics better explain 
aggregate levels of environmental concern? The short answer is that individual 
characteristics potentially explain more of the variance in environmental attitudes. The 
long answer is much more complicated. Though a larger proportion of the variation in 
environmental attitudes is accounted for at the individual level, only about 7% of this 
potential 97% of the variance is actually explained by the level-1 variables.  About 3% of 
the variance in environmental attitudes is accounted for at the national level. Of this three 
percent, about 65% is explained by the final model. In order to better understand 
environmental attitudes, it is necessary to account for variation at both levels. As the 
results have shown, accounting for one level (individual, or national) provides a much 
different and less-accurate picture of what is really happening.  
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 Next, I asked do these differences apply across all levels of the core-periphery 
hierarchy?  It appears that yes, these differences do apply at all three levels of the core-
periphery hierarchy. It is important to note, however, that there were several 
characteristics which varied in their effect between countries. For example, religion and 
educational levels have significantly different effects in some instances. Put differently, 
the effect of world-system position appears to have strong effects on certain 
characteristics, while having no effect on others. World-system position has no 
significant effect on its own. From a purely theoretical standpoint, this may have the 
implication of an overly simplistic conceptualization of world-system position. From a 
practical standpoint, however, many of these differences still illustrated the expected 
relationships between variables (Bartley and Bergesen 1997). Overall, however, some of 
the limitations (discussed below) of this study may be the real cause of this finding.  
 Finally, I asked if there are differences between individuals in different nations in 
terms of environmental attitudes, on which characteristics do they vary? In short, 
religion, gender, and education exhibit the most consistent differences between countries 
in their respective impacts on environmental attitudes. While certain religious groups 
exhibit differences between levels of the core-periphery hierarchy and between countries, 
others were no different. Specifically, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists exhibit the largest 
differences between levels of the core-periphery hierarchy.  It is reasonable to conclude 
from this that the effect of religion varies because of the conceptualization of a certain set 
of religious beliefs and doctrine. That is, if wealthy Americans become Buddhists, why 
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should they be similar to poor Chinese Buddhists? This is unlikely and potentially 
explains most of these cross-level interactions.  
The effect of education appears to have considerable variation between core and 
non-core countries as well. While this may be due to variation in the average level of 
education within a country, it may also be due to the impact that education has on an 
individual’s opportunities within a country. For example, in a core nation, a relatively 
high proportion of the population is likely to have a college degree, whereas in the 
periphery this proportion is much smaller. In the core, many opportunities require a 
college degree as a qualification, where in peripheral nations, the proportion of jobs 
requiring a college education is much smaller.  
Gender is also a particularly interesting facet of this finding. Why do women in 
peripheral and semi-peripheral countries have lower environmental attitudes? The results 
are unclear in how best to interpret this finding. One explanation is that women have 
fewer opportunities than men to get an education, or to earn a higher income, which may 
explain why they generally have lower levels of environmental concern. This effect 
should be more pronounced in non-core countries. Another possible explanation must 
draw on the notion that women are simply more concerned with the risks associated with 
environmental degradation, rather than with having a higher willingness to sacrifice or 
sense of economic trade-offs (McCright 2010; Blocker and Eckberg 1997). That is, 
women are more concerned about how the actual degradation may impact their families, 
and not so much with actually preserving the environment for the environments sake. If 
140 
 
 
 
this is the case, additional analyses with other measures to assess environmental attitudes 
are necessary.  
Another question to ask about this finding is about what it means to be a woman 
in the core versus the periphery. If women in the core are given basically the same rights 
as men, we should see fewer differences among women in the core. Similarly, if women 
in the periphery are given fewer rights than men, this difference should be highlighted. 
Put differently, where the roles of men and women come closer to convergence 
(relatively speaking), fewer differences should exist.  
Model 1: Willingness to Sacrifice. In the first model, I assessed environmental 
attitudes via a scale of two items designed to assess the willingness to sacrifice for 
environmental protection. Many of the findings mirrored those from both the individual-
level and national-level analyses discussed above (and in Chapters 3 and 4). Overall, The 
results indicate that political conservatism, confidence in social and governmental 
institutions, subjective social class, access to outside information, gender, world-system 
position, and education are significant predictors of environmental attitudes. 
 Model 2: Economic Tradeoffs. In the second model, I assessed environmental 
attitudes via a dichotomous variable designed to assess the economic tradeoffs inherent in 
many of the environmental protection debates. Again, many of the findings were similar 
to those from both the individual and national-level analyses discussed above. The 
differences between Model 1 and Model 2 highlight the importance of how exactly 
environmental attitudes are conceptualized. For more discussion on this issue, see the 
limitations section below.  
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
 In the preceding chapters, I have relied upon two theoretical frameworks in order 
to develop and interpret the results in the previous analyses. The post-materialist thesis is 
useful in the development of the individual-level and level-1 of the multilevel model 
analyses. In brief, the post-materialist thesis posits that those with higher social class, 
exhibit more concern for post-material values like environmental protection, particularly 
when those people have been a part of a generation that experienced difficulty meeting its 
material needs.  
 Based on this theoretical assumption, the post-material thesis is a useful 
framework for assessing the individual-level characteristics of people that influence their 
environmental attitudes. Another perspective, the NEP assumes that due to a paradigm 
shift, people have become more environmentally aware, and eventually this awareness 
has become environmental concern. In other words, because people have accepted their 
responsibility for much environmental degradation, and because they have had time to 
witness such effects, people have subsequently become more concerned about the 
condition of the environment, and the severity of its degradation.  But this begs the 
question: what are the characteristics of those who are the most concerned? Past research 
has suggested many characteristics like social class, political orientation, and even race, 
religion and whether one lives in a rural or urban setting.  
 The results of the previous analyses indicate that political ideology, confidence in 
social and governmental institutions, subjective social class, gender, and education are 
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the most important individual-level predictors of environmental attitudes. Unfortunately, 
neither the post-materialist thesis or the NEP is as useful for assessing national-level 
characteristics of environmental attitudes. In order to understand differences between 
countries, rather than differences within countries, I turn to the world-system perspective. 
Proponents of the world-system perspective argue that the interaction between nations is 
bounded by a single economic (capitalist) system, rather than a multitude of distinct and 
independent nation-states. As such, nations are placed in a hierarchy of world-system 
position, which contains three main categories: the core, the semi-periphery, and the 
periphery. Core nations, like the U.S. and Western Europe, are the wealthiest nations, 
which generally benefit the most from the world-system. Peripheral nations, like those in 
sub-Saharan Africa, generally benefit the least, and experience persistent exploitation 
from Core nations. The Semi-Periphery is the nations that fall somewhere in-between the 
core and periphery, like Mexico and the former Soviet Republics. These nations benefit 
marginally from the world-system by exploiting peripheral nations, but are also exploited 
by core nations. Additionally, the middle position generally encourages economic 
development in an effort to catch-up to nations in the core.  
 As a macro-theoretical perspective, the world-system approach allows one to 
clearly and easily compare nations to one another based on the metric of the core-
periphery hierarchy. The findings of the preceding analyses indicate that national-level 
characteristics like world-system position and access to outside information are important 
predictors of the environmental attitudes of the residents of various nations. Access to 
outside sources of information appear to have a negative association with environmental 
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attitudes, suggesting that the process might not operate as one might expect. The 
influence of world-system position on environmental attitudes is not absolutely clear, as 
it appears to have its biggest effects via its interaction with other variables like gender 
and religious affiliation.  
 Overall, however the findings presented here contribute significantly to the 
literature on environmental attitudes in three ways. First, I applied two theoretical 
approaches, the world-systems perspective, and the New Ecological Paradigm to a cross-
national and international sample of respondents. Second, I highlight the importance of 
assessing both individual and national-level characteristics when examining 
environmental attitudes cross-nationally. Third, I highlight the importance of measuring 
environmental attitudes by using two different measures of environmental attitudes, 
willingness to sacrifice, and economic tradeoffs in order to illustrate how the means of 
assessing environmental attitudes can impact the results.  
 In previous research, the world-systems perspective has not been used to assess 
environmental attitudes. It has, however, been used to assess environmental degradation. 
This new application of the world-systems perspective provides an important link 
between two substantive areas of environmental research: environmental degradation, 
and environmental attitudes. Also, using the world-systems perspective brings an 
alternative perspective to the environmental sociological literature which has generally 
ignored it.  
 The New Ecological Paradigm has generally been used in studies conducted with 
samples from a single nation, or a small subset of peer nations (the U.S. and Canada for 
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example). Unfortunately this hides differences between nations, making it easier to 
assume that there are no differences. By overcoming this problem, this study highlights 
what should have been obvious; the correlates of environmental attitudes are very 
different between nations. Additionally, when examining the predictors of environmental 
attitudes, one must examine each sample differently, as cross-national variation can affect 
findings significantly.  
 Post-materialism is the perspective which has generally found the most support in 
the findings. Specifically, it appears that social class is related to environmental attitudes 
in both individual-level and multilevel models. Though I do not examine the values of the 
populations of the nations in the data, this consistency is important nonetheless in that it 
allowed for a useful means of incorporating individual-level and national-level theories in 
an effort to better explain environmental attitudes.  
 Next, I found that examining individual-level characteristics does explain a larger 
portion of variance than do national-level characteristics, making it a necessity when 
conducting international or cross-national research. National-level characteristics, 
however, remain an important set of factors to account for, particularly when one is 
attempting to find all potential predictors of a particular outcome. In other words, though 
it is important to account for individual-level characteristics, national-level characteristics 
can be especially fruitful in international or cross-national research. My findings in the 
multilevel analysis (Chapter 5) were much more interesting than my findings in the 
individual-level analysis (Chapter 3) because of this.  
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 Finally, as others have noted (Franzen 2003), how exactly one measures 
environmental attitudes can have an inescapable impact on their findings. In order to 
overcome this obstacle, particularly with secondary data (see limitations below), I used 
two measures of environmental attitudes. The first measure, “willingness to sacrifice” 
was created from a scale of two items and assesses to what extent people are willing to 
make personal economic sacrifices in order to protect the environment. The second 
measure, “economic tradeoffs” was created using a dichotomous measure to assess 
whether or not people would rather protect the environment or promote economic 
growth. Though similar, the findings point to some important differences between the 
two measures of environmental attitudes. First, they do not produce the same results, 
which suggest that people assess their relationship with the environment differently, 
when they see it from their own personal perspective, or from the society to which they 
belongs perspective. Second, using two measures of environmental attitudes improves 
reliability, by highlighting the observed but unintended differences between how one 
expects the relationship between two variables to be, and how it actually is.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 As with all research, there were several limitations to this study: the concept of 
environmental attitudes was assessed in a different way than in other studies; and the 
small sample of countries used in the national-level analysis (Chapter 4) and the 
multilevel analysis (Chapter 5) impacts statistical power.  
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 By using different measures of environmental attitudes, I have limited the 
comparability of these findings to the findings of others. In many cases, this is not 
problematic, but I believe that it may be here, especially as I see environmental attitudes 
to be a global idea, rather than a national one. Often times, however, this is simply a side-
effect of using secondary data.  
 The relatively small sample size of countries (N = 27) limited the availability of 
degrees of freedom in the multilevel analysis and the national-level analysis. This limits 
the reliability of the estimates presented. In the national-level analysis this prevented 
almost anything from obtaining statistical significance, while in the multilevel analysis I 
used p > .1 as the critical value to assess statistical significance, and still found few 
statistically significant level-2 (country-level) associations. Unfortunately, even a dataset 
containing all nations may not have the statistical power required to test some of these 
hypotheses using multilevel models. With this important caveat established, the other 
limitation has to do with the range of variation on some of these characteristics. 
Government type was not significantly associated with environmental attitudes, but it was 
a skewed measure, as there were 17 “republics” and two “communist states,” a few 
“monarchies,” and a handful of “other” types of governments. 
  
Directions for Future Research 
Beyond these two main issues, the study points to several important directions for 
future research. First, the role of confidence in institutions, I have rarely come across 
research focusing on this idea specifically for environmental attitudes. Future research 
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should examine specific institutions and their association with environmental attitudes. 
Second, the religion effect on environmental attitudes appears to be specific, yet unclear. 
Future research should examine this relationship more closely, and using a variety of 
means to clarify how this relationship operates. Lastly, the concept of environmental 
attitudes continues to need refinement. While some scales have remained popular, most 
of them are complicated and have a large number of survey questions in order to measure 
them. While this is useful for constructing a scale, it is costly and prohibitive to those 
collecting such data. Future research should continue to examine how to best measure the 
concept of environmental attitudes. Additionally, future research should be conducted on 
national level characteristics using other measures of environmental attitudes. Such 
analyses could inform the literature by attempting to standardize the measurement of 
environmental attitudes, and also by clarifying exactly which countries belong at which 
level of the core-periphery hierarchy.  
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Figure 2.1 Kondratieff Wave Cycle 
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Figure 2.2: The Basic Iteration Model of World-System Development Adapted from 
Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997. 
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Country Frequency Percent
Albania 1000 2.8
Argentina 1280 3.6
Bangladesh 1500 4.3
Bosnia 1200 3.4
Canada 1931 5.5
Chile 1200 3.4
China 1000 2.8
India 2002 5.7
Japan 1362 3.9
Kyrgyzstan 1043 3.0
Macedonia 1055 3.0
Mexico 1535 4.4
Moldova 1008 2.9
Montenegro 1060 3.0
Peru 1501 4.3
Philippines 1200 3.4
Puerto Rico 720 2.1
Serbia 1200 3.4
Singapore 1512 4.3
South Africa 3000 8.5
South Korea 1200 3.4
Spain 1209 3.4
Tanzania 1171 3.3
Uganda 1002 2.9
United States of America 1200 3.4
Vietnam 1000 2.8
Zimbabwe 1002 2.9
Total 35093 100.0
Table 3.1 Country List and Proportions of Sample
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Figure 3.1: Subjective Social Class Distribution 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Education 
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Figure 3.3: Frequencies of Religious Traditions 
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Table 3.2: Bivariate Correlations for Individual Characteristics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
1
W
illingness to 
Sacrifice Scale
1
2
Econom
ic Tradeoffs
.22
1
3
Confidence in 
Governm
ent 
Institutions
.12
.02
1
4
Confidence in the 
Environm
ental 
M
ovem
ent
.16
.11
.40
1
5
Incom
e
.06
.04
-.03
.03
1
6
U
rban 
-.01
.03
-.18
.01
.09
1
7
Subjective Social 
Class
.09
.06
-.06
.03
.33
.14
1
8
A
ge
-.03
-.01
.03
-.05
-.09
.00
-.06
1
9
Sex
-.03
-.01
-.02
.00
-.04
.03
.00
.00
1
10
Conservative
.07
.01
.15
.04
-.02
-.05
.03
.02
-.02
1
11
Protestant
-.08
-.05
.03
.02
.01
.08
.00
-.01
.02
-.05
1
12
O
ther Religion
-.02
-.01
.09
.03
-.01
.00
-.06
-.01
.03
.03
-.10
1
13
Buddhist
.02
.00
.03
.02
-.01
.00
.02
.06
.01
.05
-.07
-.05
1
14
H
indu
-.03
.01
.05
-.04
-.09
-.11
.03
-.02
-.03
.00
-.09
-.06
-.05
1
15
M
uslim
.03
-.05
.08
.00
-.07
-.17
.03
-.09
-.03
.08
-.16
-.11
-.08
-.10
1
16
Jew
.01
.00
.00
.00
.01
.03
.03
.01
.00
-.01
-.03
-.02
-.01
-.02
-.03
1
17
O
rthodox
.03
-.02
-.11
-.14
.01
-.08
-.01
.09
.01
-.07
-.13
-.09
-.07
-.09
-.15
-.02
1
18
N
o Religious 
Preference
.04
.04
.02
.04
.10
.01
.01
-.03
-.05
-.02
-.18
-.12
-.09
-.11
-.20
-.03
-.17
1
19
Catholic
-.01
.05
-.11
.04
.00
.18
-.01
.03
.04
.00
-.23
-.15
-.12
-.15
-.26
-.04
-.21
-.29
1
20
Som
e Prim
ary 
Education
-.06
-.07
.09
-.03
-.18
-.09
-.23
.21
.05
.03
-.05
.03
-.02
-.01
.04
-.02
.01
-.03
.03
1
21
Som
e Secondary 
Education
-.04
-.04
.04
.04
-.04
.03
-.04
-.09
-.01
.03
.09
.04
-.04
-.01
.02
-.01
-.09
-.04
.01
-.25
1
22
Com
pleted 
Secondary 
Education
.03
.01
-.08
-.01
.07
.02
.07
-.11
-.02
-.05
.02
-.05
.05
-.09
-.04
-.01
.08
.07
-.04
-.41
-.33
1
23
Som
e College 
Education
.04
.05
-.03
.01
.06
.04
.09
-.08
-.02
.00
-.01
-.01
-.02
.02
-.04
.02
-.02
.00
.05
-.15
-.12
-.19
1
24
Com
pleted College 
Education
.08
.09
-.07
.02
.21
.11
.25
-.03
-.04
-.01
-.03
-.02
.00
-.01
-.02
.03
.04
.02
.00
-.22
-.18
-.29
-.10
1
Correlations significant at the .05 level or higher in bold
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Table 3.3: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION 
RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Significance 
Constant 3.909 0.065 *** 
Confidence in Government Institutions 0.158 0.013 *** 
Conf. in the Environmental Movement 0.231 0.010 *** 
Some Primary Education 0.170 0.041 *** 
Some Secondary Education 0.207 0.043 *** 
Completed Secondary Education 0.359 0.042 *** 
Some College Education 0.495 0.050 *** 
Completed College Education 0.551 0.046 *** 
Income 0.004 0.004  
Social Class 0.090 0.009 *** 
Urban -0.007 0.017  
Age -0.001 0.001 * 
Sex -0.068 0.016 *** 
Conservative 0.032 0.003 *** 
Protestant -0.425 0.029 *** 
Other Religion -0.232 0.037 *** 
Buddhist -0.010 0.045  
Hindu -0.268 0.040 *** 
Muslim -0.008 0.028  
Jew -0.048 0.114  
Orthodox 0.133 0.030 *** 
Catholic -0.118 0.024 *** 
  
*** p < .001   
**p < .01   
* p < .05   
Religion Reference = "no religious preference" 
Education Reference = "no formal education"   
N = 34,555   
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Table 3.4: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE EFFECTS 
OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS ON ECONOMIC 
TRADEOFFS 
Odds 
Ratio 
Standard 
Error Significance 
Confidence in Government Institutions 0.988 0.017 
Conf. in the Environmental Movement 1.287 0.018 *** 
Some Primary Education 1.028 0.059 
Some Secondary Education 1.084 0.065 
Completed Secondary Education 1.299 0.075 *** 
Some College Education 1.808 0.129 *** 
Completed College Education 1.962 0.127 *** 
Income 0.995 0.005 
Social Class 1.061 0.013 *** 
Urban 1.006 0.024 
Age 1.002 0.001 ** 
Sex 0.965 0.021 
Conservative 1.011 0.004 ** 
Protestant 0.682 0.028 *** 
Other Religion 0.836 0.043 ** 
Buddhist 0.856 0.054 ** 
Hindu 0.964 0.054 
Muslim 0.712 0.028 *** 
Jew 0.724 0.115 * 
Orthodox 0.798 0.034 *** 
Catholic 1.021 0.035 
*** p < .001 
**p < .01 
* p < .05 
Religion Reference = "no religious preference" 
Education Reference = "no formal education" 
N = 34,555 
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Table 3.5 R-Squared by Country 
Country 
Adjusted 
R-Squared 
Albania 0.1109 
Argentina 0.0508 
Bangladesh 0.0557 
Bosnia 0.0905 
Canada 0.0866 
Chile 0.0209 
China  0.0553 
India 0.1524 
Japan 0.0760 
Kyrgyzstan 0.0744 
Macedonia 0.0299 
Mexico 0.0512 
Moldova 0.0470 
Montenegro 0.1193 
Peru 0.0097 
Philippines 0.0384 
Puerto Rico -0.0007 * 
Serbia 0.1092 
Singapore 0.0711 
South Africa 0.0468 
South Korea 0.0321 
Spain 0.0748 
Tanzania 0.0326 
Uganda 0.0641 
United States of 
America 0.0894 
Vietnam 0.1531 
Zimbabwe 0.0919 
Average 0.0679 
*None of the predictors were 
significant 
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ESI Score World System Position Score
Core Nations
Argentina 62.49 -0.26
Canada 78.14 1.42
Chile 56.58 -0.12
China 37.56 1.46
Japan 60.56 3.22
Mexico 45.28 -0.17
Singapore 46.80 1.54
South Korea 40.30 0.34
Spain 59.51 0.72
United States 66.10 11.93
Semi-Peripheral Nations
India 40.87 -0.31
Macedonia 39.21 -1.19
Peru 54.32 -1.04
Philippines 35.68 -1.05
Puerto Rico * -0.52
South Africa * -1.38
Vietnam 34.19 -1.32
Zimbabwe 52.01 -1.33
Peripheral Nations
Albania 44.17 -1.42
Bangladesh 39.45 -1.34
Bosnia * -1.40
Kyrgyzstan 39.63 -1.35
Moldova 47.44 -1.36
Montenegro * -1.38
Serbia * -1.38
Tanzania 40.33 -1.53
Uganda 44.03 -1.48
Table 4.1: Nations by Core, Semi-Peripheral, or Peripheral Status, ESI 
Scores and World System Position Scores
*ESI Score not available  
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Figure 4.1: Linear Relationship Between Willingness to Sacrifice Scale and Logged13 
World-System Position Score  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 The World-System Position variable was transformed by using the log of the original score plus two as 
the data included negative values.  
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Figure 4.2: Linear Relationship Between Economic Tradeoffs and Logged14 World-
System Position Score 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
14 The World-System Position variable was transformed by using the log of the original score plus two as 
the data included negative values. 
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Figure 4.3: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Cellular Telephones Per-Capita by 
Willingness to Sacrifice Scale  
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Figure 4.4: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Internet Users Per-Capita by Willingness to 
Sacrifice Scale 
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Figure 4.5: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Land Line Telephones Per-Capita by 
Willingness to Sacrifice Scale 
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Figure 4.6: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Televisions Per-Capita by Willingness to 
Sacrifice Scale 
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Figure 4.7: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Cellular Telephones Per-Capita by 
Economic Tradeoffs 
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Figure 4.8: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Internet Users Per-Capita by Economic 
Tradeoffs 
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Figure 4.9: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Land Line Telephones Per-Capita by 
Economic Tradeoffs 
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Figure 4.10: Scatterplot of Logged Number of Televisions Per-Capita by Economic 
Tradeoffs 
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Figure 4.11: Scatterplot of Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) Score by 
Willingness to Sacrifice Scale 
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Figure 4.12: Scatterplot of Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) Score by Economic 
Tradeoffs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
174 
 
 
 
APPENDIX D: CHAPTER 5 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Six Multilevel Models Examining the Impacts of Individual-Level and National-Level Characteristics on Willingness to Sacrifice 
 
Model 1: 
World-System 
Position Effects 
 Model 2: No 
Interactions and No 
Social Class 
Measures 
 Model 3: No 
Social Class 
Measures with 
Interactions 
 Model 4: Main 
Effects Model 
With No 
Interactions or 
Variance 
Components 
 Model 5: Full 
Model with No 
Interactions 
 Model 6: Full 
Model with 
Interactions 
Variable Coef. S.E.    Coef. S.E.    Coef. S.E.    Coef. S.E.    Coef. S.E.    Coef. S.E.   
Level-1                        
Constant 5.53 .08 *** 11.9  1.38 *** 12.22 1.38 *** 9.74 2.32 **  11.27 1.33 *** 11.9  1.36 *** 
Confidence in 
Government Institutions 
    .08 .03 **  .08 .02 **  .1  .01 *** .09 .03 **  .09 .03 ** 
Confidence in the 
Environmental 
Movement 
    .25 .02 *** .25 .02 *** .24 .01 *** .24 .02 *** .24 .02 *** 
Some Primary Education     -- --   -- --   .12 .04 **  .13 .07 +  .12 .06 + 
Some Secondary 
Education 
    -- --   -- --   .28 .04 *** .26 .08 **  .25 .07 ** 
Completed Secondary 
Education 
    -- --   -- --   .33 .04 *** .32 .07 *** .31 .06 *** 
Some College Education     -- --   -- --   .35 .05 *** .36 .08 *** .35 .07 *** 
Completed College 
Education 
    -- --   -- --   .46 .05 *** .46 .08 *** .44 .07 *** 
Income     -- --   -- --   .   .     .01 .01   .01 .01  
Subjective Social Class     -- --   -- --   .1  .01 *** .11 .02 *** .11 .02 *** 
Urban     .08 .04 +  .08 .04 +  .06 .02 **  .03 .04   .03 .04  
Age     .   .   *** .   .   *** .   .   *** .   .     .   .    
Women     -.1  .03 **  -.11 .02 *** -.07 .02 *** -.08 .03 **  -.08 .02 ** 
Conservative     .01 .01   .01 .01   .01 .   *** .01 .01   .01 .01  
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Protestant     .02 .04   .05 .05   -.07 .03 *  .01 .04   .04 .06  
Other Religion     -.18 .07 *  -.13 .08   -.13 .04 **  -.11 .07   -.09 .09  
Buddhist     -.02 .07   .31 .17 +  .09 .05 *  .02 .07   .33 .16 + 
Hindu     -.12 .08   -.08 .12   -.12 .05 *  -.08 .08   -.02 .1   
Muslim     .03 .11   .16 .13   -.12 .04 **  .08 .11   .2  .11 + 
Jewish     .04 .15   .03 .16   -.14 .11 *  -.01 .14   .02 .14  
Orthodox     -.05 .12   -.09 .14   -.13 .05 **  .04 .11   -.01 .13  
Catholic     .04 .05   .04 .05   -.06 .03 *  .05 .05   .05 .05  
 
                       
Level-2                        
Semiperipheral World 
System Position 
.18 .18     -.37 .11 *   -.31 .15 +   -.31 .22     -.43 .11 **   -.36 .15 + 
Peripheral World System 
Position 
.21 .18     .34 .12 *   .23 .16     .   .24     .28 .12 +   .19 .15   
Environmental 
Sustainability Index 
(ESI) Score 
    .01 .     .01 .     .   .01   .01 .     .01 .    
Percent GDP Agriculture     -.01 .01   -.01 .01 +  -.01 .01   -.01 .01   -.01 .01 + 
Percent GDP Industry     .   .01   -.01 .01   -.01 .01   .   .01   .   .01  
Percent GDP Services     .02 .   **  .02 .   **  .02 .01 +  .02 .   **  .02 .   ** 
Proportion with Landline 
Telephone 
    -.05 .01 **  -.06 .01 **  -.07 .03 *  -.05 .01 **  -.06 .01 ** 
Monarchist Government     -.78 .19 **  -.82 .19 **  -1.08 .35 *  -.73 .19 *  -.77 .19 ** 
Communist Government     .8  .18 **  .78 .18 **  .8  .31 *  .79 .17 **  .82 .18 ** 
Other Government     .45 .09 **  .42 .09 **  .33 .18   .44 .09 **  .43 .09 ** 
Proportion Women (L1)     -5.3  1.39 *  -5.82 1.41 **  -4.1  2.37   -5.8  1.38 **  -6.26 1.41 ** 
Average Subjective 
Social Class (L1) 
    -1.56 .32 **  -1.73 .32 *** -1.39 .54 *  -1.55 .31 **  -1.73 .31 *** 
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Average Confidence in 
Gov't Institutions (L1) 
    .75 .15 **  .79 .14 *** .5  .29   .76 .14 **  .84 .14 *** 
Average Confidence in 
Environmental 
Movement (L1) 
    -.94 .22 **  -.91 .23 **  -.33 .41   -.94 .22 **  -.99 .22 ** 
Proportion Some 
Primary Education (L1) 
    2.86 .57 **  2.99 .55 *** 3.51 1.16 *  3.6  .55 *** 3.67 .56 *** 
Proportion Some 
Secondary Education  
(L1) 
    .89 .68   1.02 .68   1.14 1.28   1.96 .67 *  2.03 .68 * 
Proportion Completed 
Secondary Education  
(L1) 
    1.18 .44 *  1.37 .44 *  1.86 .95 +  1.96 .44 **  2.06 .45 ** 
Proportion Some College 
Education  (L1) 
    -3.   1.37 +  -3.09 1.37 +  -3.74 2.41   -1.43 1.33   -1.78 1.37  
Proportion Completed 
College Education  (L1) 
    8.95 1.41 *** 9.65 1.42 *** 9.81 2.44 **  9.61 1.36 *** 10.27 1.4  *** 
Average Income (L1)     -.25 .06 *** -.26 .05 *** -.35 .1  *  -.26 .05 **  -.28 .05 ** 
 
                       
Cross-Level 
Interactions  
                       
Catholic by 
Semiperiphery 
        -.15 .12           -.16 .12  
Catholic by Periphery         .04 .14           .09 .13  
Orthodox by 
Semiperiphery 
        .21 .36           .12 .34  
Orthodox by Periphery         .37 .33           .31 .3   
Jewish by Semiperiphery         -.1  .4            -.11 .37  
Jewish by Periphery         -.16 .36           -.04 .32  
Muslim by                 -.64 .32 +                   -.63 .28 * 
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Semiperiphery 
Muslim by Periphery         -.51 .31           -.44 .27  
Hindu by Semiperiphery                 -.39 .18 *                   -.39 .19 * 
Hindu by Periphery         -.16 .33           -.1  .28  
Buddhist by 
Semiperiphery 
        .18 .15           .21 .14  
Buddhist by Periphery                 .84 .5                      .85 .48 + 
Other Religion by 
Semiperiphery 
        -.15 .15           -.19 .16  
Other Religion by 
Periphery 
        .02 .23           .05 .23  
Protestant by 
Semiperiphery 
        -.11 .1            -.11 .11  
Protestant by Periphery         .13 .15           .14 .15  
Conservative by 
Semiperiphery 
        .   .02           .   .02  
Conservative by 
Periphery 
        .01 .02           .   .02  
Women by 
Semiperiphery 
                -.11 .06 +                   -.11 .06 + 
Women by Periphery                 -.18 .06 **                   -.16 .06 ** 
Age by Semiperiphery         .   .             .   .    
Age by Periphery         .   .             .   .    
Urban by Semiperiphery         -.01 .11           -.04 .09  
Urban by Periphery         .07 .11           .05 .09  
Confidence in 
Government Institutions 
by Semiperiphery 
        .01 .06           .03 .06  
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Confidence in 
Government Institutions 
by Periphery 
        -.13 .06 *          -.1  .06  
Confidence in 
Environmental 
Movement by 
Semiperiphery 
        -.04 .05           -.04 .05  
Confidence in 
Environmental 
Movement by Periphery 
        .06 .05           .04 .05  
Subjective Social Class 
by Semiperiphery 
                    -.02 .04  
Subjective Social Class 
by Periphery 
                    .02 .04  
Some Primary Education 
by Semiperiphery 
                    -.17 .13  
Some Primary Education 
by Periphery 
                                        -.42 .15 ** 
Some Secondary 
Education by 
Semiperiphery 
                    -.16 .15  
Some Secondary 
Education by Periphery 
                                        -.41 .16 * 
Completed Secondary 
Education by 
Semiperiphery 
                    -.09 .15  
Completed Secondary 
Education by Periphery 
                    -.26 .16  
Some College Education 
by Semiperiphery 
                    -.19 .16  
Some College Education 
by Periphery 
                                        -.33 .18 + 
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Completed College 
Education by 
Semiperiphery 
                    -.13 .16  
Completed College 
Education by Periphery 
                    -.27 .17  
Income by 
Semiperiphery 
                    -.01 .01  
Income by Periphery                     .   .01  
 
                       
Variance Components VC SD   VC SD   VC SD   VC SD   VC SD   VC SD  
Between Nation 
Variance 
.16 .4  *** .07 .26   .06 .24   .04 .19 *** .06 .25   .06 .24  
Catholic     .04 .19 *** .04 .2  ***     .03 .19 *** .04 .2  *** 
Orthodox     .22 .47 *  .23 .48 *      .17 .41 *  .18 .42 * 
Jewish     .17 .41 **  .17 .41 **      .1  .32   .11 .33 ** 
Muslim     .26 .5  *  .27 .52 *      .23 .48 *  .2  .45 * 
Hindu     .04 .2    .05 .22       .05 .22   .05 .23 + 
Buddhist     .03 .17   .03 .16       .03 .17   .02 .14 + 
Other     .07 .27 **  .06 .25 **      .09 .29 **  .08 .28 *** 
Protestant     .01 .11   .02 .14 +      .01 .12   .02 .15 *** 
Conservative     .   .03 *** .03 .   ***     .   .03 *** .   .03 + 
Women     .01 .12 *  .09 .01 +      .01 .11 *  .01 .09 *** 
Age     .   .   *** .   .   ***     .   .   **  .   .   *** 
Subjective Social Class     -- --   -- --       .   .07 *** .   .07 *** 
Urban     .04 .2  *** .2  .04 ***     .03 .16 *** .02 .16 *** 
Confidence in Gov't 
Institutions 
    .01 .12 *** .11 .01 ***     .02 .12 *** .01 .11 ** 
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Confidence in the 
Environmental 
Movement 
    .01 .1  +  .09 .01 **      .01 .09 *  .01 .09 * 
Some Primary Education     -- --   -- --       .08 .28 *  .03 .16 * 
Some Secondary 
Education 
    -- --   -- --       .09 .31 +  .04 .21 * 
Completed Secondary 
Education 
    -- --   -- --       .07 .26 *  .04 .19 * 
Some College Education     -- --   -- --       .09 .29 +  .04 .21 * 
Completed College 
Education 
    -- --   -- --       .09 .3  *  .05 .22 + 
Income     -- --   -- --       .   .02   .   .02 * 
 
                       
Within Nation Variance 2.1  1.45   1.98 1.41   1.98 1.41   2.   1.41   1.95 1.39   1.94 1.39  
 
                       
Deviance 123796.35  122058.56  122019.84  122044.73  121451.2   121405.77 
Number of Estimated 
Parameters 
3    156    184    44    296    338   
Change in Deviance 
--    1737.79    38.72    -
24.89 
   593.53    45.43   
Change in Degrees of 
Freedom 
--    22    2    4    1    2   
Level-1 Variance 
Explained .00 
   
.06 
   
.06 
  
 
.05 
   
.07 
   
.07 
  
Level-2 Variance 
Explained .06 
   
.58 
   
.64 
  
 
.77 
   
.62 
   
.65 
  
Overall Variance 
Explained .00 
   
.09 
   
.10 
  
 
.10 
   
.11 
   
.11 
  
                        
*** p < .001                        
**p < .01                        
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* p < .05                        
+  p < 0.1                        
Religion Reference = "no religious preference"                   
Education Reference = "no formal education"                   
Level-1 N = 34,555                        
Level-2 N = 27 
                       Data Sources: Level-1 data come from the 1999-2001 World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). Level-2 data come from the 2000 Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) and from the 2000 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) 
(http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/).  
 
Additional analyses indicate that social class variables explain about 1.6% of the variance at level-1.  
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Table 5.2: Four Multilevel Models Examining the Impacts of Individual-Level and National-Level Characteristics on Economic Tradeoffs 
 
Model 1: Main Effects Model 
without Interactions 
 Model 2: Main Effects Model 
without Social Class 
Measures 
 Model 3: Full Model without 
Social Class Measures 
 Model 4: Full Model 
Variables Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
  
Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
  
Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
  
Coef. S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
 Level-1 
                   Constant .73 1.25 2.08 
  
2.98 1.43 19.66 + 
 
2.83 1.41 16.99 + 
 
1.75 1.34 5.74 
 Confidence in 
Government Institutions -.05 .03 .95 
  
-.07 .02 
 
** 
 
-.06 .02 
 
** 
 
-.04 .02 .96 * 
Confidence in the 
Environmental Movement .03 .03 1.3  *** .27 .01 
 
*** .27 .01 
 
*** .26 .01 1.29 *** 
Some Primary Education .01 .07 1.01 
  
-- -- -- 
  
-- -- -- 
  
-.06 .07 .94 
 Some Secondary 
Education .12 .08 1.13 
  
-- -- -- 
  
-- -- -- 
  
.03 .07 1.03 
 Completed Secondary 
Education .25 .08 1.28 ** 
 
-- -- -- 
  
-- -- -- 
  
.16 .07 1.18 * 
Some College Education .37 .1  1.45 ** 
 
-- -- -- 
  
-- -- -- 
  
.29 .08 1.33 ** 
Completed College 
Education .51 .1  1.66 *** -- -- -- 
  
-- -- -- 
  
.45 .07 1.57 *** 
Income .01 .01 1.01 
  
-- -- -- 
  
-- -- -- 
  
.01 .01 1.01 
 Subjective Social Class .03 .02 1.03 
  
-- -- -- 
  
-- -- -- 
  
.04 .02 1.04 * 
Urban .01 .05 1.01 
  
.09 .05 1.09 + 
 
.1  .05 1.11 * 
 
.02 .04 1.02 
 Age .   .   1.   
  
.   .   1.   * 
 
.   .   1.   * 
 
.   .   1.   
 Women -.07 .03 .93 * 
 
-.09 .03 .91 ** 
 
-.09 .03 .91 ** 
 
-.06 .03 .94 + 
Conservative -.01 .01 .99 * 
 
-.01 .01 .99 + 
 
-.01 .01 .99 
  
-.01 .01 .99 
 Protestant .03 .06 1.03 
  
.01 .05 1.01 
  
.03 .06 1.03 
  
.03 .06 1.03 
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Other Religion -.01 .09 .99 * 
 
-.05 .08 .95 
  
.07 .11 1.07 
  
.12 .12 1.13 * 
Buddhist .13 .1  1.14 
  
-.08 .07 .93 
  
.37 .25 1.45 
  
.3  .25 1.36 
 Hindu -.34 .21 .71 
  
-.14 .14 .87 
  
-.09 .17 .92 
  
-.15 .17 .86 
 Muslim -.13 .1  .87 
  
-.18 .08 .83 * 
 
-.25 .11 .78 * 
 
-.29 .1  .75 * 
Jewish -.38 .19 .68 * 
 
-.42 .16 .66 * 
 
-.32 .18 .72 + 
 
-.41 .18 .67 * 
Orthodox -.04 .1  .96 
  
-.1  .07 .9  
  
-.01 .13 .99 
  
.01 .13 1.01 
 Catholic .02 .06 1.02 
  
-.01 .04 .99 
  
.03 .05 1.03 
  
.03 .05 1.03 
 
                    Level-2 
                   Semiperipheral World 
System Position -.45 .11 .64 **   -.45 .12 .64 *   -.46 .14 .63 *   -.46 .14 .63 * 
Peripheral World System 
Position -.6  .13 .55 **   -.17 .14 .85     -.31 .16 .73 +   -.4  .15 .67 * 
Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) 
Score .01 .   1.01 
  
.01 .   1.02 * 
 
.01 .   1.01 * 
 
.01 .   1.01 
 Percent GDP Agriculture .02 .01 1.02 * 
 
.   .01 1.   
  
.   .01 1.   
  
.01 .01 1.01 
 Percent GDP Industry .01 .01 1.01 
  
.   .01 1.   
  
-.01 .01 .99 
  
.   .01 1.   
 Percent GDP Services .02 .   1.02 * 
 
.01 .   1.01 
  
.01 .   1.01 
  
.01 .   1.01 
 Proportion with Landline 
Telephone -.07 .01 .93 *** -.07 .01 .94 ** 
 
-.07 .01 .93 ** 
 
-.05 .01 .95 * 
Monarchist Government -.38 .18 .69 + 
 
-.45 .21 .64 + 
 
-.44 .21 .64 + 
 
-.26 .2  .77 
 Communist Government .38 .17 1.46 + 
 
.83 .19 2.28 ** 
 
.77 .18 2.16 ** 
 
.68 .18 1.96 * 
Other Government -.12 .09 .89 
  
-.14 .1  .87 
  
-.12 .11 .89 
  
-.11 .1  .9  
 Proportion Women (L1) 2.56 1.35 12.96 
  
-1.59 1.51 .2  
  
-.9  1.5  .41 
  
.66 1.44 1.94 
 Average Subjective Social 
Class (L1) -.73 .29 .48 * 
 
-.97 .34 .38 * 
 
-.98 .33 .37 * 
 
-.76 .31 .47 + 
Average Confidence in 
Gov't Institutions (L1) .14 .15 1.15 
  
.17 .17 1.18 
  
.16 .17 1.18 
  
.16 .16 1.17 
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Average Confidence in 
Environmental Movement 
(L1) .17 .22 1.19 
  
.26 .25 1.29 
  
.27 .25 1.31 
  
.2  .24 1.22 
 Proportion Some Primary 
Education (L1) .84 .57 2.32 
  
1.11 .63 3.03 
  
1.11 .66 3.02 
  
.5  .6  1.64 
 Proportion Some 
Secondary Education  
(L1) -1.2  .67 .3  
  
-.6  .75 .55 
  
-.6  .76 .55 
  
-.92 .71 .4  
 Proportion Completed 
Secondary Education  
(L1) .13 .46 1.14 
  
.14 .5  1.15 
  
.08 .52 1.09 
  
-.3  .48 .74 
 Proportion Some College 
Education  (L1) -.59 1.29 .55 
  
-.65 1.47 .52 
  
-.89 1.48 .41 
  
-.04 1.37 .96 
 Proportion Completed 
College Education  (L1) 3.52 1.32 33.76 * 
 
5.36 1.48 212.29 * 
 
5.12 1.5  167.65 * 
 
3.36 1.4  28.79 + 
Average Income (L1) -.27 .05 .76 ** 
 
-.31 .06 .73 *** -.34 .06 .71 *** -.25 .05 .78 ** 
                    Cross-Level Interactions 
# 
                   Catholic by 
Semiperiphery                     .2  .1  1.22 *   .19 .1  1.21 + 
Catholic by Periphery 
          
.17 .13 1.19 
  
.18 .13 1.2  
 Orthodox by 
Semiperiphery                     -.52 .34 .59     -.58 .34 .56 + 
Orthodox by Periphery 
          
-.23 .32 .79 
  
-.27 .32 .76 
 Jewish by Semiperiphery 
          
.33 .48 1.39 
  
.42 .48 1.52 
 Jewish by Periphery 
          
-.38 .36 .68 
  
-.2  .37 .82 
 Muslim by Semiperiphery                     .38 .28 1.46     .55 .27 1.73 + 
Muslim by Periphery                     .49 .26 1.63 +   .59 .25 1.8  * 
Hindu by Semiperiphery 
          
-.24 .41 .79 
  
-.35 .4  .7  
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Hindu by Periphery 
          
-.05 .44 .95 
  
-.14 .44 .87 
 Buddhist by 
Semiperiphery 
          
.3  .18 1.34 
  
.27 .18 1.32 
 Buddhist by Periphery 
          
1.28 .73 3.61 + 
 
.96 .74 2.62 
 Other Religion by 
Semiperiphery                     .41 .17 1.5  *   .43 .19 1.54 * 
Other Religion by 
Periphery                     .67 .31 1.95 *   .69 .33 2.   * 
Protestant by 
Semiperiphery 
          
.04 .11 1.04 
  
.02 .11 1.02 
 Protestant by Periphery 
          
.   .16 1.   
  
.03 .16 1.03 
 Conservative by 
Semiperiphery 
          
.   .01 1.   
  
.   .01 1.   
 
Conservative by Periphery 
          
.02 .01 1.02 
  
.02 .01 1.02 
 
Women by Semiperiphery 
          
-.08 .07 .92 
  
-.07 .07 .93 
 Women by Periphery 
          
-.03 .07 .97 
  
-.04 .07 .96 
 Age by Semiperiphery 
          
.   .   1.   
  
.   .   1.   
 Age by Periphery 
          
.   .   1.   
  
.   .   1.   
 Urban by Semiperiphery 
          
-.06 .12 .94 
  
-.09 .11 .92 
 Urban by Periphery 
          
.02 .11 1.02 
  
.04 .1  1.04 
 Confidence in 
Government Institutions 
by Semiperiphery 
          
.04 .05 1.04 
  
.08 .05 1.08 
 Confidence in 
Government Institutions 
by Periphery                     .15 .05 1.16 **   .17 .05 1.18 ** 
Confidence in 
Environmental Movement 
by Semiperiphery                     -.06 .03 .94 +   -.08 .03 .93 * 
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Confidence in 
Environmental Movement 
by Periphery 
          
-.01 .04 .99 
  
-.03 .04 .97 
 Subjective Social Class by 
Semiperiphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
-.02 .05 .98 
 Subjective Social Class by 
Periphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.   .05 1.   
 Some Primary Education 
by Semiperiphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.17 .15 1.19 
 Some Primary Education 
by Periphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.09 .17 1.1  
 Some Secondary 
Education by 
Semiperiphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.21 .16 1.23 
 Some Secondary 
Education by Periphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.09 .18 1.1  
 Completed Secondary 
Education by 
Semiperiphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.19 .15 1.21 
 Completed Secondary 
Education by Periphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
-.11 .17 .9  
 Some College Education 
by Semiperiphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.18 1.15 1.24 
 Some College Education 
by Periphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.21 -.89 .83 
 Completed College 
Education by 
Semiperiphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.17 .48 1.09 
 Completed College 
Education by Periphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.19 
-
1.62 .74 
 Income by Semiperiphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
-.02 .03 .98 
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Income by Periphery 
          
-- -- -- 
  
.01 .03 1.01 
 
                    Variance Components VC SD 
   
VC SD 
   
VC SD 
   
VC SD 
  Intercept .03 .16 
   
.03 .17 
   
.03 .16 
   
.03 .17 
  Catholic .05 .23 
 
+ 
 
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Orthodox .09 .3  
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Jewish .12 .34 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Muslim .15 .39 
 
+ 
 
.07 .27 
 
* 
 
.11 .33 
 
** 
 
.09 .3  
 
** 
Hindu .45 .67 
 
* 
 
.12 .35 
 
** 
 
.26 .51 
 
** 
 
.28 .53 
 
*** 
Buddhist .08 .29 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Other .09 .31 
 
* 
 
.05 .22 
 
* 
 
.05 .22 
 
** 
 
.07 .27 
 
** 
Protestant .02 .13 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Conservative .   .02 
 
+ 
 
.   .02 
 
* 
 
.   .02 
 
* 
 
.   .01 
 
* 
Women .01 .11 
   
.01 .1  
 
* 
 
.01 .1  
 
* 
 
.01 .09 
 
* 
Age .   .01 
 
** 
 
.   .01 
 
*** .   .   
 
*** .   .   
 
*** 
Subjective Social Class .01 .08 
 
+ 
 
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
.01 .07 
 
** 
Urban .05 .21 
 
* 
 
.04 .2  
 
* 
 
.04 .19 
 
** 
 
.03 .16 
 
** 
Confidence in Gov't 
Institutions .02 .14 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  
Confidence in the 
Environmental Movement .01 .12 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Some Primary Education .03 .16 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Some Secondary 
Education .04 .19 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Completed Secondary 
Education .05 .21 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Some College Education .11 .33 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
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Completed College 
Education .14 .37 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
  Income .   .05 
 
** 
 
-- -- 
   
-- -- 
   
.   .05 
 
*** 
                    *** p < .001 
                   **p < .01 
                   * p < .05 
                   +  p < 0.1 
                   Religion Reference = "no religious preference" 
                Education Reference = "no formal education" 
                Level-1 N = 34,555 
                   Level-2 N = 27 
                   Data Sources: Level-1 data come from the 1999-2001 World Values Survey (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/). Level-2 data come from the 2000 Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/) and from the 2000 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) 
(http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/).  
Level-2 variance components indicate that Model 1 explains 84% of the level-2 variance, Model 3 explains 81% of the level-2 variance, and Model 4 explains 82% of 
the level-2 variance. 
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Figure 5.3: Graph of Predicted Values of Willingness to Sacrifice for Religious 
Affiliation by World-System Position Interaction 
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Figure 5.4: Graph of Predicted Values of Willingness to Sacrifice for Gender by World-
System Position Interaction 
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Figure 5.5: Graph of Predicted Values of Willingness to Sacrifice for Education by 
World-System Position Interaction 
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Figure 5.6: Graph of Predicted Values of Economic Tradeoffs for Religious Affiliation 
by World-System Position Interaction 
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Figure 5.7: Graph of Predicted Values of Economic Tradeoffs for Confidence in 
Government Institutions and Confidence in the Environmental Movement by World-
System Position Interaction 
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